My co-author, Yuval Feldman (Bar-Ilan), and I have just posted our article, Behavioral Versus Institutional Antecedents of Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An Experimental Approach, which reports on an empirical study we conducted designed to understand motivation and patterns of reporting illegality in institutional settings. I have been very fortunate to work with Yuval who is a law professor with a PhD in social psychology who is doing lots of interesting stuff on social norms, expressive law and the implications of behavioral studies on policy. Here is the abstract for our paper. Hot Download! We are working on several follow-up studies and we very much welcome input, comments and ideas:
Social enforcement, the decentralized action by organizational actors of monitoring, identifying, and reporting legal violations, is widely recognized as a key factor in ensuring good governance. This article reports on a study conducted in the United States and Israel examining the behavior of individuals when confronting unlawful conduct within their workplaces. The study provides novel insights into the relationships between state – based, organizational – based, and employee – based enforcement. It finds that the likelihood and the manner of reporting will vary depending on the type of illegality and is strongly correlated to perceptions of legitimacy, job security, and voice within the workplace. Comparing illegalities, employees prefer to report clear violations by rank – and – file employees rather than violations by managers. At the same time, external reporting to government or media entities is most likely when violations involve the organization as a whole or implicates top management. The study also finds cultural and gender differences in reporting patterns. Finally, the study demonstrates that social norms are more predictive of social enforcement than expected organizational costs.
Posted by Orly Lobel on November 30, 2007 at 05:22 PM