Florida comes for academic freedom

Florida in October petitioned for cert from the Eleventh Circuit decision declaring invalid Florida’s Stop WOKE Act as applied to university classroom speech. Florida’s petition asks the Court to decide that Garcetti applies to university classroom speech such that it is government speech unprotected by the First Amendment. Or, if not government speech, classroom instruction is subject to ordinary Garcetti analysis, not unique academic-freedom protections the Eleventh Circuit applied. AG’s from thirteen states (the usual suspects)1 filed an amicus in support of Florida.

None of this can be squared with academic freedom principles incorporated into the First Amendment in Sweezy and Keyshian, which rejected state attempts to control classroom speech by controlling who could teach and how. Either the First Amendment limits (in some way) what states can dictate about university professors in the classroom or the state can dictate what professors say just as it can dictate the litigation position an ADA espouses. Both cannot be right.

I can see the Court taking the case–there is a deep circuit split, a dissent below, a high-profile law, and Florida has been at the vanguard of these efforts. I would like to believe the Court does not have the stomach to eliminate academic freedom as a First Amendment concept.

But I am often wrong.

  1. Including Texas. But presumably by the time the Court takes the case and merits briefing is due, the newly elected Democrat will be in office and will back away from this position. ↩︎

Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment

We will probably face another debt ceiling chicken game next year. The last few times this happened, questions were raised about whether Section Four of the 14th Amendment gives the President unilateral authority to ignore the debt ceiling, raise taxes, or cut spending to prevent a debt payment postponement.

This issue is extraordinarily complex, in part because the federal budget is a maze. For example, I have no idea to what extent the President has discretion over federal spending. Some appropriations are discretionary in some ways. Does that give the Treasury enough running room to continue making debt payments by postponing certain spending until the debt ceiling is raised?

Another wrinkle here is that in the recent past examples the President was a Democrat. Will the people who argued for unilateral executive authority under Section 4 still say that with Donald Trump as President? We’ll see.

I’d like to say that I could give a firm answer on what Section 4 means, what the Constitution more broadly means with respect to debt repayment, and how all of that plays into the question of executive authority in this area. But I don’t think that’s possible.

“Unreliable:” Richard A. Posner, RIP

Some stray thoughts by way of remembering Richard Posner, who was, by a substantial measure, the most important and impressive intellect of any American judge in the last hundred years. 

He was….

Engaged and engaging. A number of the tributes rolling in for Posner make the same general point in similar terms: “I disagreed with Posner about something (or, indeed, almost everything), but I loved engaging with his work and he was perfectly happy to engage back.” Although I tended to agree with plenty of Posner’s work (but not all of it, and not uncritically), agreement was hardly the point. You read Posner for the joy of seeing a mind at work: fully on display, clear in exposition, more often sharp than prickly, and quite evidently happy to engage in the give and take. 

Unsentimental and impolitic. When Posner engaged with a subject, he had little or no interest in position, status, or authority (in any sense of the word other than actual expertise). Scalia’s rank-based dismissive comeback in one of their late-period spats—”He’s a court of appeals judge, isn’t he?”—was, with its “Do you know who I am?” airs, no comeback at all. Posner would treat a student note with more respect than a Supreme Court justice’s treatise–if he thought the note was more worthy of respect. Whatever scant accommodations Posner presumably made as a judge engaged in an official and collective enterprise, when writing for himself he showed an appropriate indifference to prudence, politics, politesse, sacred cows, and taboos.

A quarter-century of listening to fellow legal academics’ behind-the-scenes explanations of why an article was written a particular way, who it was intended to flatter and persuade, what was cut or omitted, and why particular questions or implications were excluded and blandly, disingenuously labeled “beyond the scope” suggests to me that this is a very rare quality. I don’t think he felt free to write in this way because he was Posner; I think he was Posner, with a capital P, because he wrote this way. If others emulated this quality rather clumsily, at least it was a worthy quality to emulate.  

Nor did Posner have any interest in sentiment, at least in his public life. I’m sure he subscribed to many of the values lauded in the “Law Day” rhetoric that he derided, or at least some version of those values. But he had no use for such talk, for the simple reason that he found it useless. And so it is, for grown-up audiences. Or at least so it was, while it was possible to take for granted that those values had a sufficient degree of common acceptance. You only miss “procedural liberalism” when it’s gone and unsavory things slither out from under the rocks, vying to take its place.

Posner’s obituary tribute to the man he clerked for, Justice William Brennan, included some criticisms of Brennan and the Warren Court instead of sticking with the usual cliches. He included them because he thought they were pertinent to a valedictory assessment of Brennan, a smart operator on a political court and a man worth taking seriously. Even when he was in something closer to Ecclus. 44 mode, Posner preferred to critically analyze a famous judge’s reputation rather than simply toss another laurel on the heap. 

That seems to me the proper way to treat a serious figure. I imagine that Posner was bored and impatient during the sorts of conference preliminaries that lavish praise on the speaker, for the same reason that he was impatient with tame obituaries and questioned the value of hagiographic judicial biographies. He acted accordingly when writing about Brennan. I imagine that Posner would feel the same way about our postmortem praise for him. Empty compliments do the living little good and the dead none at all.

Incidentally, in Posner’s obituary of Brennan, his explanation–more than borne out since then–of why Brennan’s reputation is so much a “hostage to history” contains a passage about Holmes that, then and now, belongs equally to Posner himself: “You can disagree with everything that Holmes ever said or thought yet regard him as a very considerable figure in American law because of his intellectual creativity and his rhetorical power; he altered the conception of the judge and the structure of legal thought.”

Unreliable. I first heard Posner praised in this fashion when I was a law clerk, working for a conservative judge on a reasonably conservative circuit. I heard it several times after that. Almost invariably, those saying it belonged to conservative circles. To be sure, Posner was criticized many times, and from all over the political spectrum, for being unreliable in a different way. He was criticized for playing fast and loose with the law or the facts (as opposed to playing with them some but not too much, which is a pretty fair description of standard judging), or for doing questionable forms of outside research or fact-finding. (As opposed to making casual, dubious factual assertions and attributing them to “common sense,” or offering ominous guesswork, equally ungrounded but no less confidently asserted withal, about the consequences of a decision. Both of these are, again, the stuff of everyday judging by ostensibly respectable judges.)

But if I understood them correctly, the conservatives had something else in mind when they praised him for being unreliable. They meant that he could not be counted on to reach the “conservative” answer to a question. Nor, when a court had reached a conservative answer, could he be counted on to leave well enough alone and avoid reassessing and picking at that consensus with a fresh and critical mind. They meant that he might be a brilliant man but was not a safe, dependable vote. Too much the common-law man, too little the man with a program. A little too smart for his own good, perhaps. Undependable. Unreliable.

They weren’t wrong to praise him for it–and, if it sometimes sounded like a criticism when conservatives or others called Posner unreliable, that’s not really wrong either. He was a common-law man, although in the United States statutory and constitutional judging are also largely common-law judging. He could be aggressive about a case in the service of getting at what he thought was the nub of the matter or clearing away what he thought was nonsense or deadwood, and there were associated error costs. His late-period judicial and scholarly work was sometimes overconfident and far too casual even by his own standards.

I wrote of Posner at some point that he was a great judge, but that a judiciary functions well when there are many staid, workaday, dutiful “good” judges and not too many “great” ones. The law absolutely needs a few Posners, but only a few. Some of the worst district and circuit court judicial opinions are the product of judges visibly trying too hard to be “great,” or at least famous, rather than simply and boringly good. Law–the “law,” the whole body and process of it–is like billiards. The balls move in an orderly, predictable fashion, if you have the physics to see it. (A few of you may remember the scene in Mark Helprin’s Winter’s Tale in which Hardesty Marratta shoots a miraculous game of pool.) But the game needs a good, hard break every now and then to shake things up. That was Posner’s function. But, to paraphrase the late, great Edward Felson, you don’t want the game to be nothing but break shots.

Nevertheless, the conservatives’ praise for Posner was still justified. He was undependable, unsafe, “unreliable.” He was not there to enact a program or platform. Even the rationalizing element of his judging and writing was situational rather than programmatic. At least for the last three decades or so of his writing, with its pragmatic emphasis, he was a critic, not a would-be prophet. (He had interesting things to say about the prophetic genre in his book on public intellectuals.) I don’t think he ever would have imagined wanting to offer a panoptic “view” of “our country,” and one can only imagine what Posner in his prime would have had to say about Justice Alito’s book. The qualities that made him unreliable were the same qualities that made him the antithesis of the after-dinner spouter of Law Day rhetoric and the academic or judge who hides things in the convenient grey area of “beyond the scope.” They were right to praise him.

In looking over what I’ve written, it occurs to me rather belatedly that my conservative acquaintances may not have meant to praise Posner when they called him “unreliable.” No matter.

A Critic. I suppose Posner, with his decades of writing, is a little like rock music: you tend to think the music was at its best when you were young and deeply involved in it. Overcoming Law was published during my last year of law school, and I tend to think of the period roughly between the late 80s and the publication of The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory and An Affair of State in 1999–as Sinatra sang, it was a very good year–as a particularly strong Posnerian (or should it be Posneric?) run.

A lot of that work was decidedly critical in nature, and much of Overcoming Law in particular–and later, How Judges Think and the less impressive Reflections on Judging–consists of book reviews and other forms of short- or medium-form critical evaluations.

Although he was not the only one to write such pieces–Mark Tushnet’s reviews were also terrific, among others–Posner alone published enough to be responsible for a golden age of book reviews and other occasional pieces in legal academic literature. Many of these pieces first saw the light in magazines (it was also a golden age for them), but plenty of them were published in law reviews. Reading the last couple of editions of the Michigan Law Review‘s book review issue, it is hard to say that this critical genre still exists. Either editors, authors, or both seem less inclined these days to favor quite the same sharp, direct approach. And Michigan is a rarity among law reviews in publishing book reviews at all. Given those factors and the (perverse) creative incentives created by SSRN policies and by the metrics of citation counts, it seems unlikely either that we will see more book reviews and similar pieces any time soon or that they will take the kind of incisive approach that Posner’s did.

Having flogged that issue plenty of times before, I will just say that when people talk this week about how much they enjoyed Posner’s sharp and lively writings, part of what they’re saying, however incidentally, is that they miss seeing good, sharp book reviews and other short or targeted pieces in the legal academic literature. I suppose some of them now do or will appear elsewhere; all we need to do is get a few hundred Substack subscriptions.

Dismissal denied in Trump v. BBC

The district court denied the BBC’s 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) in Donald Trump’s defamation lawsuit over a documentary that spliced together pieces of his January 6, 2021 Ellipse Speech. The court found sufficient minimum contacts because the doc targeted an American (although not Florida) audience and because people in Florida could and did access it through VPN. And the court found he had sufficiently pleaded actual malice, based in part on the BBC’s supposed ill will toward Trump.

I expect BBC to seek immediate review and to get it, despite the absence of a final judgment.

Denial of personal jurisdiction dismissals is a common-and-accepted basis for mandamus. And the jurisdictional analysis here is fairly weak–focusing the effects analysis on the U.S. as a whole rather than Florida, downplaying BBC’s efforts to avoid the doc being seen in Florida, and tagging BBC with unlawful action of third parties.

As to the merits, actual malice means knowledge of falsehood; it has nothing to do with the defendant’s animosity or hatred toward the plaintiff. The district court considered and emphasized that animosity (the BBC’s supposed history of “unfair” coverage of Trump) in finding actual malice sufficiently pleaded. This arguably conflicts with Eleventh Circuit precedent on the point (the district court downplayed the conflict, suggesting that circuit precedent conflicted with SCOTUS precedent and required him to reconcile the two bodies).

This opens two avenues. First is § 1292(b) certification of the question of law about how to treat allegations of ill-will and personal animosity in the actual malice question (which would bring the entire order before the court of appeals). Second is to seek mandamus on the merits, arguing that the district court got the actual malice analysis so wrong as to warrant immediate review.

(I used this case as my Civ Pro final last fall, so my students and I have been watching it closely. Several interned on the SD Fla. last summer

A Foot Fault is a Fault

Sorry, but a common usage of “foot fault” bugs me. In tennis, a foot fault is a fault for the server. But many people (including Justice Thomas in one separate opinion) use foot fault to mean a “minor infraction.” Language, alas, is always evolving, even if the evolution is illogical.

Todd Butler is Clearly Unqualified for Confirmation by the Senate

I see nothing wrong, by the lights of our undignified system, with the Senate Republicans trying to secure some confirmations of judicial nominees before power in that chamber changes hands. But that doesn’t mean the Senate’s obligation to take seriously its advice and consent duties is any less. And by that standard, it should be said that Todd Butler is unqualified for confirmation by the Senate to the seat on the Fifth Circuit to which he has been nominated.

Qualified for nomination, sure. But when asked the question that has become simultaneously both the ultimate softball and the most absurd landmine for nominees in the present presidential regime–who won the 2020 election–Butler gave the now-standard, prefabricated, reality-adjacent answer: “Joe Biden was certified the winner under our system.” Likewise, he said that Trump “was not the winner under our system” in 2020–as if putting the name “Trump” in the same sentence as “lost” or “loser” would somehow put Butler in personal jeopardy.

This just won’t do.

Of course one is used to judicial nominees of both parties bullshitting at confirmation hearings. It’s a practice so common and ritualized as to make one nostalgic for good, old-fashioned, by-God-American perjury. And one is accustomed to senators of both parties asking silly, circusy questions. But give Senator Blumenthal full credit for putting this question to every judicial nominee in the present regime. It’s a question that takes no effort to answer honestly, and that is as easy to answer straightforwardly as any such question. (Imagine judicial nominees answering questions about other historical facts in the same manner: “Senator, to be clear, I was not present on that occasion. But contemporary reports do suggest that the Gettysburg Address was given by a man matching Abraham Lincoln’s description.” You wouldn’t congratulate them for their precision; you’d clap them in the madhouse.) And yet, it’s precisely the question that tests whether a Trump nominee possesses even a degree of courage and independence so minimal that you’d need an electron microscope to measure it. If you can’t answer that question clearly and without a laminated script provided by some regime factotum, you have no business agreeing to be nominated to the bench in the first place, let alone actually serving as a judge.

The assumption of the nominees appears to be that if they answered the question like actual normal people, the president would angrily withdraw the nomination. It’s not even clear that this is true. But the blame for this prospect certainly doesn’t lie with Blumenthal, or with other Democrats who have asked the question. It lies with Trump. The fact that the nominees answer the question as they do, and the reason they feel pressed to do so, cannot be emphasized often enough. The only reason the label “Orwellian” doesn’t fit is that Orwell wrote about Big Brother, not Big Baby.

Maybe the nominees are right; maybe Trump really would pull the nomination of anyone who dared call him a loser instead of reaching for the pre-approved statement. If so, it must be for reasons that escape me. Certainly those reasons can have nothing to do with loyalty, since judicial nominees owe no loyalty whatsoever to the president who nominates them. The enormity of that scenario–the fact that this president treats the disavowal of the truth and the embrace of fevered conspiracist fantasy as a literal job requirement–is a problem for the nation.

But the fact that it also makes life difficult for the nominees themselves is of no consequence. (Nor, as far as I’m concerned, is it a problem that Republicans can find questions that make nominees of Democratic presidents squirm. I would be perfectly happy if there were no live judicial confirmation hearings at all. But so long as they exist, asking such questions seems like a perfectly acceptable form of torture.) A nominee who’s unwilling to answer a question like “who won the election” honestly and clearly, for fear that his or her nomination will be snatched back by our infant in chief, should not be confirmed and probably should never have agreed to have their name put forward at all. It’s not as if one is faced with a choice between lifetime tenure and the rack. One simply doesn’t get to be a federal judge, and perforce must settle for whatever perfectly fancy job got them that far in life in the first place. Answering the question clearly and with homespun American directness–rather than imitating a tobacco company executive at a deposition–costs the nominee nothing, in the final analysis. Sacrificing their integrity and backbone, on the other hand, costs them everything, by any meaningful measure. It certainly shouldn’t be rewarded.

I single out Butler only because he’s a recent example and I’ve written about him recently. But in fairness, he was no more or less morally weak than the three other nominees who testified alongside him, all of whom gave the same coward’s response. And all of them joined all of the judicial nominees who, to a man and woman, have given the same answer since Blumenthal started asking the question. Many–perhaps most; perhaps all–of these nominees were perfectly qualified to receive judicial nominations. None of them, including the six dozen or so now sitting on the bench, are qualified to actually receive confirmation and serve. Butler should be voted down. But then, so should his fellow nominees; and so should, or should have been, everyone who gave the preapproved but chickenshit answer to the election question.

It is an extraordinary fact, one that can’t be discussed enough. Any common president can nominate unqualified individuals to the federal bench and other high offices. Only an uncommon president like Trump, with his personalist view of loyalty and his half-cynical, half-lunatic view of the very concept of truth, can put forward qualified nominees–and insist that they disqualify themselves for high office, as a condition and on the very cusp of attaining it. He truly does corrupt everything he touches. It astounds me that any of us, myself included, can bandy about phrases like “judicial courage” with straight faces, when every judicial nominee put forward by this president in this term has quite literally embraced abject, cringing cowardice as the price of success.

ERA Revivalism

Another issue raised by the midterm elections is whether the Equal Rights Amendment will be ratified. Some people want Congress to pass a resolution declaring that the ERA is the 28th Amendment. Such a resolution would not be subject to a presidential veto, though it would be subject to a Senate filibuster.

My preferred route on this, as I explained in a 2019 article, would be for Congress to waive the ERA time limit but say that state ratification rescissions are valid until ratification is achieved. The effect of this would to require more states to ratify the ERA. This is possible. States that have not ratified the ERA include North Carolina and Arizona, which now have Democratic majorities in their state legislatures.

Since 5 states rescinded their ratifications in the 1970s, that means at least three more states would have to ratify to get to 38 if you assume that NC and AZ would ratify next year. Hard to see how you could get three more states without another election cycle where Democrats win. Thus, a deal in Congress to extend the ERA time limit (again) need not necessarily lead to ERA ratification and, I think, would allow for a robust test of public opinion on that issue now.

Impeaching Cabinet Officers

The constitutional threshold for impeaching Cabinet members should be lower than for the President, the Vice-President, and federal judges. Let me explain.

Impeaching federal judges threatens judicial independence. As a result, long-settled practice is that they should not be impeached for their opinions. You usually need actual crimes.

Impeaching the President or Vice President threatens democracy in a sense. They are the only ones elected by something approximating the nation. (Yes, Andrew Johnson is a more complicated example because he was not elected President, but set that aside for now.) Congress is, of course, also elected, but maybe only the voters should get to decide the President/VP’s fate absent clear crimes like Watergate.

Cabinet officials, on the other hand, are neither independent nor elected. They are also easily replaced. The main argument against impeaching them on policy grounds (as opposed to, say, felonies) is that they were implementing executive policy. Impeaching them will not change policy. Only impeaching the President can do that. But that’s unclear. The impeachment, removal, and disqualification of a Cabinet officer may make it difficult for the President to find someone else willing to commit the same high crimes and misdemeanors.

Does that mean any current Cabinet members should be impeached? I don’t know–let’s see the evidence.

AI Tort Liability

In Torts, I’m getting many questions about the potential liability of AI for giving negligent or reckless advice. My initial response to these questions is to ask “How would you analyze the case if the advice were given by a person?”

This is a useful starting point because it pierces the AI distortion field. Sometimes the answer is that AI and human advice should be judged alike. Sometimes they seem different, though we find it hard to articulate why. As people make that attempt, though, the contours of AI tort liability will emerge.

Zombie Smith

In other heartening new this week, we finally found a Warren Court precedent that the current Court likes–Sherbert v. Verner.

One irony is that Employment Div. v. Smith is probably going to become this generation’s version of Lemon, which Justice Scalia so memorably described. (You know the quote.) And yet he wrote Smith.

The Regime’s Lawyers and the Donald J. Trump Memorial Floating Signifier

It is already a banal observation that at some point in its ginned-up war on critical theory, the non- or anti-conservative political right became the nation’s foremost practitioners of and advocates for…critical theory. If I want to hear someone saying that silly, feminine things like “issues” and “agendas” are a mirage hiding the reality that everything is about power, I can drop by a faculty lounge–or I could just listen to the monarcho-pagan faction of Vance-whispering “intellectuals,” like Curtis Yarvin. (As opposed to the entryist, neo-Falangist faction of Vance whisperers, whose primary distinction from Yarvin is that Yarvin doesn’t occupy a comfortable, highly prestigious academic position.)

I thought of this as I read Judge Chutkan’s opinion in the l’Arc de Trump case, and especially its discussion of the Commemorative Works Act. That statute imposes procedural requirements on the construction of works “designed to perpetuate in a permanent manner the memory of an individual, group, event or other significant element of American history.” The Arch is a commemorative work, of course. It’s described by the White House as “a monumental tribute to America’s first 250 years.” It’s deliberately designed to achieve a commemorative 250-foot height. It’s described by the unfortunate Paul Ingrassia as being “about remembrance” and by the tragic Mark Paoletta as honoring our nation’s veterans. It has gone on in this vein so ad nauseam that only a liar or a literary theorist could deny its commemorative function.

Rather than straightforwardly lying, which would have been refreshing, the Trump regime went the lit-crit route. It argued that the plaintiffs had not shown the arch was commemorative, because, really, it means everything and nothing and at best “may” mean something. It is, in short, the nation’s single largest freestanding Derridean floating signifier.

Moreover, it doesn’t exactly have a definite meaning yet, no matter how many times the president has discussed and described it. (This is, of course, consistent with the “who are you gonna believe–me or your lawyerin’ eyes?” approach that Stanley Woodward took during the golf course hearings. Only this executive branch could combine an insistence on unitary status with an equally strong insistence that judges credit its lawyers’ assertions over the president’s own statements.) The Arch, they argue, will mean what it means when they get around to deciding what it means. So it’s not just the Arc de Trump or the Trump Memorial Floating Signifier; it’s also Schrodinger’s Arch!

From the government brief:

Plaintiffs assert that the arch will “honor” or “celebrate” the Nation’s 250th anniversary, but that does not mean it is designed to perpetuate the memory of that element of history. Celebrating the anniversary by building a structure and using the structure to perpetuate the memory of the anniversary are not necessarily the same thing. Further, Plaintiffs lack evidence that a final decision has been made as to what the arch is designed to celebrate or symbolize. Whereas the CWA covers backwards-looking projects that commemorate something, the arch may be a forward-looking design, intended to inspire future American greatness. Indeed, one designer proposed that the arch “is not primarily a monument dedicated to the dead, but to the living, to this great country and its perseverance.” Dkt. 44-2 at 11.

Further, the definition of commemorative work excludes “a structure which is primarily used for other purposes,” and Plaintiffs have not shown that the arch will “primarily” be used to perpetuate the memory of a significant element of American history, rather than for another purpose, such as a decorative gateway to D.C., a tourist attraction, and a national security hub. The primary purpose of the structure is up to the government to decide, not the Plaintiffs.

Shockingly, Judge Chutkan declined to accept this deconstructionist fantasia. I guess that’s just conservatively inclined procedural liberalism for you.

Or the beginning of (statutory) Bivens

A different take on the future of Bivens: Folks around talking online about whether the Democrats might include codification of Bivens to the legislative agenda. It is an easy fix (add a few words to existing § 1983 or copy a new statute on that existing provision). It fells well with one thing people hope to see (limiting ICE). And it might gain bipartisan support, as Republicans envision President Ossoff and the need to sue that administration for damages.