Trump has won a forum-selection motion in one of his nonsense defamation actions.
He sued Penguin Book and the New York Times over a book and several articles suggesting Donald Trump was bad businessman who failed upward into the presidency by giving off the mirage of success. Trump filed in the Middle District of Florida, citing business and reputational injuries there; the court denied dismissal for improper venue and refused to transfer venue under § 1404.
Venue was proper under § 1391(b)(2) as “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in the Middle District–publication of the book and articles plus reputational and business injuries there. More importantly, based on circuit precedent, § 1391(b)(2) asks a different question than the effects test for personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction focuses on whether defendants intentionally directed their actions (writing, editing, publishing–what they called “relevant journalistic activities”) to the forum state, which considers the forum connections within the creating and production of the publication. Venue looks at the events relevant to a claim of defamation–publication and reputational and business harm, which occurred in the Middle District. The court rejected the analysis of a different Middle District judge who dismissed Devin Nunes’ defamation action against CNN and Jake Tapper in 2023 because the publications had no Florida connection; that decision had the “flavor” of minimum contacts rather than distinct venue analysis.
Transfer was not warranted, even though Trump did not sue at home, because the non-party witnesses could easily travel to the Middle District. And the “parties’ robust financial means” ensure that non-party witnesses will not endure a financial burden in having to travel to the district.
Two thoughts on this decision.
First, the logic creates something like nationwide venue under § 1391(b)(2) for Trump’s performative defamation actions. The material was published in the district (because it was published nationwide) and Trump suffered business and reputational harm in the district (because Trump, as “perhaps the world’s most prominent public figure,” has business and reputational interests everywhere in the United States). And because Trump and most of the media entities he sues have “robust financial means,” the burden of getting witnesses and (electronic) documents to the district will never be so burdensome as to warrant transfer.
Second, the case disconnects personal jurisdiction from venue. Federal courts often treat them interchangeably because the analyses overlap. Entity defendants reside in a district for § 1391(b)(1) purposes where they are subject to personal jurisdiction, meaning personal jurisdiction determines venue. And many courts treat § 1391(b)(2)’s “substantial part of the events or omissions” as equivalent to minimum contacts (which is what Judge Merryday purshed back on). Many federal defendants move under 12(b)(3) rather than (b)(2), on the view that they achieve the same goal of getting the action out of that state under the same analysis. But if (b)(2) considers events and omissions distinct from PJ’s minimum contacts, it creates a situation in which venue in a district within a state could be proper even though the defendant might not be subject to PJ in that state.