Lithwick on Acts of Conscience

Dahlia Lithwick over at Slate is one of my very favorite legal commentators. In this article, she discusses the issue raised by Dan of pharmacists refusing to fill prescriptions for contraceptives.

Her conclusions:

Patients cannot have their expectations of timely, professional service undermined by unanticipated bursts of conscientious objection. That’s why the counterproposals under consideration in at least four other states grappling with reluctant pharmacists seem eminently reasonable: Such laws would require druggists to fill all prescriptions unless they can find alternatives that don’t inconvenience the patient. This is essentially the mechanism created earlier this month when Illinois Gov. Rod Blagojevich filed a 150-day emergency rule requiring drugstores to either fill prescriptions or otherwise accommodate their patients.

These solutions don’t force individual pharmacists to undermine their personal religious views. They do place high costs on the drugstores, which would now need to implement fixes such as posted warnings, agreements with other pharmacies, and the hiring of extra pharmacists, even if they can ill afford it. If an individual service provider wants to reserve the right to deny services, they should be free to do so, and if a drugstore wants to employ such a person, they should also do so.

It sounds to me like a reasonable compromise.

Posted by Hillel Levin on April 14, 2005 at 12:53 PM

Comments

Amos: because it’s not the point, is it? Assume we’re talking about a man’s right to birth control or interstate travel.

It’s not clear to me that a private party refusing to facilitate something that the government cannot restrict (such as travel, or birth control) violates anyone’s rights. Lithwick appears to assume that it does.

Posted by: gst | Apr 15, 2005 7:49:00 PM

A pharmacist who works for himself can decide anything he wants. A company that wants to give pharmacists free reign over their actions is welcome to do so. A pharmacist who works for me and refuses to perform his job duties gets fired on the spot.

Posted by: roysol | Apr 15, 2005 11:20:39 AM

qst: Why would you “put aside issues of gender discrimination” in either interstate bus travel or the provision of contraceptives?

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 15, 2005 9:29:58 AM

I just hope that no laws pop up requiring pharmacies to employ people who refuse to prescribe RU-486.

Posted by: Lucas Wiman | Apr 15, 2005 1:31:56 AM

Does someone really have a “legal right” to be provided with birth control, as Lithwick implies (currently, “religious objections of the pharmacist can trump the mother’s legal rights.”)? Sure, the government can’t prevent someone from selling or using birth control, but I don’t see how you get from there to a right to have someone provide you with it.

How about this analogy: We have a right to interstate travel. The owners of several bus lines, however, believe, for whatever reason, that young women shouldn’t be permitted to travel unaccompanied and refuse to sell tickets to a young woman without a chaperone to accompany her. Putting aside issues of gender discrimination, public accommodations laws, etc., does the bus company’s refusal violate the young woman’s right to interstate travel?

Posted by: gst | Apr 14, 2005 8:19:59 PM

Ariela Migdal on Feminism

Ariela Migdal writes in on feminism and legal academia:

So, how many male law grads are planning on dropping out of the workforce to be fathers and giving their children their wives’ last names? For that matter, I’d be interested to know answers to the following (admittedly indulging in the feminism of the elite & overeducated):

How many of the young profs around here are men? How many are married (or in long-term hetero relationships)? How many of the married men’s wives followed them to places like Indiana or Georgia so that they could pursue their careers as hotshot profs? And, how many of the women profs here are married and have found a (male) partner willing to shlep around the country to facilitate their careers as hotshot “prawfesses”? Are there prof couples? Whose career wins (unless you both got tenure-track jobs at Columbia and Fordham at the same time)? Just curious….

I think the lady deserves answers. As for me, part of why I chose a career in academia is precisely so that I could also devote much of my time to non-career, family-related activities. And I suspect many men are attracted to the profession for that reason.

My wife was very interested in leaving New York–and had a lot of input into where we chose to go: she has many more friends in San Francisco than I do. On the other hand, if I had only gotten a job in Buffalo, she was willing to go with me (reserving the right to force me to leave the job or the profession if she got too miserable at any point down the road). She kept her last name (though I admit that I insisted on it and threatened to change mine if she tried to adopt my name). And if we have kids that aren’t adopted in their teens (who would already have last names of their own), we are likely to give some of them my name and some of them hers. At least that is the plan now. Of course, her name is really her father’s–but we have to start somewhere, right?

I confess that I’m very interested in what others have to say about this. As you all know, this is a very White Male blawg, as so many are: e.g., Solum/Leiter/Bainbridge/VC (for the most part)/Right Coast (for the most part)/etc. There are exceptions, of course. Affirmative action anyone?

Dissemination had a debate about the naming issue here.

Posted by Ethan Leib on April 14, 2005 at 10:16 AM

» Feminism and the Two-Body Problem from Letters of Marque Over on Prawfsblawg, a blog of “young legal turkeys” that I might get around to adding to my blog roll when I stop being so darned lazy, they’re talking about something that Ariela Migdal called “feminism and legal academia” and… [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 14, 2005 4:49:39 PM

» Academics in Love from Discourse.net PrawfsBlawg takes up a subject near and dear to my heart: job searches by legal academic couples. Or does it? The post is titled Ariela Migdal on Feminism and the comments veer in all sorts of directions…. Once upon a time it was next to impossib… [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 15, 2005 8:05:01 AM

» Young Law Profs in Love from Red State Lawblog Over at PrawfsBlawg, Ethan Leib responds to a feminist challenge to young male profs by providing his vita as a properly-gender-correct husband and father: [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 15, 2005 10:57:14 AM

» White Blawgs and Women in the Academy. from Dissemination.org Interesting discussion on PrawfsBlawg (I know the name blows) on White Male Blawgs and Women in the Legal Academy here. The post that sparked this debate is here. I would urge interested readers to get in on the discussion there, which has generated so… [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 15, 2005 2:37:31 PM

Comments

I’d like to respond to a few points, but will keep responses in separate posts so as not to run on interminably (hope that is not a problem).

Brian Leiter: Actually, I find it rather significant that you ARE a white male (even if not of the political persuasion of Bainbridge et al.). Your blog reveals a deep-seated interest in, how shall I put it, the stats of academic legal hiring: who was hired where, what their law school affiliations are, how many have PhDs or other degrees, and so forth. It’s like reading the Sons of Sam Horn page for rabid Red Sox fans (myself included, I confess): fascinating, if you really care about such stuff.

I don’t mean that as an indictment, ok? I do think, however, that it is a huge predisposition in many males (how many women track stats on a regular, labor-intensive basis?); but it’s one that perhaps we females should take note of, if not outright adopt. We should care about the numbers; and we should wield our stats when lobbying for change. Moreover, we should know the incontrovertible evidence of hiring patterns for our own sense of where we stand in the marketplace. (That just seems obvious – but not to everyone, I believe.)

Most academic women don’t, from what I can see (and admittedly this is very limited/subjective anecdata), think carefully about the strategy of hiring, from the kind of calculated vantage that would get the stats on our side: for e.g., bartering an acceptance at one law review for a higher ranked one; fighting to be on panels in our field; maybe joining blogs with high hit rates, so our names become visible and recognizable (if Postrel and Althouse can do it, so can many more); etc. The old adage about a woman having to be twice as good as a man may, unnervingly (to some of us), still hold water. But there are more opportunities for us to do something about that – and I think you would agree.

I think your site does offer us a service, Brian. But it should also teach us a lesson in the savvy of many males in the academic world (ok, the “white” part may be tangential, but there just isn’t a critical mass of we people of color even to be able to add that to the conversation, in my view). Volokh and Lessig, among others you name, are recognized as standing for something – and I bet that has some bearing on their reception, credibility, and standing in the legal world. You, too, have an important position, in part by virtue of your being a man who has a firm grip (and the only major one) on the ins and outs of legal academia. Women would do well to emulate your positioning; and I, for one, am trying to take the lesson to heart…

Ethan: I like what you wrote, but while I am a fan of affirmative action at certain levels, I think at the academic hiring level we women (especially of color, perhaps) have to figure this stuff out. When you get to be as privileged and elite as we are (and no, I don’t put those in scare quotes, as I really mean we are), we do for the most part have great choices before us. I think that’s it’s our job to figure out what those choices allow us, and then to plan how to get there.

Obviously, innate unfairnesses in the system may continue to thwart womens’ progress. That should be challenged at every step. But it’s about time we women assert our places in the professional sector by fighting to “measure up” to the men who have clearly figured it out.

Femaleprof: Nothing I say is intended to undermine your excellent arguments, however. Men and male-dominated institutions have a key role in changing the hiring patterns, especially in the cases of women who have lined up their qualifications and are productive/contributing members of the academic community.

I would be very interested in hearing your thoughts/comments.

Posted by: Tiger | Apr 20, 2005 7:20:13 PM

Just to play AA2’s advocate here (and yes, we are different corporate entites), Rob:

Everyone has family and loved ones to take care of. People with kids have more family and loved ones. So if you cater to them, you are necessarily preferencing them over those who do not have kids. That is, a childless person may have to tend to her partner should she become ill; but a spouse with a child may have to tend to her sick spouse AND her sick child.

So even your proposal still preferences employees with children, assuming it starts with their time demands as the starting point for determining policy.

I think there is little doubt that employers frequently cater to people with children. If I take paternity leave, someone else must pick up the slack; and the only person who will never take ‘ternity leave is the childless employee.

I have heard one rationale for such preferential treatment: people with children tend to be more stable employees. That is, it is less likely that I am going to up and leave my job than my single co-worker in the cubicle next door. So my employer has to keep me happy. This, however, only gets you so far, and it depends on the particular job.

I think the real answer is this: most people do have, or plan to have, children. Employers must keep most of their employees happy. They must keep their employees happy, and thus they must cater–to some degree–to people with children.

So, in the end, if the people with children continue to make these demands, and if it is economically feasible, then employers will have to meet them.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 15, 2005 4:38:18 PM

This is a response to AA2.

I think that “family-friendliness” needs to be defined broadly–it should include not only consideration of the adjustments needed in people’s professional lives for taking care of their children, but also for example situations where their partner might have a prolonged illness or other unusual needs, or where they are under special demands due to relatives or even non-relatives in some cases being dependent on them for caretaking. I would only be resentful of concessions to “procreating types” if those concessions were not extended to others who have analagous personal responsibilities and demands.

Posted by: rob howse | Apr 15, 2005 4:29:52 PM

I have an odd question. To what extent, if any, should we realize that this discussion is motivated by a bias in favor of persons or couples that raise children. I initially was going to say there’s a heterosexist bias in the discussion: namely, that giving women special maternity rights (or men paternity rights) basically is a wealth transfer on the margins from gays on faculties to straights. Of course, nowadays, increasing gay families are emerging, so there’s no need to assume a heterosexual bias for procreation and raising kids, so much as a bias for raising kids simpliciter. Should singles or couples who don’t want kids be resentful of the suggestions here to give longer times or more leaves to the procreating types? Or is a renunciation of “family-friendliness” something that is off the table altogether here?

Posted by: AA2 | Apr 15, 2005 12:45:29 PM

I teach at a top-tier law school that is considered to be (and really is) extremely family friendly: we do our best to make accommodate joint career couples, there are lots of faculty with young children, and on the whole people are warm and supportive to faculty of either gender struggling to balance family and career. That said, I can’t help observing that of my many male colleagues with young children (under 6 or so), all but one is married to a stay-at-home mom. Needless to say, every single one of my female colleagues with young children has a husband with a full-time job.

Also unsurprisingly, the men with young children are, on average, somewhat more productive than the women with young children. As a result, they tend to get more recognition and perks.

No question, most women are rational actors and do what they think will be best for them. But they also are forced to make the best of a pretty crappy bargain.

I don’t see any easy solution to this structural problem. But here are some things that would sure help:

1) Law schools should redouble their efforts to accommodate joint career couples 2) Law schools should have generous maternity leave policies, but should also grant leaves to men who wish to act as primary caregivers for their babies; 3) While it’s inevitable that productivity will continue to matter (and it should), law schools should be somewhat flexible about tenure standards/hiring standards: one might consider “productivity per unit of time truly available” rather than productivity as such. Granted, that’s pretty fuzzy– but it would be nice to see hiring and promotion committees at least build into the process some recognition that people with significant family responsibilities may produce less per year, and that significant family responsibilities usually, though not always, fall more heavily on women. 4) Law schools should stop the idiotic practice of requiring visits prior to making lateral offers. There was a discussion of this on Brian Leiter’s blog a while back. It sucks for all two-career couples and particularly for women, who, as Laura notes, find it hard to move around. 5) Law school appointments committees should recognize that people with children (and, again, women in particular) can’t hobnob at conferences that much either: who’s home with the kids? That means that appointments committess looking at laterals should make a concerted effort to do Lexis searches and find other ways of identifying up-and-coming young people. If you rely on the old “I met an interesting person at a conference who gave a great paper,” you’ll mainly come up with the names of men. 6) God day care on-site!!! I know some law schools have this. We don’t. It would sure have made my life easier.

And, finally, MEN, nothing’s gonna change as long as this is seen as a “women’s” issue. You need to fight for your wives, girlfriends, sisters, and daughters… and for YOUR right to stay at home with the kids and spend more time in general on family.

Posted by: femaleprof | Apr 15, 2005 12:28:14 PM

I think that it is important to examine the expectations that women place on themselves with respect to their families.

I recently accepted a fellowship in a far-away city, where it looks like there are few professional opportunities for my very sucessful husband. Our current plan is for me to commute home whenever possible, and frankly that may be our best and only option.

Nonetheless, I can’t tell you the guilt I feel about this decision. When we tell people what our living arrangements will be for next year, I’ve heard a number of not-so-subtle variations of “wow, so you are leaving your husband to pursue your career.” Almost no one has asked why my husband is not moving with me. I definitely don’t want him to have to put his career on hold so that I can follow my dream, but I also can’t help but wonder whether, if the situation were reversed, I would be packing my things to accompany him.

Sorry this comment doesn’t really advance the debate. Just thought I’d share 🙂

Posted by: wanna-teach | Apr 15, 2005 10:53:10 AM

My own experience of legal academia as a career is that is highly demanding both in time and energy. I regularly work 12-13 hour days and on the weekends as well, and I’m travelling 3 times a month on average for professional reasons, which means being away from home often for close to a third of the month. And it isn’t as if I’m one of those people who doesn’t have other interests–I’d love to be spending some of those “extra” hours writing fiction, and with my wife and dogs.

I don’t think my experience is unique, as far as I can see from talking with colleagues, especially junior colleagues. I’m sure that there are folks who don’t work so hard, but on the other hand they don’t get many of the upsides of being a legal academic in the US, including the chance to make a real difference to the way a field of law is understood and/or taught.

At the same time, legal academia gives you a margin of freedom to organize and balance multiple commitments, to some extent according to your own priorities–for me, that freedom is REALLY important, even if the overall number of hours I work is enormous.

Rob

Posted by: Rob Howse | Apr 15, 2005 7:20:56 AM

I’m a young lawyer. Hope to be a prof someday.

I got married just out of law school. My wife and I both hyphenated our names.

My wife followed me to SF (where I clerked) after law school. Now she is starting law school at Minnesota, so I followed her here (let me tell you, moving from San Francisco to Minneapolis was not exactly a dream come true for me).

We have a daughter coming in a couple months. I haven’t dropped out of the workforce, but I do work from home, in part so that I can take primary childcare responsibility when she’s in school. (Will it work? Who knows…)

Incidentally, we also run a blog together. On women’s basketball.

Posted by: ted | Apr 14, 2005 10:37:08 PM

No offense, but while you guys are arguing about personal, deeply-held opinions that aren’t likely to change, the country is going to hell. Why can’t the left focus on the real bad guys instead of cannibalizing itself?

Posted by: Jeff V. | Apr 14, 2005 10:08:57 PM

If you look at current law faculties right now, including junior faculty, I think it would be fair to say that perhaps 80% of all male professors have families with children, many of them assisted by a wife who works part-time to help care for younger children. Maybe 50% of all female law professors have families with children, and if they do, it is because the women are doing the “second shift” at home. Christine Hurt, you are fortunate that your husband is so supportive of your career; the reality is that legal academia is still the province of men. Look at this blog–who are the contributors? Male professors (unless I’m undercounting the anonymous contributors). And the original phrase describing this blog, “young turks and turkeys” (which I note has been changed)–if that doesn’t signify a male bias, I don’t know what does. I agree there are some great supportive husbands out there in legal academialand, but looking at the academy as a whole, it’s much easier to have a family and be a hot young law prof if you’re male. Wishes don’t make horses, as my grandmother used to say.

Posted by: future femalelawprof | Apr 14, 2005 10:04:42 PM

To Ethan Leib:

Under *no* circumstances should you mix and match your children’s last names. Just pick a last name and run with it–either yours, your wife’s (which is her father’s, as you point out), or a creative combination of the two.

You’ll save yourselves (and your children) a lot of needless bother and explaining later on.

Posted by: snowball | Apr 14, 2005 9:52:52 PM

It seems to me that what is always missing in this type of discussion is the possibility that the above-mentioned women are simply rational actors and are pursuing a means to effect their life choices.

If a woman wants to have children and participate in a meaningful way in their upbringing during their formative years, it is very difficult to do and yet still have the financial means to live comfortably. That’s a simple fact of economics and that raising a child is a full-time affair.

In choosing to have (or choosing to keep in the event of an unexpected pregnancy) children, a woman is making a choice, in the very same way that she might make the opposite choice to instead pursue a career. Neither choice is any more valid than the other and both have their benefits and their drawbacks.

Choosing a partner who can provide a financial means (or recognizing that having such a partner provides an opportunity) for her to support that choice is therefore rational. To attribute one choice (forgoing a career for a time to have and raise a child) as resulting from “false consciousness” seems entirely paternalistic in the same way attributing the opposite choice (forgoing having and raising a child to build a career) to feminist brain-washing would be.

Women who forego a career (or at least for a time forego a career) are no less rational actors than women who forego a family. Having a spouse/partner who can provide the financial means to facilitate that life decision looks to be not only rational, but choice-affirming. Unless one is arguing that woman are incapable of assessing the cost/benefits of stay-at-home motherhood vs. career, it is difficult to understand how the decision to stay-at-home is anything other than a choice – life is full of them.

Posted by: MJ | Apr 14, 2005 4:56:24 PM

I’m not taking anything personally. As for my cloak of anonymity, let’s just say that it was thrown on top of me as I walked out the door. I didn’t exactly pick it out at from the closet.

But when you claim that our wives aren’t actualized because they choose to stay at home, and that we husbands are actualized because we get to go to work, I think it missed quite a bit of the bigger picture. I’d like a lot more flexibility both for us husbands and for them wives. And I think we are getting there–very, very, very slowly.

So no, it isn’t personal at all. We’ve struggled with everything you say. The little rant about my own family was not to make it personal; but rather to highlight that things under the microscope are more complex than your points would suggest. Principles are easy; applying them to life is what is hard.

I believe I, like many men, walk around with a great deal of guilt for not having more time for our families and for operating within a patriarchical structure. I don’t think we are letting ourselves off easy at all; I think we are all facing difficult options, and our choices are limited. All I can hope is that we are getting there, and that we are teaching values to our children even if we can’t live up to them ourselves.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 4:26:20 PM

Not sure I really posed a solution anywhere or that I have an easy one that is a cure-all. What I’ve suggested is that it is a little easy on men to let themselves indulge the fiction that women will be fully actualized as mothers, so that men can be actualized through their work.

And I know it is paternalist to suggest that there may be some false consciousness in the minds of women brought up to assume their primary duties should be as mothers. But since we all agree that inherited cultural norms exert a lot of force on how we adapt our preferences, it seems a bit naive to put on our blinders all in the name of assuming that everyone “truly” wants what they say they want. As we all know, we rarely think we want an option that seems wholly impractical or unimaginable given the way norms are.

I really didn’t want to make this personal–because I do respect that people have particular situations that should be respected. So please understand my point as a general one. You hide behind the cloak of anonymity, remember, so shouldn’t get to take anything too personally.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 4:08:15 PM

So what, pray tell, is your solution: that I rip the child from the breast and order the wife back to work? That’ll teach the little buggers the right lesson: daddy and Ethan know what’s best for mommy.

I’m not defending the patriarchical society in which we live. I’m simply suggesting that the solutions you offer (to the extent you offer any) are far too glib to be taken seriously.

And how is it, exactly, that you seem to know that the wife does not insist on staying home? Isn’t that a wee bit paternalist, not to mention presumtuous? And, although you may not be in a position to know, I can also tell you that it is wrong.

As for our kids, I don’t think it is a bad thing for them to see that a parent wants to stay home with them. It is too bad that they don’t see their father getting that opportunity and taking that responsibility, but finances being what they are, it is the best they can get. Meanwhile, considering that the wife and all aunts, grandmothers, and at least one great-grandmother are professionals, with each generation progressing into the workforce at greater speed (and meanwhile, all of the males make sacrifices to be home as much as possible), I think we’re moving in the right direction.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 3:56:21 PM

I suppose it is my role here to be the jerk. But aren’t you letting yourself off a little easy, Amos, by not breaking the cycle of violence? Surely your wife isn’t insisting that she be kept from work. We can’t affirm all people’s choices when they reproduce hierarchical structures that will continue to gender our society and reinforce the very stereotypes we all have hoped our children wouldn’t have to confront. It matters when little boys and girls look out into the world and see the choices mommies and daddies made.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 3:41:44 PM

Not old-fashioned feminist of you at all. In fact, absolutely correct. I’m not exactly certain what our future holds, but my family may fall into that model–and it isn’t a model I like.

But telling my wife she’s either anti-feminist or a victim surely isn’t the answer.

I recommend reading the companion books “Bitch in the House” and “Bastard on the Couch,” if you haven’t yet. Many of the thoughts expressed in the essays rang true for us.

I also recommend “Little Children,” a nice little satire on suburban white parenting.

Now: what were we disagreeing about again?

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 3:35:22 PM

We agree on (and our anecdotal experiences converge on) this: among working class and (truly) middle class families with one SAH parent (usually mom), the person staying at home often views that role as a great privilege, even a family consumption item. I see a lot of comments like “We did without cable and a bigger car this year because it’s important for me to be at home with the kids, and I wouldn’t have it any other way.” And the dads often express regret about not being home more. In part, this is because the jobs that many of the people in question are leaving (or working) are just that — jobs, not careers or passions. If I were a receptionist with a cranky boss, I would also relish the opportunity to be home full-time, and if I were a guy with an office job that I didn’t love, I would be sad that I could not spend more time with my kids. My grandmother couldn’t understand why I didn’t want to be home full-time if I could afford it, but that’s because she had to work in a dry-cleaning store when she would have preferred to be home with her children.

The issues among the “financially secure” tend to be different — often you have two people in whose educations staggering amounts of money (or at least loans) have been invested, and one of them ends up pursuing an “alpha” career while the other sort of peters out. I think that’s fine, but I get anxious when the alpha careers seem to fall disproportionately to the men while the petering falls to the women. Sorry if that’s old-fashioned-feminist of me…

Posted by: Ariela | Apr 14, 2005 3:24:39 PM

Ariela, I think these are important questions, and questions that hopefully appointments committees are asking as well. I was just wondering from the lead-in “Ariela writes in on feminism and legal academia” whether there was an underlying argument connecting feminism (or its death) to women’s experiences in legal academia. But definitely, being geographically mobile is a key to a teaching appointment, and people in two-career families are much less geographically mobile.

Posted by: Christine | Apr 14, 2005 3:14:45 PM

Ariela: First: not the exclusive province of the “law school” set; rather, that of the economically secure.

You say you often see families scaling back so that one person gets to stay home with the kids. My experience is precisely the opposite: couples choose to enter the workforce together in order to move into the “right” neighborhoods with the “best” schools for their kids.

But let us assume that you are correct, and you surely are in lots and lots of cases. People are making sacrifices for their children. You believe that the sacrifice usually falls on the mother, for she is the one who usually stays home. And in many cases, that is absolutely true and unfortunate. But in lots of cases, the sacrifice is the father’s who wants to stay home, or it is borne by both–neither of whom is completely satisfied with the status quo, but both of whom believe they are doing the best they can for themselves, each other, and their family.

And so: YES. It would be wonderful if the choices and opportunities were available equally. The fact that they aren’t isn’t quite the fault of the individuals living their lives, nor are they deservant of the rhetoric that is lobbed their way.

I’ll be honest with you: maybe you are right that rhetoric about the middle and lower classes is usually employed by secretly anti-feminist men who just love the status quo. I, however, was first introduced to it by a bona fide female feminist who has spent her life working to build grass-roots support for progressive legislation and employment policies that would allow for more choice at all strata of society; rather than worrying about whether my wealthy wife is a victim for wanting to stay home with her children.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 3:10:46 PM

“[H]it it on the head AGAIN?” Do tell, Joel.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 2:54:15 PM

In response to amosanon1’s last comment (I am confused – are you the same person as Amos Anon?), I only partly agree with you that these decisions about how to balance and trade off careers and family care are the exclusive province of the law school set. Obviously, the truly poor are not taking turns having clerkships while their spouses stay home with the kids and work on their dissertations (my life last year — my clerkship, my husband’s dissertation; this year we switched and I moved to an insane place for his grad studies). But I’ve found, at least anecdotally, that a lot of working-class parents make significant sacrifices so that one of them (USUALLY but not always the wife) can be home with the kids, for the same reasons that your wife may choose to be home. Okay, I will admit that my sample comes from some of the “parenting” web sites and newsletters (does any of you subscribe to babycenter.com?), but you do see an awful lot of people on those sites who exert some control over their lives by moving to smaller houses or cheaper neighborhoods so that one parent can stay home. I’ve also found that when male elites (not you, of course) get annoyed with being questioned about the gender arrangements that facilitate their careers as leftist intellectuals, they sometimes try to change the subject by saying that the whole topic is of concern only to rich, overeducated white feminists … it is a great way to shut down the examination of the practices that perpetuate the imbalances on law school faculties.

To Christine: the point of the questions was more to suggest that academia, while child-friendly in the ways Ethan suggests (namely, the flexible hours), is also still a career that often requires an entire family to move around to facilitate one person’s advancement. I was supposing that the one person is still usually male (but maybe I’m wrong, haven’t seen your blog yet), and that this may account for what seems to be an unbalanced readership/writership on these blogs. I didn’t mean the questions as a personal interrogation of anyone; I was more interested to see if the numbers more or less break down the way I’m guessing they do.

Posted by: Ariela | Apr 14, 2005 2:53:54 PM

AA1, the legal gestalt he or she is, has again hit it on the head. We are products of our culture and that culture has primarily been patriarchal. That there is even a question of the proper balance between the home and job for either men or women demonstrates this. We are still working on the ideal world where gender and race don’t matter and where the choice of who works and how much is there for all families. In the meantime, the psychology of development supports strong parental involvement in the formative stages of a child’s life. Ethalogically speaking, the desire to be a “stay-at-home mom” or “stay-at-home dad” may be rooted in what it means to be human. That it is predominantly women who make this choice, IMHO, goes to the socialization of the genders in our society. As to the data collection, I’m only a part-time prawf and single so I don’t have useful data for Ms. Migdal.

Posted by: Joel | Apr 14, 2005 2:46:24 PM

I’m not sure what the point of answering the questions is. Is the assumption of the questions that feminism died? That it deserved to die? That it didn’t deserve to die?

As readers of the Conglomerate know, our blog is 50% female, and I moved cross-country with my very supportive husband of a different name and our two small children. Small victories? Maybe, maybe not.

Posted by: Christine Hurt | Apr 14, 2005 1:49:07 PM

In an ideal world, each spouse/partner would be able to choose what kind of job heesh wants, how much time heesh will spend with the children, and so forth.

But we don’t live in that ideal world. Indeed, the amazing thing is that this conversation only even applies to elites. Most people don’t get to choose whether he’ll work or whether she’ll work; or get to live out their fantasy of achieving “balance” through taking up academic positions or paid bloggers. That isn’t even on the radar for most.

The woman who cleans my office in the middle of the night would surely prefer a day job and good daycare for her kids; but just as surely, those aren’t options for her. She’s not elite enough to get to make those choices. The feminist revolution hasn’t much impacted the life of this poor hispanic mother; unless you think that giving her the “opportunity” to scrub toilets at 2 A.M. is a real pleasant one for her. But who knows? Maybe it is better than whatever alternative she had before this oppotrunity was available to her.

For those of us who are lucky enough to have these choices, I sympathize with both Dan and Ethan. W

ho is Ethan to say that my wife’s deep desire to stay home with a child for a few months or years–even when it means sacrificing some of her career goals, or at least delaying them–is somehow not worthy, or merely the product of a patriarchical society? And Ethan, why don’t you step over to my house and suggest that to her; see what she has to say. She’d tell you (as she’s told me when I’ve pointed out that there are other options) that having this time with her children is far more important to her at this stage of her life than whatever other options she has. Or is she just too dense to know any better?

And you know who is paying a price for this? Me. I frequently lament and have deep guilt about the fact that I do not have more time to spend with my family. It was never really a choice I could make.

On the other hand, Ethan is no doubt correct that we are products of our culture, a culture which obviously comes from, and still includes, deep patriarchical structure. It isn’t just kismet that my wife wants to stay at home and that I feel that I couldn’t make that choice. That didn’t just happen for us, and it doesn’t just happen for millions of others.

In the end, the question is not whether I should kick my wife out the door and rip the kid from her breast while I stay home with the bottle. Rather, the challenge is to affirm people’s decisions, while still doing everything we can to increase everyone’s choices: mine, my wife’s, the pre-k teacher’s, and the woman who cleans my office.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 14, 2005 1:40:39 PM

Brian:

Obviously anyone who reads these blogs knows that you are clearly not aligned with the right-wing echo chamber. But I think we just can’t get around the fact that the blawgosphere is dominated by white men, who together, if not individually, must acknowledge that voices are missing here. Even if you are a powerful advocate for the left, it still matters that you are a white man. I could be wrong–and I hope one day gender and race don’t matter.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 12:55:29 PM

What light does my being a “white male” shed on my similarities in blogging with Bainbridge, Volokh, Bernstein, Smith, Rappaport, etc.? None, I should have thought–at least for anyone who had read these blogs–which might have given one pause before clustering bloggers that way.

Posted by: Brian Leiter | Apr 14, 2005 12:44:50 PM

I give up.

Posted by: Dan Markel | Apr 14, 2005 12:14:25 PM

As you know, Dan, the “privacy” of the family unit is very often used as a cover to turn a blind eye to the domination that goes on therein. Of course, ideally, we shouldn’t judge people’s choices. But if the “women moving for their man prof” is routine, we have to scrutinize that social practice (at least with intermediate scrutiny!).

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 11:43:33 AM

To answer Ariela’s questions, I agree that, like Ethan, part of the reason that motivates the choice to abandon lucre in the marketplace to pursue academic life is the flexibility to spend more time (at different times) with your kids. That said, there are bad parents who are academics and good parents who are lawyers, to state the obvious. Each family dynamic requires attention and cultivation.

Michael Froomkin had actually asked Brian Leiter to set up a post on couples in the academic marketplace. We can start it here, I guess. Froomkin and his spouse are on the Miami faculty, Jerry Kang and his spouse (S. Kim I believe) were being considered in various places this year before they decided to stay in LA; Julie Suk and Jae Lee both got jobs in NY this year. I’m sure there are many “established” couples at various faculties: e.g., Martha Minow and Joe Singer at HLS. Among the junior set, I can also think of Sam Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger at Wash U., though they are no longer so junior since they lateraled over to Wash U as tenured profs.

FWIW, schools in places like T-town have a tougher time recruiting women notwithstanding the schools’ mightiest efforts. But I think it’s misguided to suggest that there’s something “wrong” with women going to move to other cities to facilitate the husbands’ careers and v-v. Each relationship is its own moral universe and any suggestion (and I’m not suggesting this is Ariela’s point) that the compromises a couple works out is subject to external validation or opprobrium is itself subject to the strictest of scrutiny!

Posted by: Dan Markel | Apr 14, 2005 11:37:41 AM

Foreign Law and the Bible

Orin Kerr, at the VC, is comparing the Court’s citing of foreign law in interpreting the US Constitution with the potential citing of biblical reasoning. He’s no doubt right that such an alternative source of inspiration would elicit outrage from many who are perfectly pleased to see the Court using foreign sources in its rendering of the Constitution. It is a provocative comparison–and I welcome comments here about why the analogy does or doesn’t work (since he hasn’t allowed comments).

As a first pass, I think there is the obvious point that the Constitution itself purports to be immune from religious hermeneutics. We can argue about what is a fair and properly historical account of the First Amendment’s religious protections; but reasoning about the Constitution’s meaning from within a particular religious tradition is probably precluded by the document itself. It would do extreme violence to the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment. I don’t think the document is similarly textually immune from foreign law.

I welcome more comments, since this is hardly enough to dispense with Orin’s very interesting thought experiment.

Posted by Ethan Leib on April 13, 2005 at 05:06 PM

Comments

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Posted by: xango mangosteen | May 20, 2005 10:33:25 AM

I appreciate Kerr’s thought experiment, and if I were more clever, I would take it further: citing the Bible to bolster the philosophical basis for a Constitutional right, and contrariwise, citing international consensus to support government action against such a right.

Kerr’s point is that these things fit nicely into touchstones in the culture war, and I agree — to the extent that they are exaggerated in the partisan media. The opposite cases, I imagine, would be ignored by culture warriors as useless for their purposes. But the cultural debate of the day shouldn’t affect the legal validity of the opinions.

I feel sorry for Kennedy that he, a conservative, gets the brunt of right-wing criticism. (What was the latest — comparing him to the KKK?) In difficult questions of rights, getting the moderate vote seems to require watering down the philosophical and historical argument. In Roper, his opinion came down to a pretty narrow bean-counting reversal, along with some empirical hedging, rather than the best case against juvenile execution. That’s my feeling, anyway.

Posted by: Ezra | Apr 15, 2005 5:45:37 PM

Above, Davelawyer wrote:

“The use of the Bible would be an appropriate tool to test the evolving standards of decency in, say, 70 A.D., but not today.”

This seems unquestionably wrong, at least in the United States. If we truly want the 8th amendment debate to turn on current beliefs about standards of decency, then the fact that the United States has a very large and increasing number of very religious christians should be a factor. If “our” includes a large part of the nation’s population, the document that they cite as a moral guide surely tells us something about their beliefs about what is and what is not decent.

This seems to me to be a tempest in a teapot. Outside of the 8th amendment context (a special one), the main use of international law in domestic decisions is in providing alternative rules to unsolved problems. Courts turn to british and other common law countries to solve questions of how to interpret the common law of torts, contracts etc. all the time and do so without much incident. Outside of the 8th amendment context, international law decisions are used this way by the Supreme too (as they are, in a way, in Lawrence, where they were used for, among other thing, evidence that permitting sodomy hasn’t had any of the bad effects Texas claimed it would have in other similar jurisdictions).

If international law decisions are merely used as examples of potential rules and/or evidence about the potential effects of rules, then there isn’t much to worry about in the citation of the bible. Citing the bible wouldn’t be wrong — it would be ineffective. Outside of the 8th amendment context, it is unlikely that judges would cite to the bible as a rhetorical technique because it would be unlikely to convince anyone that a rule is good.

Posted by: Question | Apr 15, 2005 1:55:37 PM

Not only does the nature and structure of the constitution preclude any possible relevance of foreign law or opinion, lest we forget that the Constitution is (or at least used to be) a source of the enumerated powers of our government. Absent an affirmative grant of authority/sovereignty to other nations, there is no basis to argue that their laws or norms have one scintilla of relevance to the meaning of our Constitution.

I hope that conservative judges and policy makers stay principled to the text of the Constitution, but who could blame them for joining in the game of looking out over the crowd of foreign laws and picking out a few friends to undermine the exclusionary rule if that is the new game in town? Decisions like Lawrence and Roper, as well as the recent statements by Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor on the relevance of foreign law to our Constitution, are opening the door for it to be perfectly proper to look to what Great Britain and Canada are doing in with their repressive libel laws in order to determine what our First Amendment means.

I hope that it doesn’t come to that but that is the road that the Court is going down. If it becomes an acceptable practice, you can bet a day will come when five conservatives throw Roe on the ash-heap, citing extensively to all the other nations who prohibit abortion.

The court is doing something terribly destructive to the Constitution with citations to international law. (I remind you that the precedent the Court overturned in Roper was less than sixteen years old) While it may be aesthetically pleasing for the left at this particular moment in history, if it is not stopped now, the left will rue the day this became acceptable practice. The right already does.

Posted by: MJ | Apr 15, 2005 12:21:44 PM

Roy,

But there is NO point in using that point of reference unless foreign opinions of decency and governance are to be incorporated into American law.

I have to say that I don’t think those espousing this bizarro theory have realized the opposite could happen. If international norms of punishment can influence American law, then they can also allow laws which Americans think are cruel and unusual to occur despite our morals to the contrary. Imagine if in 100 years Europe becomes Islamic. They decide to start chopping limbs off for petty theft. Should that effect our law on dismemberment as a form of punishment? If a state or locality decides to adopt this barbaric punishment, do we then cite the international community’s consensus in contravention to American morals? Is that permissable too?

Posted by: Palooka | Apr 15, 2005 12:08:14 PM

It seems to me there is a difference between “French law says xyz and requires us to follow it” and “No developed country executes juveniles” as a point of reference.

I also wonder about biblical guidance. There was a death penalty case recently overturned because the jury consulted bible passages.

Posted by: roy solomon | Apr 15, 2005 11:45:41 AM

I’m going to have to insist on my point above: this is a debate over the legitimate sources of law, and Kerr’s (and my) intuition is that only those materials recognized as such by a majority of Americans will do. All I know about the Calabresi argument is Ethan’s precis of it, but from that it seems Calabresi shares the same intuition: his argument, as I understand it, is that the Framers incorporated international law, or the laws of nations, into certain provisions of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment among them. International or foreign law is probative in interpreting these provisions, then, on an originalist interpretive theory. And originalism also rests on democratic legitimation (although it’s much more restrictive than living constitutionalism). Calabresi’s historical claim sounds a bit far fetched to me, but he knows better than I.

Why must the Justices take sides in the culture wars with regard to their choice of sources of law? Kennedy could rest his arguments on precedent, a few well-established treatises, and still render a left of center holding, and Thomas could rely on the same sources and come out the other way. That is, by mutual agreement, the Justices could, and generally have restricted themselves to uncontroversial sources of law, on a kind of Mutually Assured Destruction model: if you reach for your ICC convention, I’ll reach for my Leviticus, and who knows where it will end?

What is dismaying about this new arms race over the sources of law is that it seems to be provoked by the left, and the left is pushing in a prima facie anti-democratic direction. We on the left have been down this road before, and have ceded more and more of the electorate to the right. The academy should reject the trend; instead, I get the sense that it really wants to justify it by complex and counterintuitive argument which will explain why, despite appearances, this is not an anti-democratic trend. All this flows from the left’s self-defeating and disasterous embrace of the judiciary as its forum of choice.

Am I wrong about that?

Posted by: Joe Schwartz | Apr 15, 2005 8:50:02 AM

I just reread my post, and I don’t know why I wrote “craven.” I intended depraved, wicked. Sorry for the confusion.

Posted by: Palooka | Apr 14, 2005 11:40:01 PM

There is absolutely no basis to believe the 8th Amendment commands our Courts to impose foriegn opinions of decency on craven Americans. It’s ridiculous to posit that by “cruel and unusual” the Framers intended what is “cruel and unusual” abroad to dictate American law. Unless you think the Constitution means whatever the Court says it means. And in that case, what’s the point of this discussion?

Posted by: Palooka | Apr 14, 2005 11:00:45 PM

Hey, all, I disagree with Kerr’s analogy. I don’t think its even roughly apposite (is that a phrase?). My understanding is that the hubub about reference to foreign law arose recently because of the majority opinion in Roper, an Eighth Amendment case. I think much of the discussion misses the point that Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual analysis requires a review of trends for or against a particular punishment (“evolving standards of decency”). This is a pretty unusual framework except for obcenity cases (could be wrong here, though).

The use of the Bible would be an appropriate tool to test the evolving standards of decency in, say, 70 A.D., but not today. The better evidence is to look to the local, then state, then national, and then the international community standards. The latter are especially helpful when addressing thorny and open questions like the death penalty for offenses committed as a minor (as opossed to a closed question like “whether it’s okay to kill blue eyed Irishmen” – well perhaps not so closed to my long-suffering esposa!)

The peculiar Eighth Amendment analytic requirements mandate (in my thinking) that the court consider international legal trends (especially when consonant with local, state, and national trends) that are so overwhelming as to align the minority of states that still condoned killing individuals that commited their crimes while legally children with a handful of strikingly oppressive regimes.

Ultimately, though, we are talking about analyzing the contemporaneous and evolving standards and behavior. Looking to the laws of our fellow nations does that. Looking to the Bible gives us a wonderful glimpse of ancient societies, but not our own “evolving standards.”

The “hubub” is indicative, I think, of a lack of information among the general public about various legal standards and the inevitable overreaction that flows from that. (By this, I indict our curricula, I do not condescend.) The Roper opinion does not forbode the EU overseeing our dogcatcher regulations. It brings to mind the last stage of the Schiavo case and the reaction of many that the judiciary thumbed its nose at Congress. It did no such thing. The court merely applied well establishe TRO factors and the Schindlers lost. But nobody talks about TRO factors because they are boring and require an explanation that lasts more than 30 seconds. Oh, what to do…?

Posted by: Davelawyer | Apr 14, 2005 10:00:14 PM

In the territory of political theory, though, we’ll have a hard time avoiding Orin’s point: that we will just have to pick a side in the culture wars. I’m a secularist, as it turns out. So my political theory keeps religion out of government as much as possible. But what I’m looking for is some way to distinguish Orin’s cases. Political theory is surely a good way to get some results I like–but it leaves me without a rejoinder to the admittedly narrow goal I set for myself here.

We do need to get more fine-grained about what we are talking about. Maybe I’ll start a new strain with some distinctions to get the conversation off the ground.

As for whether “moral sentiments abroad” are “patently ridiculous” for the Court to consider: I suspect I’d have to concede that “moral sentiments abroad” are usually pretty irrelevant to the interpretation of American law (though I couldn’t say the same of how foreign courts interpret the concept of “due process of law”). But in Roper such sentiment may not have been completely irrelevant: “cruel and unusual punishment” is not obviously immune from a deeper and wider inquiry into what is “unusual.”

There are also questions of public policy that courts are invariably asked to adjudicate, where foreign norms may matter. But this terrain has been well-trodden.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 9:49:50 PM

I think the OP and all the comments actually miss the critical error in Orin’s post. The court in the JDP case looked to foreign law to determine (according to their own jurisprudence, a required determination of) what exactly the modern social standards of cruel and unusual were.

The problem with Kerr’s example is not that it’s religious. The bible is fine as a historical and cultural document. The problem is that the support for the death penalty in the bible provides no probative value in understanding modern understanding of what is cruel and unusual. Indeed, some of the examples Kerr uses proves this point itself, as the bible allows the death penalty for crimes in which the sheer lack of proportionality would make them banned by the 5th amendment without hesitation.

To put it this way: the view of the leaders of the largest denominations of churches (including nonchristian ones), particularly those within the United States, would have probative value…and I’d imagine they would go both ways but mainly push against the death penalty. Since the Court would be looking at the religious views for modern cultural value, rather than timeless/past religious value, I think (as a liberal) that this would be acceptable, so long as it was not the exclusive area the Court searched for in giving meaning to “cruel and unusual”.

Posted by: Justin | Apr 14, 2005 9:46:35 PM

Ethan, aren’t you just pushing things back a level? If someone asserts that the first amendment is best interpreted in a way inconsistent with the meaning you set forth here, and then cites as additional support the bible, what are we to do?

I don’t think the text is going to do the job. What is needed isn’t an interpretive theory, but a political theory.

Posted by: Thomas | Apr 14, 2005 9:27:21 PM

“But say the Court cites my article on the Guarantee Clause (available on my SSRN page, by the way) in support of its legal conclusions some day in the future. It would be hard to say that such a citation has any democratic legitimacy”

Scholarship which has to do with the US law is certainly legitimate. I doubt there would be much controversy if the Supreme Court cited a french expert on the US Constitution or its history (how many times has Tocqueville been cited?). I think you’re confusing the “source.” Scholarship on US law is using the law and its history as the source, the scholarship is just one interpretation of that source. Sifting through that scholarship is part of finding the best or “right” interpretation of the Constitution.

Foreign courts, however, are not in the business of interpreting American law. They deal with their constitutions and legal traditions, not ours.

That said, I think labeling the problem as one of “democratic legitmacy” is not terribly helpful. The appropriate question is: what are the valid sources of American law. I don’t see how one can include in those sources moral sentiments abroad. That seems to me patently ridiculous.

Posted by: Palooka | Apr 14, 2005 9:24:36 PM

Kerr’s wrong. It IS a soveriegnty issue. There is no reason to cite international opinion of homosexuality or the death penalty unless international opinion carries weight in our legal system. It, of course, does not. It’s just one of many problems in what is today’s grab-bag jurisprudence. A dash of legislative history, a smidgen of international opinion, and a good dose of sophomoric philosophy, and you have what passes today as “interpretation” of our nation’s laws.

Sovereignty issues aside, the approach is dishonest. America has a unique and exceptional Constitution. I do not think the Court wishes to throw away the exclusionary rule, separation of church and state, exceedingly liberal freedom of speech, or abortion-on-demand because those are unique to America or are uncommon in the international community.

To be sure, there are limited cases in which I can accept the use of international law (such as in the interpretation of treaties). Interesting as the acceptable cases may be, let’s be clear–we are talking about Lawrence and Roper v. Simmons when we criticize the Court’s use (or misuse) of international law.

Posted by: Palooka | Apr 14, 2005 7:10:11 PM

Elegantly done, as always. To be sure, the plain meaning of “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” tells us nothing about what is really at issue in this conversation: proper modes and sources of judicial interpretation. And I am very honest in my original post that I can’t quite say what is wrong with your very interesting analogy.

Still, I think the First Amendment is at least a clue that we shouldn’t look to establishments of religion in trying to understand consitutional provisions. The Preamble–MJ’s textual anchor–just didn’t seem to counsel against foreign sources in the same way.

I haven’t made it through the new S. Calabresi article on the subject but something seems right about its conclusions: that there are domains where the Constitution signals to us where foreign sources might be more relevant than others. I believe he concludes that in the 4th and 8th Amendment contexts, it is appropriate to look to other countries because these provisions invoke reasonableness and typicality on their face. I’m not sure what I think of that, but I do like the idea that the document may be signaling to us what sorts of authorities are relevant when. And I would say that the First Amendment is signalling to us that biblical reasoning is okay just about never.

To me, Zorach is a stain on the U.S. Reports. Same with Bowers and Moore. Precisely because they invoke our Judeo-Christian heritage.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 14, 2005 6:21:00 PM

Ethan,

Is your view that the First Amendment bars the the Supreme Court from noting that its view of the Constitution happens to be shared by a Biblical rule? If so, can you explain how you reach that conclusion?

Posted by: Orin Kerr | Apr 14, 2005 6:03:34 PM

Sometimes at least the citation of foreign law seems completely reasnable and right, and these are often the cases that get people the most worked up. Consider Lawrence. One reason why it was perfectly reasonable, perhaps necessary, to cite what Europe was doing was that the majority in Bowers had done much the same thing, saying that all of western civilization had had such rules. Given that these rules had been turned down in Europe since then, this helped undercut the argument in Bowers. So, it was a useful part of the argument for showing that Bowers could not stand. I don’t know how far this sort of thing applies to other controversial cases, but it seems important here.

Posted by: Matt | Apr 13, 2005 9:13:01 PM

If we’re letting Americans vote with their remote controls, then by looking at The West Wing’s ratings I think we can preclude Barlett from being any form of precedent.

Posted by: Polybius | Apr 13, 2005 7:46:30 PM

Ethan,

Your point, as I understand it is that the text of the first amendment precludes the use of a religious basis to interpret the Constitution.

My first point is that the preamble states that the Constitution was enacted by citizens of the United States for the United States. Doesn’t that provide the same immunity from foreign law that the first amemndment provides from religious law? If not, why? My second point is that mere silence on a matter does not mean that it is permitted, the (perhaps not so) obvious implication being that the very nature and sructure of the Constitution itself is highly suggestive that it is immune from foreign law.

If I wasn’t clear; those are my points – the Constitution is immune from foreign law both by the text of the preamble and its nature and structure, every bit as much as it is immune from (for lack of a better term) religious law.

Posted by: MJ | Apr 13, 2005 7:09:03 PM

Or maybe there exists a third option: that legal reasoning should be seen as distinct from authority. If your law review article legal reasoning were persuasive, the Court could adopt it. Citing you, then, is gratuitous — a courtesy, and one I’m sure you’d appreciate, but neither here nor there.

But that is really by the way. The issue here is not one of reasoning (or “analysis”), but one of authority, I think, and that is because the guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment can only be given content by authority, not by reasoning from first principles.

Posted by: Joe Schwartz | Apr 13, 2005 6:16:19 PM

Hey – I thought you lived in California. You’re in my building?

So how would you defend the use of law review articles, then (so much is contained in that word, “probative”)? I think you’re attacking from the more controversial side, that there exists a non-democratic mode of legitimation. What is it?

Posted by: Joe Schwartz | Apr 13, 2005 6:11:26 PM

Hey, Joe. Welcome! Funny that we work in the same builing but communicate only this way.

I do understand the gist of your point–and you know that I’m all for democratic legitimacy. But say the Court cites my article on the Guarantee Clause (available on my SSRN page, by the way) in support of its legal conclusions some day in the future. It would be hard to say that such a citation has any democratic legitimacy. But it would be harder to say, I think, that it would be inappropriate if the legal analysis were probative.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 13, 2005 6:06:13 PM

Ethan,

I take your point that the First Amendment would preclude, say, an explicitly Episcopalian interpretation of the Constitution. But I think Kerr’s point is more straightforwardly about the legitimate sources of law, rather than legitimate modes of reasoning. Kerr (and Justice Kennedy) complicate the question somewhat by merely “finding confirmation” (in the words of Roper) for their holdings in those sources, rather than finding authority (binding or otherwise).

But the question remains the same: what texts or legal communities are among the legitimate sources of law on which the Supreme Court may rely or to which it may refer? Stated that way, I think Kerr’s intuition is this: only those sources of law that have democratic legitimacy — i.e., that are recognized as legitimate by a sizeable American majority — should be counted among the sources of law. (Your post points out that even if a source has democratic legitimacy, the Constitution may impose other limits if, for instance, reliance on (or reference to) those sources were to violate an individual right protected by the First Amendment).

If you’re going to defeat Kerr’s argument, you’re either going to have to argue that international law does have democratic legitimacy, or else that there exists another, non-democratic test for the legitimacy of a would-be source of law.

Oh, and hi! Enjoying your blog very much.

Posted by: Joe Schwartz | Apr 13, 2005 5:54:07 PM

We aren’t talking about “applicability” (i.e., using foreign law as a rule of decision). Nor, in fact, are we talking about the merits of taking judicial notice, as it were, of foreign decisions. We are simply pursuing the differences in the analogies. Stay analytically focused. We’ll blog about the merits another time.

We can disagree about the persuasiveness of any particular foreign decision. Indeed, the decisions of Saudi Arabia may be no more probative than the decisions of the fictional court on the West Wing. But that is a wholly different matter from the question of the exclusion of a set of authorities by the very text we are seeking to interpret–one that strongly suggests on its face that certain forms of interpretation are not to be consulted.

On the other hand, maybe “securing the blessings of liberty” requires us to look to the source of that blessing, a religious word I can’t deny….

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 13, 2005 5:46:21 PM

You don’t think the preamble’s “We the people of the United States…do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America” is a pretty conclusive basis to infer that foreign law, made by persons other than of the United States for countries other than the United States of America, is inapplicable?

There is not one syllable in the Constitution that confers a single power to any foreign government. The argument saying that because the Constitution is silent as to foreign law, it’s use in interpreting the document may be permissible is the equivalent of saying that because the Constitution is silent as to hour long dramas and sitcoms, the Supreme Court may legitimately cite to statements by Jed Bartlett and George Costanza to determine evolving standards of decency.

At least the citizens of the United States vote for Bartlett and Costanza with their remote controls.

Posted by: MJ | Apr 13, 2005 5:33:37 PM

Should Supermajority Rules Apply to SCOTUS Decisions

Over the past couple of years, some scholars have argued in favor of requiring a supermajority of the Supreme Court to overturn congressional laws. My good friend Jed Shugerman (who was just hired by Harvard Law) wrote a piece in 2003 arguing that the Rehnquist Court’s trend of overturning federal legislation by 5-4 margins is historically anomalous, undermines the presumption of constitutionality, and turns the notion of coequal branches into mere lip service.

I agree that Jed has identified a serious problem, but. . . .

I am not convinced that a supermajority rule fixes it. It may be true that a 6-3 majority provides a bit more confidence that the Court has it right than a 5-4 majority does, but not much more. All it would take to increase many decisions from 5-4 to 6-3 would be for Stevens to step down and be replaced by a conservative. A 6-3 head count does not prove fidelity to the Constitution, nor does it evidence increased deference towards Congress and its role in constitutional interpretation.

The real issue is that perhaps all Justices on the Court pretend as though the Constitution speaks clearly on every issue, and that the choice is always binary: yes, it is constitutional; or no, it is not constitutional. In fact, sometimes the answer is neither yes nor no, but rather “maybe.”

It would be better if the Justices simply recognized that the Constitution simply isn’t clear on everything; and if it is not clear–that is, if a reasonable argument can be made in either direction–then Congress should be given latitude to interpret the Constitution reasonably.

Thus, a statute could be overturned even by a 5-4 margin, so long as the 5 Justices believe that any other interpretation is unreasonable. Similarly, even if 6 (or 8) Justices believe one interpretation to be stronger, they should be hesitant to strike a statute that is within the realm of reasonable interpretation.

The point is that the Justices, individually and as a group, should be a bit less territorial about the right to interpret the Constitution.

I should be clear that this is just a suggestion I am throwing out there; I am not certain whether it could work in practice, or even if it is desirable. But I am certainly not bothered by the fact that this suggestion, if followed, would protect statutes in place that I believe ought to be overturned. That’s what it means to live by principle: identify the principle, and let the chips fall where they may–even if on your own head.

Posted by Hillel Levin on April 13, 2005 at 04:17 PM

» 5-4 decisions and the presumption of constitutionality from World Class Federalists in Paradise Some scholars have argued that 5-4 Supreme Court decisions that invalidate federal statutes undermine the presumption of constitutionality that legislation normally receives. The idea is that any question of constitutionality which is so close as to re… [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 20, 2006 7:08:01 PM

Comments

Nowhere in the Constitution does it state that the Supreme Court is the only body that may interpret the Constitution. Indeed, members of congress all swear oaths of fidelity to the Constitution, and it is thus incumbent upon them to understand and (therefore) interpret it. If a Justice believes that the right to bear arms is somewhat difficult to understand and apply to the present circumstances, and that its contours and application are therefore muddy, complex, and hidden in the shadows of the past, then why should this counter-majoritarian institution substitute its will for that of The People, whatever the vote is? I would much rather defer to congress in such an instance. As I said, if the Court’s majority is overwhelming or unanimous, that may indicate that there is only one reasonable interpretation; but it isn’t a perfect proxy.

Looking back through history, I am less than confident that the Court gets it right more times than it gets it wrong. Nor, by any means, do I believe that congress gets it right more often than not. But if I must choose between two flawed institutions, I prefer the one that is ultimately answerable, in some small measure to me. The Court has its place: where congress CLEARLY oversteps its bounds, the Court is an effective check. But where judges are reduced to arguing about how many guns George Washington owned in order to determine whether we may bar people from owning anti-aircraft weapons or whether gun lock laws are permissible, I fear we’ve missed the point.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 15, 2005 9:43:42 AM

Your position that if “a reasonable argument can be made in either direction–then Congress should be given latitude to interpret the Constitution reasonably” sounds a lot of a sort of qualified immunity for federal statutes. Perhaps this is in proper. Though I would hope that one would study a stack of AEDPA and 1983/QI cases before concluding that government officials need further immunity from review. A lot of fans of individual liberty despise (justifiably, I think) the Court’s current QI and AEDPA jurisprudence.

I realize my point is somewhat means-end based. But I think it’s appropriate to look at the possible result of your proposal. I think one obvious result would be the implosion of individual liberty.

Moreover, the Court’s arful use of standards of review already largely provides the result you seek. E.g., Congress’ interpretation of its own powers are subject to rational basis level of review. (But see City of Boerne). Note too that the rationale of the FECA and BCRA cases relied heavily upon deference to Congress. Lowenstein & Hasen even style a chapter in their election law book as “The New Deference.”

I’m not sure Congress needs further review from scrutiny, which is what your procedural rule would impose. As with many AEDPA cases, an opinion might lede: “We hold that X-law is not an unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional law.” Is that really a world we would want to live in?

Posted by: Mike | Apr 14, 2005 9:37:28 PM

To make things simpler, change the number of justices to an even number, 8 or 10 or 20. That would eradicate 1 vote margin decisions. The lower court decision would stand, often in obedience to a SC decision of 10 years before. The chowderheads on the SC lay in wait for the public to accomodate to their irresponsible, moronic, yet inscrutable gibberish decisions. After 10 years, they pounce and reverse.

Early signs of dementia are also valid reason for removal by force and impeachment, underutilized to date. I am not picking on Rehnquist. I am picking on those buffoons, Scalia and Breyer. Get rid of all 3.

A 5-4 decision indicates the country has not settled the controversy. It brings disrespect to the court.

Posted by: SupremacyClaus | Apr 14, 2005 7:45:32 PM

Marriage and Taxes

Interesting piece in the New York Times Magazine on the dilemma same-sex couples married in MA face when filling out their federal taxes, which do not allow them to check off one of the “Married” boxes.

Two quick points:

1. Some couples believe that the federal government is forcing them to lie by checking off “Single.” I disagree. The strongest argument in favor of same-sex marriage is that marriage itself is just a secular legal relationship. Although I strongly believe that same-sex marriage should be permitted under federal law, it is not inconsistent with the view of marriage as a legal relationship to say that one is married under MA law, but not federal law. Checking off the “Single” box just means “I am single under federal law.” Morally, we may believe that federal law should recognize these relationships, but as a descriptive matter, there is no lie here.

2. The article also mentions that some same-sex couples will simply fill in the “Married, Filing Separate” box to ease their consciences, and the IRS will just ignore it. Mathew Staver, a conservative opponent of same-sex marriage, states:

”[D]own the road, people could say, ‘We’ve been filing as married for quite a long time, and the I.R.S. hasn’t done anything about it.’ . . . Practice can ultimately become future law.”

I disagree with his politics, but I don’t think his prediction is wrong. Aren’t we likely to hear estoppel arguments? “We have been representing ourselves as married to the federal government for 30 years. The government took no action against us during all of that time. It can’t now deny a fact that it has tacitly accepted for 30 years!”

Posted by Hillel Levin on April 13, 2005 at 03:17 PM

SSRN and Blogging Subsidies, Redux

My soon to be colleague at FSU, Jon Klick, makes the following astute observations about the use of SSRN and the uses of blogging :

I wonder whether there will be enough buy-in to make the SSRN tournaments enough of a credible signal of school quality to make it worthwhile to subsidize blogging. First, lots of the law and econ schools (the main suppliers for the law series in SSRN) are migrating to BE Press, which will dilute SSRN’s effect. Second, I wonder if law reviews worry about taking an article that has been widely circulated via SSRN to the extent that it reduces its freshness (of course, there could also be the opposite effect that law reviews use SSRN rankings as a screening device . . . I don’t know where I come down on this, but I know one of my law co-authors is hesitant about posting on SSRN because of worries about adverse reactions from the law reviews). If the latter is the case, it will be hard to get law profs to post their articles (I suspect that one of the reasons law and econ people post so much is because they send the bulk of their stuff to peer reviewed journals where freshness is necessarily less impt given the multi-year publication lags).

There is, however, a potential positive effect of blogging in that I suspect law review editors will be drawn to the work of folks who have big blog presences (i.e., use blogging reputation as an additional proxy in their decision rule). Obviously it’s not a rigorous observation, but it would seem that a number of folks who blog have gotten a bump up in their placements as of late. Causality’s always a tough nut to crack (e.g., it could be that blogging simply makes one more productive, get better feedback early on in a work, etc), but one could probably get to the bottom of this by using the econ-side law and econ bloggers (who submit to peer reviewed journals where any blog reputation effect should be muted) as a control. If one were to determine that this effect exists, schools may want to subsidize blogging. However, as more folks blog, the proxy will be used less by editors and the effect gets diluted. So, in the end, it’s not clear that the subsidization equilibrium would be a better equilibrium.

Greg, over at Crescat, adds the perspective of a law review editor. Larry has touched on this as well.

Posted by Administrators on April 13, 2005 at 01:18 PM

Antigone and the Death Penalty

Fascinating op-ed by the Unabomber’s brother, who had helped law enforcement capture murderous Ted way back a few years ago. The essay actually presents an interesting and perhaps unmeasurable point about deterrence and the death penalty, one that I haven’t seen mentioned before:

How many family members out there are harboring information about a loved one’s crimes because they fear that their hubby, brother or son etc. will be executed? More precisely, the deterrence types should focus on how to answer the question of marginal deterrence: for those families who know something, are they not disclosing information because they fear any punishment at all for their loved one, or specifically executions?

Ethan and I are planning to write an article in the not-too distant future on the problems Antigone-type figures, such as the Unabomber’s brother, face in the law. Thoughts are welcome.

Posted by Administrators on April 13, 2005 at 12:50 PM

Comments

Family members are likely to have both more information and more loyalty than anyone else. Not always, of course, but I’d say the Unabomber’s brother was as torn as anyone could be. Thus, putting it in the context of family highlights the issue in the starkest way possible, but you are right that the logic can apply elsewhere.

Posted by: amosanon1 | Apr 15, 2005 1:19:20 PM

Why are families different than others who have both incriminating information and loyalty to the suspect?

Posted by: Noel O’contend-Ray | Apr 15, 2005 1:07:04 PM

I like the Antigone parallel. I think you can make the interesting case that the family member is put in the most difficult of positions in the law stuck between the duty to the law and duty to family. In the Orestia, Antigone gets the worst of the punishments since Orestes gets to have a trial and reform the Furies to the Eumenides. I think you can keep that analogy going. The fear of potential punishment because of the very lightning-bolt throwing law enforcement system that has developed does discourage cooperation from the family member … who ends up in greater trouble once the original suspect is apprehended. The family member may be guilty of harboring a fugitive whether or not the fugitive is convicted of the crime charged or not. The ethical catch-22.

Posted by: Joel | Apr 15, 2005 9:48:18 AM

Political Science Quarterly

My review of Lipset & Larkin’s The Democratic Century has just come out in the Spring 2005 issue of the Political Science Quarterly.

Now, they told me that they wouldn’t bother showing me line edits, so I was prepared for it to look a bit different. But they made the first sentence literally incomprehensible — and omitted the last paragraph, which was where I got critical. My bad review turned into a good one without consultation. Outrageous.

Here’s the paragraph they cut:

Still, there is something a bit stale about the book. There aren’t many new arguments; there is virtually no new data; and often the authors simply cite the work of others without performing their own testing or validation. Although much of the second part argues that hard-to-quantify variables need more rigorous attention from social scientists, the narratives in the final part of the book sometimes feel like just-so stories. We are told, for example, that culture matters, but we are given no real way to test whether and how much that may be so. We are given classic stereotypes about Latin American values, but are given no real way to test whether they were decisive in democracy’s development. Nevertheless, the book will be useful to many readers by introducing them to the world of democracy studies; it helpfully lays out the terrain in the field and makes a contribution with its broad-ranging exploration of democratic development in Latin America. Although the book will not likely be remembered as Lipset’s most original or thought-provoking contribution to social science, it surely displays his many impressive interventions into our understanding of democracy and allows us to see how his approach to studying democracy can be useful for the those interested in Latin America in particular.

Posted by Ethan Leib on April 13, 2005 at 11:04 AM

Teaching Loads

Over at The Conglomerate, Gordon Smith is gathering data about standard teaching loads at various schools. We young profs (can we stop with that ridiculous spelling?) probably can help filling in the information here. Write in with what you know.

Generally, first-year teachers get a reduced load — but some schools seem to give a reduced load for the first few years. I’d be interested in who is getting what on this dimension.

I believe my full load is an 11 credit year: a 5 credit Contracts course and a 6 credit Con Law sequence. In my first year, I am only teaching one semester of Con Law. I’d be interested in the deals others are getting at other schools.

Posted by Ethan Leib on April 13, 2005 at 10:50 AM

Comments

Totally appropriate comment, Scott. In my defense, Gordon Smith’s whole inquiry is premised on the hypothesis that there is a correlation between rank and load; hence my query’s infelicitous formulation. Apologies. As you’ll come to learn, respecting the hierarchy (whether Leiter’s or the US News’) is not one of my priorities.

Posted by: Ethan Leib | Apr 13, 2005 7:11:06 PM

I’m in my first year at Marquette Law. I had one three-credit course (employment discrimination) in the fall and then two courses in the spring: a four-credit 1L class (con law) and a seminar (class actions). The other new prof had the same “course types” in his first-year load. In future years, we have a four-course load, with the possibility of lighter loads for sabbaticals or special requests.

ps: Ethan — I love the blog, but if I were you, I’d avoid formulations like “better and worse schools”!

Posted by: Scott Moss | Apr 13, 2005 7:02:34 PM

I have a 3 credit course and a 2/3 credit seminar in the spring, and a four credit course in the fall. There is a good chance I may be teaching an extra seminar in the following year. It appears that reductions in load are used as inducements of various sorts at FSU and other schools.

Posted by: AA2 | Apr 13, 2005 3:02:25 PM

More on Dworkin

Sanjukta Paul has some more thoughts on Dworkin’s death and its reception here.

And David Grosz, also of Dissemination, is more generally musing on our astonishing number of big deaths in the past few weeks.

Posted by Ethan Leib on April 13, 2005 at 09:45 AM

Big Debut! Michigan’s Howse Joins PrawfsBlawg

I’m thrilled to announce the arrival of Rob Howse on the pages of PrawfsBlawg. I’ve been lucky enough to know Rob for the better part of a decade, when I went to research for him back in our shared hometown of Toronto the summer before law school started. (Chapeau tip here to Peter, who had a trenchant op-ed in the other day’s WaPo about the need to increase funding for Islamic and Middle Eastern studies in universities.)

Although Rob’s officially a widely respected international trade scholar at the University of Michigan Law School, that’s really a ruse. Rob is first and foremost a citizen of the republic of letters. His labo(u)r of love the last few years has been a wonderful novel entitled Mozart. You can learn more about it here and buy it here.

Rob will be an irregular contributor to PrawfsBlawg, where he will write short reviews of current fiction on a semi-monthly basis (or so), and some other notions. Welcome to PrawfsBlawg, Rob!

(I will post Rob’s Reviews next.)

Posted by Administrators on April 13, 2005 at 07:34 AM

Should Law Schools Subsidize Blogging? For SSRN’s sake?

Larry Solum notes the arrival of his future colleague and prawf Larry R.’s interesting new piece up at Legal Theory Blog and SSRN on the law and economics of blogging. In the piece, which is short, and therefore recommended, Ribstein observes how beneficial blogging has been for the law schools of those professors who blog — and, if I recall, Ribstein mentions specifically the high performance of Texas (Leiter), UCLA (Volokh and Bainbridge) GMU (Bernstein, Zywicki et al.), and GW (Kerr and Solove) — in the SSRN tournament rankings. He therefore poses the valuable (if rent-seeking) question: whether schools should be subsidizing the production of blogging.

Questions:

Which schools, if any, are underwriting any of the costs associated with blogging (whether in terms of research assistance, which would be valuable for a blog like Larry Solum’s, which performs incredibly valuable service to the profession, but also is highly administrative in nature, or fees for webhosting, or more generally, the time of the profs)? If none, why aren’t they? Is it possible that the blogs have already generated sufficient rewards to the bloggers in terms of name recognition (among law review editors and other profs, if not others)?

Second, how dangerous is reliance on the SSRN tournament as an indicator of anything? Someone the other day said that SSRN can tell whether it’s one person downloading her articles a lot, or whether the downloads are dispersed. Classic deterrence strategy: this is like whipping and hanging effigies far away from the crowds. Who cares if SSRN can detect violators as long as people believe SSRN can detect them?

Putting aside the question of manipulability, should we be worried about the effects of the Tournament on scholarship? Could it encourage introductory pieces just to court favor with a wider audience? Unlikely in reality, but possible on the margins of reality where some professors live 🙂

Update: Just a point of clarification. Though Larry Ribstein’s paper suggests there may be a causal connection between Brian Leiter’s blogging and Texas’ strong performance in the SSRN tourney, Brian indicated to me in a followup email that Bernie Black is the main driver of Texas’ SSRN output: the numbers don’t lie. Thanks for the tip Brian.

Posted by Administrators on April 12, 2005 at 05:18 PM

» Blogging as academic publishing from Ideoblog Prawfsblawg asks (following up a question in my blogging paper) whether blogging should be subsidized. [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 12, 2005 9:13:16 PM

» http://vaconservative.com/archives/2005/04/12// from Commonwealth Conservative Prawfsblawg has an interesting post about whether law schools should subsidize blogging for their professors. It’s an intriguing idea, especially since some of my favorite bloggers (Glenn Reynolds, to whom I tip my cap, and Professor Bainbridge) are … [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 12, 2005 9:45:32 PM

» What I’ve been reading from ProfessorBainbridge.com Mark Coffey on the fairness doctrine Tim on Lovecraft and some guy named Lemony Snicket Tish on the 101 point wine Tigerhawk on expensing of options PrawfsBlawg on subsidized blogging I know we’re all so over Schiavo, but XRLQ has [Read More]

Tracked on Apr 18, 2005 11:20:29 PM