Apparently NYU law students have developed an informal market for space in law school classes. As reported in a recent New York Post story, some students have posted offers of cash and other goods in return for class spots. According to new NYU registration guidelines, the practice of “ad hoc add-drop” with no waiting list forced law students to “troll for open spots or arrange late-night trades with friends.” My first reaction is that ability to pay should definitely not affect class access. And I assume that angle is what got the Post‘s attention, as suggested by the somewhat cryptic headline, “NYU Law’s Classless $wapfest.” (The article also suggested that other non-cash types of currency were proposed, although the students interviewed said these were just jokes.) So, should students be able to trade goods or cash for class spots?
The Post story notes that the registration process is changing in 2009-10, but leaves out the fact that NYU Law’s new system also creates a market for classes. The system drops the lottery system in favor of an auction in which students bid points for class spots. In addition to popularity of subject matter (the Post article listed Environmental Law and Capital Punishment), I wonder if down the line the information from this system will rival student evaluations as a way of gauging how much a student is willing to pay for the various classes and professors. Is this auction system a current trend? Is it a good idea?
Posted by Verity Winship on August 1, 2008 at 03:48 PM
Comments
I wonder whether bidding strategies will devolve into maximum bids for the most preferred class. (The system allows for bids conditional on not getting into other classes, and so it would actually be maximum bid for class A, and then a conditional maximum bid for class B, &c.) This is all the more likely since only 1/3 of classes and fewer than 1/5 of non-seminars close. It seems unlikely that you could get into more than one class that will close, so why split your bid?
Posted by: guest 1L/2L | Aug 1, 2008 4:27:53 PM
I would question this as a system to rival class evaluations. I think some portion of class bidding is about the time slot and how it fits with other classes (what is it scheduled against, does it meet late Friday afternoon? Does it ruin what was a nice open afternoon for an externship?)
I am a rising 2L who is convinced our Dean has a secret plan to make it impossible to not come to campus every day of the week. How? By making all of the sections of Con Law I (which we take as 2Ls) meet on Friday and any other class a 2L might want to take (Corporations, Evidence, Tax, IP Survey, T&E) meet on Monday. Somehow, there is no way to take three of these and not come to campus every day. Evil.
The auction system actually works pretty well. There is no way to transfer your auction points to another student and so all students are on the same footing. However, since I only got two classes in bidding for this fall, I will have to see if things actually work out.
Posted by: CarrieLouise | Aug 1, 2008 2:49:17 PM
I suppose this might disadvantage students with lower financial resources, depending on the market rate of the most popular classes. But might part of the aversion be due to some academic egos that don’t want further reinforcement that they’re less popular than their colleagues? Maybe they don’t want their relative popularity to be quantifiable…
Posted by: anon | Aug 1, 2008 12:58:42 PM