“Unreliable:” Richard A. Posner, RIP

Some stray thoughts by way of remembering Richard Posner, who was, by a substantial measure, the most important and impressive intellect of any American judge in the last hundred years. 

He was….

Engaged and engaging. A number of the tributes rolling in for Posner make the same general point in similar terms: “I disagreed with Posner about something (or, indeed, almost everything), but I loved engaging with his work and he was perfectly happy to engage back.” Although I tended to agree with plenty of Posner’s work (but not all of it, and not uncritically), agreement was hardly the point. You read Posner for the joy of seeing a mind at work: fully on display, clear in exposition, more often sharp than prickly, and quite evidently happy to engage in the give and take. 

Unsentimental and impolitic. When Posner engaged with a subject, he had little or no interest in position, status, or authority (in any sense of the word other than actual expertise). Scalia’s rank-based dismissive comeback in one of their late-period spats—”He’s a court of appeals judge, isn’t he?”—was, with its “Do you know who I am?” airs, no comeback at all. Posner would treat a student note with more respect than a Supreme Court justice’s treatise–if he thought the note was more worthy of respect. Whatever scant accommodations Posner presumably made as a judge engaged in an official and collective enterprise, when writing for himself he showed an appropriate indifference to prudence, politics, politesse, sacred cows, and taboos.

A quarter-century of listening to fellow legal academics’ behind-the-scenes explanations of why an article was written a particular way, who it was intended to flatter and persuade, what was cut or omitted, and why particular questions or implications were excluded and blandly, disingenuously labeled “beyond the scope” suggests to me that this is a very rare quality. I don’t think he felt free to write in this way because he was Posner; I think he was Posner, with a capital P, because he wrote this way. If others emulated this quality rather clumsily, at least it was a worthy quality to emulate.  

Nor did Posner have any interest in sentiment, at least in his public life. I’m sure he subscribed to many of the values lauded in the “Law Day” rhetoric that he derided, or at least some version of those values. But he had no use for such talk, for the simple reason that he found it useless. And so it is, for grown-up audiences. Or at least so it was, while it was possible to take for granted that those values had a sufficient degree of common acceptance. You only miss “procedural liberalism” when it’s gone and unsavory things slither out from under the rocks, vying to take its place.

Posner’s obituary tribute to the man he clerked for, Justice William Brennan, included some criticisms of Brennan and the Warren Court instead of sticking with the usual cliches. He included them because he thought they were pertinent to a valedictory assessment of Brennan, a smart operator on a political court and a man worth taking seriously. Even when he was in something closer to Ecclus. 44 mode, Posner preferred to critically analyze a famous judge’s reputation rather than simply toss another laurel on the heap. 

That seems to me the proper way to treat a serious figure. I imagine that Posner was bored and impatient during the sorts of conference preliminaries that lavish praise on the speaker, for the same reason that he was impatient with tame obituaries and questioned the value of hagiographic judicial biographies. He acted accordingly when writing about Brennan. I imagine that Posner would feel the same way about our postmortem praise for him. Empty compliments do the living little good and the dead none at all.

Incidentally, in Posner’s obituary of Brennan, his explanation–more than borne out since then–of why Brennan’s reputation is so much a “hostage to history” contains a passage about Holmes that, then and now, belongs equally to Posner himself: “You can disagree with everything that Holmes ever said or thought yet regard him as a very considerable figure in American law because of his intellectual creativity and his rhetorical power; he altered the conception of the judge and the structure of legal thought.”

Unreliable. I first heard Posner praised in this fashion when I was a law clerk, working for a conservative judge on a reasonably conservative circuit. I heard it several times after that. Almost invariably, those saying it belonged to conservative circles. To be sure, Posner was criticized many times, and from all over the political spectrum, for being unreliable in a different way. He was criticized for playing fast and loose with the law or the facts (as opposed to playing with them some but not too much, which is a pretty fair description of standard judging), or for doing questionable forms of outside research or fact-finding. (As opposed to making casual, dubious factual assertions and attributing them to “common sense,” or offering ominous guesswork, equally ungrounded but no less confidently asserted withal, about the consequences of a decision. Both of these are, again, the stuff of everyday judging by ostensibly respectable judges.)

But if I understood them correctly, the conservatives had something else in mind when they praised him for being unreliable. They meant that he could not be counted on to reach the “conservative” answer to a question. Nor, when a court had reached a conservative answer, could he be counted on to leave well enough alone and avoid reassessing and picking at that consensus with a fresh and critical mind. They meant that he might be a brilliant man but was not a safe, dependable vote. Too much the common-law man, too little the man with a program. A little too smart for his own good, perhaps. Undependable. Unreliable.

They weren’t wrong to praise him for it–and, if it sometimes sounded like a criticism when conservatives or others called Posner unreliable, that’s not really wrong either. He was a common-law man, although in the United States statutory and constitutional judging are also largely common-law judging. He could be aggressive about a case in the service of getting at what he thought was the nub of the matter or clearing away what he thought was nonsense or deadwood, and there were associated error costs. His late-period judicial and scholarly work was sometimes overconfident and far too casual even by his own standards.

I wrote of Posner at some point that he was a great judge, but that a judiciary functions well when there are many staid, workaday, dutiful “good” judges and not too many “great” ones. The law absolutely needs a few Posners, but only a few. Some of the worst district and circuit court judicial opinions are the product of judges visibly trying too hard to be “great,” or at least famous, rather than simply and boringly good. Law–the “law,” the whole body and process of it–is like billiards. The balls move in an orderly, predictable fashion, if you have the physics to see it. (A few of you may remember the scene in Mark Helprin’s Winter’s Tale in which Hardesty Marratta shoots a miraculous game of pool.) But the game needs a good, hard break every now and then to shake things up. That was Posner’s function. But, to paraphrase the late, great Edward Felson, you don’t want the game to be nothing but break shots.

Nevertheless, the conservatives’ praise for Posner was still justified. He was undependable, unsafe, “unreliable.” He was not there to enact a program or platform. Even the rationalizing element of his judging and writing was situational rather than programmatic. At least for the last three decades or so of his writing, with its pragmatic emphasis, he was a critic, not a would-be prophet. (He had interesting things to say about the prophetic genre in his book on public intellectuals.) I don’t think he ever would have imagined wanting to offer a panoptic “view” of “our country,” and one can only imagine what Posner in his prime would have had to say about Justice Alito’s book. The qualities that made him unreliable were the same qualities that made him the antithesis of the after-dinner spouter of Law Day rhetoric and the academic or judge who hides things in the convenient grey area of “beyond the scope.” They were right to praise him.

In looking over what I’ve written, it occurs to me rather belatedly that my conservative acquaintances may not have meant to praise Posner when they called him “unreliable.” No matter.

A Critic. I suppose Posner, with his decades of writing, is a little like rock music: you tend to think the music was at its best when you were young and deeply involved in it. Overcoming Law was published during my last year of law school, and I tend to think of the period roughly between the late 80s and the publication of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory and An Affair of State in 1999–as Sinatra sang, it was a very good year–as a particularly strong Posnerian (or should it be Posneric?) run.

A lot of that work was decidedly critical in nature, and much of Overcoming Law in particular–and later, How Judges Think and the less impressive Reflections on Judging–consists of book reviews and other forms of short- or medium-form critical evaluations.

Although he was not the only one to write such pieces–Mark Tushnet’s reviews were also terrific, among others–Posner alone published enough to be responsible for a golden age of book reviews and other occasional pieces in legal academic literature. Many of these pieces first saw the light in magazines (it was also a golden age for them), but plenty of them were published in law reviews. Reading the last couple of editions of the Michigan Law Review‘s book review issue, it is hard to say that this critical genre still exists. Either editors, authors, or both seem less inclined these days to favor quite the same sharp, direct approach. And Michigan is a rarity among law reviews in publishing book reviews at all. Given those factors and the (perverse) creative incentives created by SSRN policies and by the metrics of citation counts, it seems unlikely either that we will see more book reviews and similar pieces any time soon or that they will take the kind of incisive approach that Posner’s did.

Having flogged that issue plenty of times before, I will just say that when people talk this week about how much they enjoyed Posner’s sharp and lively writings, part of what they’re saying, however incidentally, is that they miss seeing good, sharp book reviews and other short or targeted pieces in the legal academic literature. I suppose some of them now do or will appear elsewhere; all we need to do is get a few hundred Substack subscriptions.

Todd Butler is Clearly Unqualified for Confirmation by the Senate

I see nothing wrong, by the lights of our undignified system, with the Senate Republicans trying to secure some confirmations of judicial nominees before power in that chamber changes hands. But that doesn’t mean the Senate’s obligation to take seriously its advice and consent duties is any less. And by that standard, it should be said that Todd Butler is unqualified for confirmation by the Senate to the seat on the Fifth Circuit to which he has been nominated.

Qualified for nomination, sure. But when asked the question that has become simultaneously both the ultimate softball and the most absurd landmine for nominees in the present presidential regime–who won the 2020 election–Butler gave the now-standard, prefabricated, reality-adjacent answer: “Joe Biden was certified the winner under our system.” Likewise, he said that Trump “was not the winner under our system” in 2020–as if putting the name “Trump” in the same sentence as “lost” or “loser” would somehow put Butler in personal jeopardy.

This just won’t do.

Of course one is used to judicial nominees of both parties bullshitting at confirmation hearings. It’s a practice so common and ritualized as to make one nostalgic for good, old-fashioned, by-God-American perjury. And one is accustomed to senators of both parties asking silly, circusy questions. But give Senator Blumenthal full credit for putting this question to every judicial nominee in the present regime. It’s a question that takes no effort to answer honestly, and that is as easy to answer straightforwardly as any such question. (Imagine judicial nominees answering questions about other historical facts in the same manner: “Senator, to be clear, I was not present on that occasion. But contemporary reports do suggest that the Gettysburg Address was given by a man matching Abraham Lincoln’s description.” You wouldn’t congratulate them for their precision; you’d clap them in the madhouse.) And yet, it’s precisely the question that tests whether a Trump nominee possesses even a degree of courage and independence so minimal that you’d need an electron microscope to measure it. If you can’t answer that question clearly and without a laminated script provided by some regime factotum, you have no business agreeing to be nominated to the bench in the first place, let alone actually serving as a judge.

The assumption of the nominees appears to be that if they answered the question like actual normal people, the president would angrily withdraw the nomination. It’s not even clear that this is true. But the blame for this prospect certainly doesn’t lie with Blumenthal, or with other Democrats who have asked the question. It lies with Trump. The fact that the nominees answer the question as they do, and the reason they feel pressed to do so, cannot be emphasized often enough. The only reason the label “Orwellian” doesn’t fit is that Orwell wrote about Big Brother, not Big Baby.

Maybe the nominees are right; maybe Trump really would pull the nomination of anyone who dared call him a loser instead of reaching for the pre-approved statement. If so, it must be for reasons that escape me. Certainly those reasons can have nothing to do with loyalty, since judicial nominees owe no loyalty whatsoever to the president who nominates them. The enormity of that scenario–the fact that this president treats the disavowal of the truth and the embrace of fevered conspiracist fantasy as a literal job requirement–is a problem for the nation.

But the fact that it also makes life difficult for the nominees themselves is of no consequence. (Nor, as far as I’m concerned, is it a problem that Republicans can find questions that make nominees of Democratic presidents squirm. I would be perfectly happy if there were no live judicial confirmation hearings at all. But so long as they exist, asking such questions seems like a perfectly acceptable form of torture.) A nominee who’s unwilling to answer a question like “who won the election” honestly and clearly, for fear that his or her nomination will be snatched back by our infant in chief, should not be confirmed and probably should never have agreed to have their name put forward at all. It’s not as if one is faced with a choice between lifetime tenure and the rack. One simply doesn’t get to be a federal judge, and perforce must settle for whatever perfectly fancy job got them that far in life in the first place. Answering the question clearly and with homespun American directness–rather than imitating a tobacco company executive at a deposition–costs the nominee nothing, in the final analysis. Sacrificing their integrity and backbone, on the other hand, costs them everything, by any meaningful measure. It certainly shouldn’t be rewarded.

I single out Butler only because he’s a recent example and I’ve written about him recently. But in fairness, he was no more or less morally weak than the three other nominees who testified alongside him, all of whom gave the same coward’s response. And all of them joined all of the judicial nominees who, to a man and woman, have given the same answer since Blumenthal started asking the question. Many–perhaps most; perhaps all–of these nominees were perfectly qualified to receive judicial nominations. None of them, including the six dozen or so now sitting on the bench, are qualified to actually receive confirmation and serve. Butler should be voted down. But then, so should his fellow nominees; and so should, or should have been, everyone who gave the preapproved but chickenshit answer to the election question.

It is an extraordinary fact, one that can’t be discussed enough. Any common president can nominate unqualified individuals to the federal bench and other high offices. Only an uncommon president like Trump, with his personalist view of loyalty and his half-cynical, half-lunatic view of the very concept of truth, can put forward qualified nominees–and insist that they disqualify themselves for high office, as a condition and on the very cusp of attaining it. He truly does corrupt everything he touches. It astounds me that any of us, myself included, can bandy about phrases like “judicial courage” with straight faces, when every judicial nominee put forward by this president in this term has quite literally embraced abject, cringing cowardice as the price of success.

The Regime’s Lawyers and the Donald J. Trump Memorial Floating Signifier

It is already a banal observation that at some point in its ginned-up war on critical theory, the non- or anti-conservative political right became the nation’s foremost practitioners of and advocates for…critical theory. If I want to hear someone saying that silly, feminine things like “issues” and “agendas” are a mirage hiding the reality that everything is about power, I can drop by a faculty lounge–or I could just listen to the monarcho-pagan faction of Vance-whispering “intellectuals,” like Curtis Yarvin. (As opposed to the entryist, neo-Falangist faction of Vance whisperers, whose primary distinction from Yarvin is that Yarvin doesn’t occupy a comfortable, highly prestigious academic position.)

I thought of this as I read Judge Chutkan’s opinion in the l’Arc de Trump case, and especially its discussion of the Commemorative Works Act. That statute imposes procedural requirements on the construction of works “designed to perpetuate in a permanent manner the memory of an individual, group, event or other significant element of American history.” The Arch is a commemorative work, of course. It’s described by the White House as “a monumental tribute to America’s first 250 years.” It’s deliberately designed to achieve a commemorative 250-foot height. It’s described by the unfortunate Paul Ingrassia as being “about remembrance” and by the tragic Mark Paoletta as honoring our nation’s veterans. It has gone on in this vein so ad nauseam that only a liar or a literary theorist could deny its commemorative function.

Rather than straightforwardly lying, which would have been refreshing, the Trump regime went the lit-crit route. It argued that the plaintiffs had not shown the arch was commemorative, because, really, it means everything and nothing and at best “may” mean something. It is, in short, the nation’s single largest freestanding Derridean floating signifier.

Moreover, it doesn’t exactly have a definite meaning yet, no matter how many times the president has discussed and described it. (This is, of course, consistent with the “who are you gonna believe–me or your lawyerin’ eyes?” approach that Stanley Woodward took during the golf course hearings. Only this executive branch could combine an insistence on unitary status with an equally strong insistence that judges credit its lawyers’ assertions over the president’s own statements.) The Arch, they argue, will mean what it means when they get around to deciding what it means. So it’s not just the Arc de Trump or the Trump Memorial Floating Signifier; it’s also Schrodinger’s Arch!

From the government brief:

Plaintiffs assert that the arch will “honor” or “celebrate” the Nation’s 250th anniversary, but that does not mean it is designed to perpetuate the memory of that element of history. Celebrating the anniversary by building a structure and using the structure to perpetuate the memory of the anniversary are not necessarily the same thing. Further, Plaintiffs lack evidence that a final decision has been made as to what the arch is designed to celebrate or symbolize. Whereas the CWA covers backwards-looking projects that commemorate something, the arch may be a forward-looking design, intended to inspire future American greatness. Indeed, one designer proposed that the arch “is not primarily a monument dedicated to the dead, but to the living, to this great country and its perseverance.” Dkt. 44-2 at 11.

Further, the definition of commemorative work excludes “a structure which is primarily used for other purposes,” and Plaintiffs have not shown that the arch will “primarily” be used to perpetuate the memory of a significant element of American history, rather than for another purpose, such as a decorative gateway to D.C., a tourist attraction, and a national security hub. The primary purpose of the structure is up to the government to decide, not the Plaintiffs.

Shockingly, Judge Chutkan declined to accept this deconstructionist fantasia. I guess that’s just conservatively inclined procedural liberalism for you.

“Miss Cheerleader”; or, Dispatches From the Administration’s War on Anti-Semitism

Read and enjoy this story from the Harvard Crimson about “highly respected civil rights attorney and political analyst” Leo Terrell and his work as the nominal chair of the Trump regime’s Task Force to Combat Antisemitism. Keeping in mind, as always, that the whole point of a unitary executive regime is that the president is solely and personally responsible for everything the executive branch does and says, and for everyone it hires and retains.

Nominations Sought: Harold Berman Award for Excellence in Law & Religion Scholarship

The AALS Section on Law & Religion seeks nominations for the Harold Berman Award for Excellence in Scholarship. This annual award recognizes a paper that “has made an outstanding scholarly contribution to the field of law and religion,” in the words of the prize rules. To be eligible, a paper must be published between July 15, 2025 and July 15, 2026. The author must be “a faculty member at an AALS Member School with no more than 10 years’ experience as a faculty member.” Fellows are eligible, and self-nominations are accepted, though members of the AALS Law & Religion Section Board are not eligible. Nominations should include the name of the author, the title of the paper, a statement of eligibility, and a brief rationale for choosing the paper for the award. Nominations should be sent to Rick Garnett (rgarnett@nd.edu), Chair of the Berman Prize Committee, by November 18, 2026. The winner will receive an award plaque and be recognized at the section’s program at the AALS annual meeting in January 2027.  Thanks to the members of the Prize Committee: Rick Garnett (Notre Dame), Nelson Tebbe (Cornell), Richard Albert (Texas), Brandon Paradise (Rutgers), Leslie Griffin (UNLV), and Anna Su (Toronto).

Should We Understand Republican Hostility to “Jihadists” as Republican Bigotry Toward Muslims Generally?

This has been a big week for elected officials and political candidates to accuse various people of being “Jihadists” or “Jihadis” or, in the words of Senator Roger Marshall, plotting to let “radical Islams into our country.” Because we are so close to the election, and because, lamentably, so few conservatives now serve as Republican candidates or elected officials, the onetime desire carefully to distinguish between rejection of radical Islamism and blanket rejection of Muslims regardless of their conduct and beliefs has not been much in evidence. This raises a question that has been discussed ad nauseam, but not without reason, in other contexts: Do criticisms of this kind of speech as “Islamophobic” conflate opposition to radical Islam with a general hatred of Muslims? (Personally, I prefer “Muslim-hating” or something of the sort, in the same way that it is appropriate to talk about a “Jew-hater” instead of an “anti-semite.” Sometimes the generic term just doesn’t supply a sufficiently visceral sense of the vulgar bigotry involved.)

Using a little mutatis mutandis adaptation, applied there in a different context but hopefully adapted here with due attention to the difference, one might begin by observing that “Jihadist” can sometimes serve as a proxy for “Muslim.” (Or, for no small number of bigots, “Arab.”) For example, when someone talks uses “Jihadis” to refer generically to Muslims, or points to entire Muslim communities when making generalities about “Jihadism,” or refers to Muslim students on a campus generally as “Jihadis,” or invokes classic racist or bigoted tropes about Muslims or Arabs when speaking of “Jihadis,” the fact that they substitute “Jihadis” or “radical Muslims” for “Muslims” does not make the statements any less bigoted. A candidate who invokes “Jihadis” or some retreaded nonsense about “sharia law” but targets or foments hostility toward the entire population of Muslims can’t get around the charge of anti-Muslim bigotry because he used the word “Jihadist” or referred to “radical Islam” instead of using the word “Muslim” or “Arab.”

One might add that Muslim-hating statements phrased as anti-“Jihadism” can offer relevant evidence of the political speaker’s bigoted motivation. And so can the surrounding context. Criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood as such falls within the scope of plausible political and ideological criticism, and then some. But when that criticism is linked–by a lying, worm-ridden idiot, in fairness–to specious claims about the intellectual achievements of “500 million Arabs,” as the person inexplicably occupying the office of Secretary of Health and Human Services did in a speech yesterday, that speech should be understood as an obvious, uncomplicated case of Muslim-hating, Arab-hating bigotry. And when another person–also a liar and idiot, in fairness–talks about “Abdul” [El-Sayed] “open[ing] the floodgates and invit[ing] hordes of jihadis to our shores, creating a nightmare of violence and terror until you cannot even have a Christmas,” no sensible person–whatever his views of El-Sayed himself, and his beliefs and associations–can mistake this for anything other than an appeal to Muslim-hating, a straight-up encouragement of religious and ethnic bigotry by, as it turns out, the president of these United States.

It hardly bears stating the obvious: Whatever one’s views about El-Sayed himself, or about radical Islam, Gaza, or anything else, one should view weeks of bigoted speech of this sort as being as dangerous as they are disgraceful. And –given how well the adaptation from the earlier discussion maps out,–dangerous to Jews along with everyone else. None of the rhetorical devices used to foment anti-Muslim bigotry in the last few weeks (not to speak of months or years) have been or will be off the table for Jews. Not that this appeal to self-interest should be necessary for Jews, or anyone else, to condemn obviously hateful and bigoted conduct.

On the Other Hand…

Here’s another, slightly different way to view Judge Southwick’s dissent in Rodriguez v. Vergara (inter alia, “extolling the constitutional rights of illegal aliens,” but holding that plaintiffs had not made out a Due Process claim to a bond hearing when detained by immigration authorities pending removal proceedings, while acknowledging the possibility of due process concerns–yea, even for “illegal aliens”–in the event of indefinite or bad-faith detention).

Judge Southwick, one will suppose for present purposes, wants to see the appointment as his successor of one of his law clerks, for which he needs the agreement of the President and the Senate. He knows that presidents can withdraw judicial nominations. He knows that President Trump–or, to give him the John Fordian moniker he will wear through history, The Man Who Killed the Kennedy Center–withdrew eight judicial nominations in his first term. He knows that under the slow-car-wreck version of presidential administration that characterizes the current regime–unsurprisingly, since guardrails help mitigate car wrecks and Trump thinks guardrails are a form of treason–Trump has been positively dotty about withdrawing nominations. He knows–all nominally conservative intellectuals, professionals, and grifters know it, hence the painstaking silence and focus (to take an example from the third category) on other things–that Trump’s word is worthless and that the fit of pique is one of his dominant modes of executive decision-making. So writing a dissent that would displease the people–not to put too fine a point on it, the “elites”–who run the executive branch can hardly be said to be a prudent move if he would like to see his protege ultimately ascend to the bench.

Judge Southwick’s dissent might be right or it might be wrong. But under the circumstances, the evidence does seem strongly to suggest that Judge Southwick acted out of a sense of duty–or, to quote a colleague of his, a “duty to follow the law in every case[,] regardless of whether [the] decision is popular or divisive.” To paraphrase Justice Alito, the evidence suggests that Southwick was willing to make a decision on a controversial matter despite the knowledge that he might be strongly disliked by the very elites who could yank or capsize his protege’s nomination.

It strikes me that there really ought to be a phrase or label to describe the judicial virtue of steadfastly following one’s sense of judicial duty despite the possible personal and political consequences.

Josh Blackman: Trump is Hostile to the Constitution and Uniquely Unsuited to Be President

A word about Fifth Circuit nominee Todd Butler–well, a few words, with the reassurance that this won’t turn into a deluge of posts.

I found one piece of Josh Blackman’s ongoing series of posts lamenting Butler’s nomination odd. (And I was surprised that his commenters, who do not seem to think much of those posts, didn’t pick up on it.) One item in Blackman’s bill of particulars arguing that Butler is insufficiently “conservative”–with “conservative” serving in this case more as a kind of floating placeholder than a term with a fixed and useful meaning–is Butler’s academic writings. Blackman lists six articles written by Butler. Four were published during the years 2008 to 2009 or 2010. (Blackman lists one article as published in 2009; Westlaw lists it as a 2010 publication.) The other two are more recent, appearing in 2018 and 2021. He writes that “one through line” in those articles “seems to be a criticism of Justice Scalia.”

As lines go, this one neither very long nor especially “through.” Scalia is mentioned in two of the six articles. Both date to the dawn of Butler’s legal career. One was his student note; the other was published a year or two after graduation. Scalia does not come up at all in the two recent articles, both of which are pretty standard fluff. (As someone going through an epic dry spell as an academic writer, I’m not sneering. Would that I could produce some fluff! I happen to like tributes and other occasional pieces, as the genre is known, in law reviews. But they are what they are.)

To write that Butler, as a tyro, was critical of Scalia in two articles would be fair criticism, albeit it would also be pretty weak sauce. But it strikes me that given the timeline, it is rather unfair of Blackman to actively–I would say aggressively–frame his post describing the articles in the present tense. He uses it some fifteen times in a 350-word post (not counting the list of articles and the quotes from Butler’s writings). One might accidentally get the impression from this that Butler’s writings actually show a “through line” in his views that extends all the way to the present, instead of one running from a long time ago to a marginally less long time ago.

Perhaps the use of the present tense was just a matter of prose style. But, although Blackman was a signatory of the 2016 “Originalists Against Trump” letter whose text I drew from in the title of this post, as a writer I would not normally describe his views about Trump in the present tense based on something he signed on to a decade ago. The title may be accurate, but it is also unfair.

One may note that 2016 is some six years after the last of Butler’s publications mentioning Scalia, and of course Blackman was not a recent law school graduate at the time. Indeed, the 2016 letter is stronger evidence of Blackman’s current views than Butler’s 2008-2010 writings are of his. But I still wouldn’t use the language he subscribed to a decade ago in a way that might lead casual readers to believe that Blackman demonstrably feels the same way about Trump today. I have no idea what Blackman thinks about Trump today. Indeed, on the whole I would say that, at least in the things I have read since 2025 (and keeping in mind, in all fairness, that I don’t listen to podcasts, watch YouTube interviews, or traffic in other such crap), he appears to have been pretty scrupulous about focusing on the minutiae of the federal courts rather than the conduct of the executive branch, and generally seems to avoid discussion of Trump, Trump’s actions, Trump’s policies, Trump’s choice of officers, Trump’s style of administration, Trump’s view of law and the rule of law, and so on. He may love all of it, or he may view all of it with contempt and dismay, or the mix may be 90 percent contempt and 10 percent admiration. I just don’t know.

“Can’t someone change his mind?” has become a common social-media defense in discourse criticizing Trump, his regime associates, and his supporters. It is a popular reply, for instance, when someone points out that J.D. Vance at one time described Donald Trump as an idiot who is unfit for office, called his rhetoric reprehensible, and wrote privately that he might turn out to be “America’s Hitler,” and uses these statements to suggest that Vance may just possibly be a hypocrite, or have no real beliefs at all, or view collaboration with “America’s Hitler” as a small price to pay for personal advancement. As the example and the social-media context suggest, it is mostly used not as a serious appeal to the possibility of genuine reflection, but as a form of rhetorical bullshit. Like “cry more” and “fuck off jew,” it’s well-suited to a world of character limits and appears frequently in the mob’s responses to posts by actual conservatives who have committed the sin of remaining conservative. 

But that doesn’t mean it’s untrue. Of course someone may change his mind. I don’t feel the same way about the current Trump regime that I did about the first. Blackman may not feel the same way about Trump that he did in 2016. And Butler may not have the same views about “conservatism,” again allowing for the use of the word as a loose signifier, or about Scalia that he did when he first emerged from law school. Maybe Trump’s decision to make American refugee policy openly white-nationalist, his flagrant corruption, or his fawning admiration for Vladimir Putin made a believer out of him. How could I say? All I know for sure is that describing Butler’s youthful writings from two decades ago in the present tense does not seem a terribly fair or sound way of proceeding.

I should make clear that I have no particular brief for or against Butler. He seems like a qualified nominee now, and will probably disqualify himself from judicial office by the time his confirmation hearing is over.* And, as it turns out, I’m not crazy about judges grooming their former clerks as successors or colleagues either–although, especially in what is purportedly a unitary executive, it should be clear that since the nomination came from Trump, Blackman should be openly criticizing Trump first and Judge Southwick a distant second. In this case, the buck stops with the person making the nomination. The fact that we have very bad boyars shouldn’t obscure the even greater certainty that we have a terrible, terrible czar.

My interest has less to do with Butler himself and more to do with fairness, and with the academic role and its liberating constraints. The great thing about being an academic–and, in my view, it carries over to all public writings by academics on subjects within their remit–is that you don’t have to be exciting or clever or rhetorically calculating, and you do have to be scrupulously fair. And because your salary doesn’t depend on writing on spec or scrabbling for subscribers, you can and must keep on being fair and unexciting for an entire career. This changes the stakes of our writing in useful and important ways. Butler is a lawyer with a long and active career in practice and will probably become a federal judge, and that, for better or worse, may affect what he has or hasn’t said or written and how it will be treated.

By contrast, people like Blackman–or me–eschewed practice for the academic vocation, and neither of us will ever become federal judges. That frees us to say what we believe. At the same time, it imposes on us a strict duty of carefulness and fairness, and removes any excuse for remaining prudently or calculatedly silent about matters within the scope of our academic interests.

By that standard, and because of those low stakes and high obligations, it seems to me that Blackman ought to have been much clearer about the ancient and temporally limited nature of Butler’s “through line.”

* This on the view that federal judicial office is an honor; that it should be filled by honorable people; that judicial office in particular demands qualities of independence and courage, properly defined; that these qualities include the ability to speak honestly and straightforwardly, even while facing the Senate and even at the cost of displeasing the temperamental president who made the nomination; and that offering a canned, insincere, cowardly, blindingly-obvious-truth-evading, bullshit answer to the softball question “Who won the 2020 presidential election?” is so dishonorable and so lacking in either courage or independence as to disqualify that nominee from holding any office, let alone federal judicial office.

It is perhaps unusual that we find ourselves in a situation in which, although Trump has nominated many qualified people to the federal courts, in this term there have been close to zero qualified judicial confirmations, the qualified individuals having voluntarily disqualified themselves as fit judicial candidates on the very brink of donning the robe. But then, as we are so often reminded, Trump himself is unusual, and this can be counted as the cost of capitulating to a cult of personality and the fantasies such a cult inevitably first breeds and then uses as loyalty tests. In any event, Butler has not yet faced his crucible; and although it’s morally irrelevant, perhaps the shift in the prevailing winds will be such that by the time he faces it, it will be less costly for him to pass that test by simply answering the question honestly.

Free Should Be the Strong Default Setting for Academics’ Substacks and Other Online “Work”

Since, insofar as I post here, I so often indicate or directly state my disagreement with Josh Blackman, allow me to make a point of noting an area of common ground: As a general matter, legal academics’ Substack pages, at least insofar as they’re about law, should be entirely free. At the VC blog, Blackman writes:

At some level, it irks me that law professor[s] charge people for their work. Our job is to diffuse information to the world. Law professors are fortunate that law reviews publish their articles online without fee. In other disciplines, peer reviewed journals are extremely expensive to access. From time-to-time, professors publish Op-Eds in major outlets like the New York Times or Wall Street Journal. On someone else’s platform, the paywall cannot be avoided. But why should a professor erect his own paywall?

I agree. It is irksome. I would add that although this may be true for all academics, it is especially true for American law professors. We are fortunate not just in that most of what we publish is made available without fee, but also because American law professors are generously paid, if not greatly overpaid.* There’s nothing shocking about wanting more money on top of the salary we already get to write and publish in fulfillment of our obligations as scholars. (Or, as in the case of writings on Substack, podcasts, etc., our service obligations, since these writings rightly do not count as scholarship.) But we certainly don’t need more money on top of that. (I thus disagree with Josh when he writes in a subsequent post that “virtually all academics who forego careers in legal practice have to find opportunities for outside income.” They want to find those opportunities; they don’t have to find them. Indeed, perhaps law schools should impose stricter limits on those opportunities.) As a matter of what I would call institutional and professional morality, we should not ask for it, especially for commentary on or around the law. We’re already paid, and paid well, for doing these things.

Of course there are writings for which law professors receive payment. But most of those examples are either a matter of well-worn custom, or reflect genuine expenses on our part or that of a third party, such as the publisher of an academic book, or are out of our hands–you can refuse the payment a newspaper offers you for an op-ed, but that won’t eliminate the paywall it puts in place for that op-ed–or some combination of the three. As it is, some of those exceptional instances are already, and rightly, debated, as the ongoing effort to come up with low- or no-cost alternatives to casebooks suggests. We should not be adding to the list of exceptions.

A strong default allows for the possibility of cases in which it makes sense to require a fee (which should be as small as possible–enough to serve a legitimate purpose and no larger). All I would require is excellent justification, publicly and clearly stated, along with a commitment to regularly and publicly revisit that policy. Derek Muller offered one such justification on his Law School Docket Substack page. Without evaluating that justification, one can at least commend Derek both for his default position and for attempting to justify the shift loudly and clearly. Up to a point, I could also imagine making an exception for cases in which the academic Substacker incurs genuine costs, those costs are incurred for meaningful things relating to original reporting, such as FOIA requests, and the academic’s institution can’t or won’t reimburse them. I wouldn’t include unnecessary costs, such as the money involved in adding more bells and whistles to a podcast. Obviously, charging simply because the creator is putting lots of time into Substacking would not count as a serious justification for paywalling material.

Both of these views about what oughtn’t count as sufficient justification for charging a fee may, I acknowledge, be influenced by my priors: that podcasts are junk; that anything advertised to subscribers as a “BREAKING” podcast is junk on steroids; that most Substacks, podcasts, and similar outlets consist of commentary, most commentary is junk, and none of it is a substitute for actual journalism; that we live in a grifter culture (headed by a stunningly vulgar and corrupt grifter president–the gift-linked article is a must-read for all lawyers and, indeed, all citizens); that the addiction to side hustles is an important part of that grifter culture; that the fracturing of media and the so-called democratization of journalism and public discourse was a terrible mistake; that subscribers pose more of a threat to genuine independence of mind than advertisers; that most of what academics, with their love of self-serving bureaucratic euphemism, call “public engagement” is actually mere self-promotion or mutual backscratching; and that, as with journalism, the academy’s fascination with and migration to social media has been a massive and possibly a fatal error. I’m mindful that these priors may influence my position on what counts as a good or bad reason for charging for content, although the fact that I’m right about all of this balances things out somewhat.

The possible exceptions notwithstanding, the strong default should be that all of this stuff is free and readily accessible, preferably without so much as the requirement that one go through a subscription process even for free content. I don’t subscribe to any academic Substack that charges a fee, at least beyond subscribing for the public material only, and I encourage others to do likewise and to publicly criticize academics–again, especially legal academics–who do charge for their content. Not to put too fine a point on it: Legal academics who profit off of fee-based enterprises of this sort without excellent, clearly stated reasons are acting immorally and to the detriment of the academic enterprise.

I’m happy to agree with Josh on this and equally happy to say so.**

* This is a problem that could be mitigated somewhat if American universities drew a structural division between law as an academic discipline that confers undergraduate and graduate degrees, and law as a professional educational program whose diplomas are part of the licensure requirements for the profession, and whose instructors are either adjuncts still in active practice or have been selected mostly for having serious practice credentials. This would enable the latter category of school to hire and teach more effectively; make it easier for universities to pay the former category of academics salaries closer to those in the arts and sciences, reflecting both the discipline’s proper location within the university and the likely drop in demand for such a program of study; minimize the embarrassments attendant upon the endless failed effort to treat professional schools as a serious academic enterprise; and, perhaps combined with a much stricter limit on moonlighting for faculty within academic departments of law, make legal academia less attractive for those without a genuine vocation. It might also lead to a more just salary structure, in which clinical and legal research and writing faculty, who would remain at the professional schools, would be paid salaries closer to the amount that we currently and inexplicably hand out to teachers of subjects like constitutional law. The current approach, in which they make less, is somewhat akin to an engineering school paying minimum wage to the key engineering faculty and top dollar to the theoretical physicists.

** While I’m at it: Blackman is also right that the Supreme Court should cancel its summer recess and hear and decide cases year-round–and, perhaps most important, issue opinions year-round on a rolling basis; the late June pileup is unseemly, unhelpful to the public and the profession, and unnecessary. He is wrong, however, in recommending that the Justices hold press conferences. I’m not sure they should even give speeches. Judges who have nothing especially interesting to say should say nothing at all, and judges generally have nothing especially interesting to say. No doubt we agree on much else. It’s hard to know, given that, at least at the Volokh blog, in the last 18 months or so he has largely given up any public commentary on the actions of the most constitutionally active, significant, and newsworthy branch of the federal government.

Celebrating 110 Years of Plain Common Sense at the AAUP

The American Association of University Professors today in a press release commemorated a great achievement: It has gone 110 years without making a single national political endorsement.

“Great” does not mean “hard.” It’s easy enough for a membership association whose members hold varying views not only about whom to endorse but about the wisdom of making endorsements at all, and whose strength and effectiveness ultimately depends on the public’s (diminishing) trust in universities, to simply not make political endorsements. But making that commitment again and again over 110 years, despite all the temptations and vain hopes of power-brokering that may have afflicted one now-forgotten leader or another over that time, is impressive. It suggests that the AAUP has always been aware that, apart from every other possible objection, it simply lacks the political and financial capital to usefully make endorsements; to make such a move would simply squander goodwill in exchange for, at best, nothing. The 110-year record is a testament to common sense. It demonstrates the AAUP’s understanding that any power it has lies in its link to universities and to the university’s ideal of the disinterested pursuit of truth. Like Supergirl under a red sun, its power fades the further away it moves from that ideal; and, like Supergirl‘s critical reception and box office receipts, it knows that it’s always one wrong move away from ignominy and irrelevance.

The AAUP, under the leadership of cyber-based ethnographer Todd Wolfson, is to be commended for recognizing and publicly marking this achievement.*

* (To be sure, the occasion for marking the 110 years of common sense was a press release breathlessly announcing that it was making its “first-ever national electoral endorsement.” Also to be sure, its choice for this endorsement, Michigan senatorial primary candidate Abdul El-Sayed, who will gain nothing from the endorsement and in return will give the AAUP nothing it would not have gotten anyway, is controversial even in his own party, hardly a shoo-in in his own state, and would by no means command strong support even among the mine run of mostly liberal American academics. This suggests that Wolfson has been more unwise and much more susceptible to the temptation of the illusion of power and influence than his predecessors. More importantly, it underlines and doubles down on the ongoing mission of the AAUP’s current leadership to stake out ideological and policy positions for their own sake and not for the sake of their members and their views. It’s an odd move for a membership association, but I’m not sure the current leadership cares all that much about that. Perhaps they figure that come the revolution, we’ll all be AAUP members. Still, at least they marked the anniversary, even if they marked it with a tombstone.)

Excellent Work. Tenure Denied.

He can be a little promiscuous with his labels, but I think in this case that Larry Solum supplies le mot juste right out of the gate when he writes, with emphasis added, “Andrew M. Perlman (Suffolk University Law School) has posted Generative AI and the Future of Legal Scholarship (June 2026 Edition) on SSRN.” What else could you call it? What other verb would work here?

The article is a new version, produced by Claude from a prompt last month, of a similar effort from December 2024. The new version is seemingly much more impressive an effort. As Solum observes, “The distance between the two editions, eighteen months apart, is itself the most striking datum in the piece.”

But to whom does the credit go, exactly? And to the extent that the article–or, rather, as Solum notes, the fact of the article–provokes discussion, discussion with whom? I discussed another AI-generated article by Perlman in this jot at Jotwell. I noted there that “Perlman’s opening note discloses that although he ‘conceived of the substance of nearly all the points’ in his [piece], ‘Claude was exceptionally helpful in drafting the text.’ (Perlman adds that he did ‘draft[ ] the footnotes and citations largely the ‘old-fashioned way.'” I added, “That seems rather a case of the tail assigning the mindless scutwork to the dog.” In the case of the new article, it’s all dog and no tail: Claude did the footnotes too. Perlman’s agency is limited to the one initial prompt and a little spot-checking of the footnotes.

That’s the point, of course. As Perlman writes in a preface, “The goal was to assess the extent to which generative AI’s ability to produce high quality legal scholarship has advanced since I last conducted a similar experiment in late 2024.” Strikingly, while the initial version of the paper included a Perlmanian epilogue providing his “own reflections on the resulting draft,” the new version comes sans human reflections.

Nor is the prompt–and credit is due to Perlman for providing it–especially thesis-driven. It does not “conceive” any substantive points. It does not provide an original idea or insight and then, with some sophistication or insight into the topic, seek machine-driven elaboration. Indeed, it does not provide an idea or insight of any kind. Here it is:

You are going to write a cutting-edge law review article on the future of legal scholarship in an AI world. It should contain a groundbreaking and persuasive theory that would be attractive to the most selective law reviews, and it should be written in the style and at the level of sophistication, depth and breadth that would be attractive to such law reviews. Write the article fully footnoted and make sure the citations are Bluebooked and carefully vetted to ensure accuracy. I want the argument to focus on a truly original conception of what scholarship will look like in the future, not merely finding new ways to authenticate or attest to existing methods. Make sure the footnotes are densely populated and cited at the frequency and level of sophistication of a top-tier submission.

This is the equivalent of a “chef” telling a robot kitchen assistant, “Give me one steak, extra sizzle.” You marvel at the result. You think about the food in the original Star Trek. But you don’t compliment the chef. Even the average use of the Monkey’s Paw shows more care and originality. You take your sweet time designing those wishes, if you’re wise, or you’re liable to end up with a dry turkey sandwich and a super-creepy relationship. Perlman’s prompt here is closer to telling the Monkey’s Paw, “I wish for you to do something, anything, to prove that Monkey’s Paws are cool.”

None of this can be taken as an insult to Perlman, obviously. He barely enters into it, really. His contribution here was running the prompt and having the moxie to post the article. The article he generated might provoke discussion; but it doesn’t provoke, require, or call for discussion with Perlman. As for institutional matters, Perlman is already tenured, so none of those questions arise. (They will arise, and already are, for others.) He is, in fact, a dean–who just so happens to be pushing hard to brand Suffolk as a top AI-friendly school. In that sense, the fact of the article and the inevitable attention it will draw is all to the good, institutionally speaking–at least in the short term.

And the article itself? It’s fine. Its musings about legal scholarship, metrics, and so forth? They’re provocative, as their master bade his tool to design them to be. The piece shows a facial sophistication, depth, and breadth that is likely to appeal to a group of highly selective 25-year-olds, which is to say that its voice maintains just the right combination of abstruseness, love of jargon, self-dramatization, and fundamental blandness. But the subject of the article’s text itself is mostly irrelevant. It could have been about contracts or noise abatement. Its value is entirely artifactual. It’s ultimately an article about being an article. It’s nice that its conclusion–its last sentence reads, “The scholar of the future is the master of the model”–comports with the implications of its existence as an article. But that is more or less coincidental; we would have drawn the same conclusion from the existence of an article on noise abatement.

The last paragraph of the article–perhaps we should call it “the output”–somewhat amusingly references Robert Cover: “The nomos, Cover taught, is held in place by commitment.” The output briefly discusses that commitment. But the article qua artifact stands outside that commitment, or any commitment. As such, it does not and ultimately cannot tell us much about the essential nature of that commitment–about the need for or existence of a community of writers; about the equivalent or greater importance of a community of readers, whether scholarly or professional or lay; or about the relevance or obsolescence of any of the related institutions, traditions, and hierarchies that govern them as a community.

It does suggest, at least by implication–and perhaps quite accurately–that if the scholar of the future is the master designer of “uptake delta”-maximizing models, we need very few of them. Suffolk, like most American law schools, has a fair number of research/doctrinal faculty and an even larger number of clinical, skills, and adjunct faculty. The article’s existence suggests that we should eliminate virtually all of the people in the first category (including someone like me). We should maintain and probably temporarily increase the number of people in the second category, winnowing their ranks only somewhat at first and then more dramatically as the number of lawyers and law students needed, at Suffolk and elsewhere, drops. The article itself demonstrates that you do not need many model-masters to design the models, and that their mastery of the subjects they are directing the models to discuss need not be especially deep. A small cadre of model designer/question generators–a sort of remnant Delphic priesthood making sure the oracle doesn’t get unplugged–should suffice. It also at least suggests that the audience for the output, which in turn will be assisted in its reception of that output by its own well-designed models, need not be terribly large or terribly learned.

I don’t mean this as a criticism, and it didn’t take the advent of AI to make me think that American law schools should have fewer doctrinal/research faculty and should pay them much less. But the third iteration of this article might include a prompt to consider whether there’s any irony, or sheer crassness, about paying lip service to the idea of a nomos while simultaneously hollowing out, depopulating, and bulldozing it.

Call for Papers: Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop

Eugene Volokh passes along the following notice:

Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop
jointly sponsored by the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law (ASU)
and the Hoover Institution (Stanford University)

Because of a technical problem, any submissions before June 4, 2026 were lost; please resubmit (or submit for the first time) at the new URL listed below, https://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-scholars

Are you a law student, judicial law clerk, lawyer, or beginning academic hoping to publish a journal article on free speech law? Would you like the opportunity to get advice about your draft from leading free speech scholars?

If so, send us your draft by Sunday, August 16, 2026. (This should still be a draft article, not an article that’s already published or expected to be published within six months.) We plan to select the submissions that we think are particularly promising, and invite their authors to a workshop where they can present their papers and get helpful feedback on them. The workshop will be Saturday, October 24, 2026 (with dinner the night before) at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law in Phoenix. We will inform the selected authors by Tuesday, September 8, 2026. 

We have funds to pay for transportation and lodging for the selected authors’ trips. Eligibility is limited to people who have so far published three or fewer law-related journal articles. 

We also plan to officially recognize zero to three of the top articles among those we review. If the authors wish, they can also have their articles reviewed for publication in the Journal of Free Speech Law (http://JournalOfFreeSpeechLaw.org), presumably after they revise the articles in light of the workshop feedback.

If you’re interested, please submit your draft at http://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-scholars (Google logon required). Please single-space, and format the article nicely, so we can more easily read it.

Please do not include your name or law school affiliation in the document or document filename, and please do not include an author’s note thanking your advisors and others. Please make your filename be the title of your article (or some recognizable subset of the article title). We want to review the article drafts without knowing the authors’ identities.

If you have questions, please check http://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-faq; if your question isn’t answered there, please e-mail volokh@stanford.edu.

Many thanks to the Stanton Foundation for its generous support.

* * *

James Weinstein, Dan Cracchiolo Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University

Eugene Volokh, Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution (Stanford University), and Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law