Dan Drezner (IR at Tufts) and John Wilson (Vanderbilt) have takes on Vanderbilt’s The University and its Purpose: A Statement of First Principles. Both argue that, in various ways, the document misunderstands the academic freedom it purports to protect, defend, and support. Both are correct.
I want to hit on one small point: The statement repeatedly (13 times) invokes academic merit, distinct from personal or political commitments. Thus,
Universities fail in this purpose if they try to settle debates rather than encourage them, or when they suppress or censor points of view due to political expediency or other convictions unrelated to their academic merit. Faculty— individually and through academic units — fail in their responsibility if course offerings, syllabi, or class discussions suppress or promote ideas and perspectives that are rooted in political or personal commitments as opposed to academic merit.
As Wilson puts it, “There is nothing wrong with promoting perspectives that have political commitments; in fact, intellectual diversity requires this, because some viewpoints include political commitments.” Drezner frames it in the expertise at the core of academic freedom–non-expert board members lack the expertise to dictate to faculty what qualifies as “academic merit” in their disciplines.
The conversation reminds me of the meaningless use of “judicial activism.” aJust as it is impossible to determine when a judge has ignored the law in favor of her personal preferences, it is impossible to know when a scholar has taught or written something based on her personal commitments rather than scholarly merit. Both attempt to apply a neutral principle to hide pure subjective distaste. Much as the charge of judicial activism reduces to “any decision I disagree by a I judge I do not like,” the charge of ignoring academic merit reduces to “any scholarly point I disagree with by an academic I do not like.”