“Justice Talking” event in Philadelphia

On July 10, the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia is hosting an event, “Highlights of the Supreme Court Term: How Has the New Conservative Majority Affected the Court?,” at 5:00 p.m. Among other things, the event involves a discussion about the Term among Jan Crawford Greenburg, Prof. Geoff Stone, and me. For more information, click here.

I’m going to go out on a limb, and predict friendly-but-spirited disagreement about Carhart and Catholic Justices.

Posted by Rick Garnett on June 30, 2007 at 03:13 PM

Comments

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Posted by: fasd | Jul 5, 2007 4:17:33 AM

If This is July, It Must Be PrawfsBlawg

Let’s see. The last time I posted something here it was August 2006, I had just rolled into New Orleans, and everything was contingent. Here it is July 2007, I’m attending the AALS New Law Professor Workshop (see post over at Legal Profession Blog on that) which says something in itself about the reduction of contingency. Since last July we’ve graduated one son from high school (and he is going to Stanford), saw our daughter get married and accepted to the theater grad program at Columbia, moved our permanent household to Cambridge, Massachusetts, and increased the number of nights I will spend in the same area code with my wife (whether she likes it or not).

But I digress. I want to give substantial credit to Dan Markel, and his courageous decision to let me guest blog a year ago, for the fact that I am now a faculty member at a respected institution. I discuss the power of the internet and the blogosphere, among other things, for the, shall we say, “well-seasoned” academic aspirant in the only thing I’ve written in the last couple years that my family understood (they didn’t like it, but they understood it): Memo to Lawyers: How Not to “Retire and Teach.”

Thanks for having me back!

Posted by Jeff Lipshaw on June 30, 2007 at 10:48 AM

Comments

Jeff, that’s very gracious to afford any credit to Prawfs, let alone substantial credit, but it is obviously false, and I’m sure any survey of your colleagues can attest to that…nonetheless, thank you. We’re glad to have you back.

Posted by: Dan Markel | Jun 30, 2007 11:06:54 AM

Transit and Transitions

I’m going to be spending a lot of time on airplanes for the next couple of days, so I may be slow to read and respond to any substantive reactions to my “Copyrights and Pornography” post below. It’s the last day of June, so my guest stint here is technically over except for the shouting (by which of course I mean the comments), and I want to thank Dan and all the other Prawfsblawggers for the opportunity to guest post here. Hope everyone is having a great summer, and if y’all find yourselves traveling through the South, please stop by the University of South Carolina School of Law and say hello.

Posted by Ann Bartow on June 30, 2007 at 06:58 AM

Copyrights and Pornography

Until 1979, copyright protection was effectively unavailable for “obscene” pornography. Then in Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1979) and Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), two courts expressly found obscenity protected by copyright law. Courts are not in compete accord on this issue as William Patry noted at his blog:

In the SDNY, then Judge Martin refused to grant a preliminary injunction and a pretrial impoundment and seizure order for movies he believed to be obscene writing, “Given the clearly criminal nature of plaintiff’s operations, it is self-evident that the Court should not use its equitable powers to come to the aid of plaintiffs and should invoke the doctrine of clean hands and leave the parties where it finds them,” Devils Films, Inc. v. Nectar Video Corp., 29 F. Supp.2d 174, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

As Patry also noted, in Nova Products, Inc. v. Kisma Video, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24171 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004), Judge Baer decided to follow Mitchell Brothers, writing:

In its well-reasoned and scholarly opinion, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the history of the copyright legislation and found that all-inclusive language of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 34 (1970) (repealed), which encompassed “all the writings of an author,” did not bespeak of an obscenity exception to copyright protection. The Fifth Circuit further reasoned that the existence of other restrictions in the related areas of trademarks and patents, together with the need for a uniform system of copyright, which could be fragmented by the community-driven obscenity standard, counseled against finding an obscenity exception. Finally, the Court was reluctant to stifle creativity and enlist “the judgment of government officials regarding the worth of the work.”

Congress never addressed this issue in the copyright, and with the exception of Bill Patry, copyright scholars haven’t had much to say about pornography specifically, even though many high profile copyright cases (such as this recent one and this golden oldie) involve pornographic content. I think studying and theorizing the roles that copyright law plays in the production, distribution and consumption of pornography would be useful and instructive in many regards (as I noted here and here), but I’m not sure how likely it is to happen. Some law profs think that pornography is socially beneficial (see e.g. this and this), but I disagree (e.g. here and here) as do others. Because the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorizes copyright law only to the extent that it promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, one might expect the copyrightability of pornography to be more controversial than it has been so far, given the incentives that copyrights provide and the government resources that are required to sustain the copyright legal regime. That both policy makers and legal scholars choose to ignore these issues gives pornography a privileged position with respect to more interrogated categories of created works such as mainstream music and non-pornographic movies. I’m interested in any opinions about whether pornography should be copyrightable, and why so many people are willing to assume that it should be without reflection.

Posted by Ann Bartow on June 30, 2007 at 06:42 AM

Comments

Prof. Bartow, if the policy goal is elimination of pornography with cruel content, then I would think affording copyright protection would not matter were the producers of such material criminally prosecuted. I am in the process of writing a law review note on this topic, and most of the justifications I keep seeing for making obscenity a bar to copyright protection involves porn with activity that is obviously illegal (as opposed to porn that may be deemed obscene in one community but not another). For example, Mr. Markel’s note discusses the public policy problems with allowing copyright protection of child pornography, but no child pornographer is ever going to move on an infringer for fear of exposing his illegal acts. Material like “Behind the Green Door” where abuse of the actors is alleged is more problematic being that the illegal acts are not necessarily obvious, but it seems to me that criminal prosecution is the way to go in preventing such abuses rather than charging the Copyright Office with determining something that the Supreme Court spent fruitless years attempting to define. If anything, granting copyright protection may bring abuses further into the light so they can be prevented in the future.

Posted by: Christopher McDavid | Oct 7, 2007 5:08:34 PM

So the theory is that we reward producers of “less bad” pornography with a copyright, in order to shift incentives toward that style instead of “more bad” pornography? That’s an interesting theory, though I am skeptical that differential copyright would have that effect.

I am also skeptical that stripping copyright will discourage the viewing of “more bad” porn. While less might get made, distribution will be broader for that which does get made – so long as the demand is there, the only shift will be the variety, and not total consumption.

Posted by: Michael Risch | Jul 1, 2007 10:42:06 AM

Michael – some percentage of pornography is the result of violence and coercion. Increasing distribution of certified “cruelty free” pornography and/or computer generated pornography might be something to attempt through copyright law, to create disincentives for the production and distribution of “bad porn,” however that gets defines.

In addition, the consumption of certain porn may be socially harmful, and we may want to discourage it. That is a very contested point, but I think it’s worth debating. I don’t claim to have all the answers, but we’ll never get close to any of them if all discussions about porn are shut down in flames, which happily does not seem to be happening here, for which I am grateful.

Posted by: Ann Bartow | Jul 1, 2007 7:43:23 AM

P.S. I am not a First Amendment scholar – I could be way off on the content discrimination issue.

Posted by: Michael Risch | Jul 1, 2007 7:26:12 AM

For Ann: “There are a lot of law review articles questioning the utility of copyright protection in music, movies, dance, computer software, architectural works, etc.”

Yes, but the goal of those articles is to have MORE distribution of music, movies, dance, software, architecture, etc. That’s my primary point that I didn’t get an answer to – why would we want to change the rule to encourage MORE distribution?

For Frank: I think the different term issue is a good question. I suspect that different terms would be acceptable based on the content of speech only if very narrowly tailored, etc. (that is, strict scrutiny for content discrimination), and even then the decision to put material in different categories would have to be pretty clear cut.

I guess it depends on your policy goals – if you want pornographers to make less money, then you strip copyright. However, because of technical measures, non-economic goals, etc., pornographers will continue to produce pornography, even with less protection. Despite less production, you will have wider distribution of fewer products without protection.

If you want less distribution, you have to allow some protection.

Posted by: Michael Risch | Jul 1, 2007 7:15:28 AM

Sorry, I should have given a bit more context on the Post piece, or bracketed it. Anyway, its cite is 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249

Criterion 1 of content neutrality is just that speech “be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech”.

Posted by: Frank | Jun 30, 2007 11:53:18 AM

For Michael: Would a decision to give a different term to pornography (or software) offend the constitution? How about just giving some kinds of expression different kinds of protection? It seems to me that after the Eldred decision, the Supreme Court is in the mood to give heaping helpings of deference to Congress on these matters. (See, e.g., Treanor’s article in YLJ).

The big problem is the content neutrality issue. But as Robert Post has said, “Whatever the ultimate merits of a First Amendment focus on content neutrality, the Court’s doctrinal elaboration of criterion [1] has been haphazard, internally incoherent, and for these reasons inconsistent with any possible principled concern for content neutrality.”

However, there may be a way around content-neutrality. I believe that copyright as instantiated now can be modeled better as a subsidy to the creative industries, not as their divine right. (There’s a Mark Lemley article on Free-Riding citing Tom Bell to this effect re the subsidy model.) In that case, demanding the government give the same rights to all works is like demanding that the NEH give the same size grants to all applicants. See, e.g., Finley, where “1998 the Supreme Court ruled 8 to 1 that [a decency test for grants] was constitutional, and that it violated no rights. Grant-seekers, the court noted, were required to submit their proposals to a panel representing diverse points of view; as such, the risk that an arbitrary ruling of indecency would be reached was minimal.” (from http://law.jrank.org/pages/4459/Art-Law.html

So perhaps the complete counterexample would be: Congress sets the term of copyrights to one day for all works, then selectively grants long terms to everything but porn.

But for a warning about getting gov’t too involved in such decisions, see: http://scrivenerserror.blogspot.com/2007/06/unkeen-wit.html

Posted by: Frank | Jun 30, 2007 11:51:20 AM

Perhaps because I’m not viewed as much of an IP guy these days, the piece hasn’t received too much attention, but my law review note in the Harvard Law Review was on this topic in 2000 (more specifically about porn deemed obscene or other culpable copyrighted material), which “Nimmer on Copyright” cites–but which not many others do. Here’s the link to it: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410933

The topic of the piece is more generally about how IP law can be used to regulate the incidence of criminal behavior, but the piece is motivated by the apparent abuse of Linda Lovelace in Deep Throat, and the proposition that producers of IP that break certain criminal laws during the production of their work for IP should be stripped of their gov’t conferred monopoly. I address the con law issues too. If I recall, Tribe disagreed with me, but various other con law people at HLS and others didn’t think it would be a problem. I’d be curious to hear what people think because my plan is to build the idea into a more general article about “firewalls” between branches of government: when to have them, when to get rid of them, what their structure should look like, etc. Of course, the more general question of copyright and porn (as opposed to obscene porn) remains a very knotty question; the piece I wrote suggests some of the reasons why.

Posted by: Dan Markel | Jun 30, 2007 10:55:30 AM

“We” already make decisions about what is copyrightable (and patentable, and protectable via trademark law) all the time. “We” make the same calls about pornography, child pornography, and obscenity as well. Registrants bear the cost of registration. The Copyright Office makes a call on copyrightability, which can be appealed. Nothing new there either.

There are a lot of law review articles questioning the utility of copyright protection in music, movies, dance, computer software, architectural works, etc. but not so with pornography. I think this is at least in part because law profs are afraid that if they are critical of any aspect of pornography, they will be accused of being prudes, censors, or “in bed with the religious right.”

Posted by: Ann Bartow | Jun 30, 2007 10:48:08 AM

What a great question. This is exactly the kind of sexy (pun intended), quasi-constitutional, approachable but still legally-grounded issue that usually produces a disproportionate number of law review articles. I’m very surprised there is so little commentary.

Posted by: Andrew Siegel | Jun 30, 2007 9:13:26 AM

Here are some ideas (not necessarily my own): 1. Who are “we” to decide what is and is not copyrightable, or what is or is not pornographic for that reason. Do we really want to start down the slippery slope of content review to determine whether or not something is worthy of copyright protection? If you open that door, it becomes very difficult to shut, especially when it is difficult to tell what is obscene and what is not (and where that determination depends on community standards).

2. Even starting that inquiry can be very costly. Copyrights remain unexamined for registration. Do we really want to set up an examination corps to determine whether a work is pornographic? Sure, this might be simple for professed hardcore, but don’t we need to have examination of books, magazines, and even NC-17 rated films in order to avoid due process/arbitrary and capricious claims?

3. Then, to what end for all this cost and disparate treatment? Pornography will still exist, and denying copyright would likely be counter productive. Given the amount of pornography that is now on the internet and the ease of making “homemade” film a la YouTube, the primary protection measure is technical – password protection, etc. The copyright is only a fallback for mass duplication of non-online works. Even then, an enforced (either through courts or voluntarily) copyright serves to increase the price of pornography, which in turn lowers distribution, which sounds like your goal. Without such protection won’t pornography become more readily and widely distributed?

4. Empirical question: How many actions are there now to protect pornographic materials? Is copyright really a bestowment that has a noticeable effect today?

5. To summarize the above in a real story, I was involved in a case 15 years ago (my first as a legal assistant out of college) involving grey market importation of soft-core asian pornography, for which there were copyright registrations. These movies were otherwise legal in the U.S. and we were able to seize the grey market copies. Was the owner of these movies really to be denied relief for an otherwise legally protected activity? Is that what the free speech and equal protection are really about? Was it really so bad that there were fewer copies of these movies on the street after the seizure?

Just my .02.

Posted by: Michael Risch | Jun 30, 2007 7:43:09 AM

Rotations

Many many thanks to Stuart Green, Yair Listokin, Mark Drumbl, and Ben Depoorter for their contributions the last couple months. Some of our other June visitors will be lingering, I hope, for a little longer.

In the meantime, let me give a slightly early welcome back to our visitors for the month of July: Kim Kessler Ferzan (one of my favorites in my area of law, crim law theory; Rutgers); Gowri Ramachandran (con law, Southwestern); Jeff Lipshaw (business law, Suffolk); and Scott Moss, formerly of Marquette and now at Colorado, where he’ll continue teaching in work law areas. Also joining us for the first time is Carter Snead, from Notre Dame, where he teaches torts, crim pro, and bioethics. Welcome, welcome.

Posted by Administrators on June 29, 2007 at 03:33 PM

Comments

I vote Scott Moss to be America’s Next PermaPrawf!

Posted by: Belle Lettre | Jun 30, 2007 1:53:15 AM

Was it my imagination or was there not too long ago a promis of some Rob Kar blogging that never showed up? Or did I somehow miss him? Or was it someone else who promised and then didn’t deliver? Anyway, I vote for some bloging by Rob Kar, here or elsewhere.

Posted by: Matt | Jun 29, 2007 4:35:13 PM

‘Bye now

With the end of June just about here, it’s time to pack up my suitcase and say thanks to the nice folks at Prawfsblawg for inviting me over. I had fun sharing some inchoate thoughts, learned a lot from readers’ comments, and developed a new respect for the art of blogging. I may sound like an old fogey for saying so, but, after a month of being involved in this venture, I’m more amazed than ever at the miracle of the Internet.

Posted by Stuart Green on June 29, 2007 at 12:18 PM

Comments

Bye now.

Posted by: |2aymo0nd | Jul 7, 2007 1:11:58 AM

Bye now.

Posted by: |2aymo0nd | Jul 7, 2007 1:11:54 AM

Bye now.

Posted by: |2aymo0nd | Jul 7, 2007 1:11:23 AM

What You See is What You Get

At least until recently, it was the conventional wisdom that it is difficult to predict the voting behavior of Supreme Court nominees. Conservatives would complain that Republican appointees tend to drift leftward the longer they serve. Liberals would bemoan the increasing prominence of stealth nominees whose writings and comments were so thin as to prevent serious analysis. And well-meaning good government types, including some of the Justices themselves, would argue that extensive pre-confirmation vetting of a nominee’s views were not only unseemly, but also pointless, as the shifting tide of issues and the very process of judging would quickly date those positions.

Well that conventional wisdom has grown a bit ragged over the last few years and this year’s Supreme Court term probably (and hopefully) has driven a final nail in its coffin. The truth of the matter is in fact squarely the opposite: with the possible exception of Justice Stevens, every single Justice on the current Court has behaved on the bench almost exactly as his or her pre-confirmation writings and confirmation hearing testimony would have suggested.

Let’s take them one by one, starting with the newest Justices. John Roberts and Sam Alito came across as rock-solid judicial conservatives, committed to limiting the powers of the courts and along the way chipping away at the substantive excesses of the Warren Court. Check. They also came across as judges with long time horizon who understood the complicated dance of precedent and principle. Check. Even the quirks of their judicial personalities were right there in the record–Roberts’ near obsession with standing; Alito’s comparative sympathy with First Amendment plaintiffs.

Or take the two Democratic appointees on the Court: Steven Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Both had track records and writings that marked them as clearly and on first principles hostile to attacks on federal power and on the rights legacy of the Warren Court. Yet, on the other hand, neither was a doctrinaire left-winger: Breyer having demonstrated both a wonkish approach to criminal justice issues that boded ill for criminal defendants and a sympathy to the efficiency-oriented concerns of businesses in regulatory cases; Ginsburg having built a moderate record on the DC Circuit largely by eschewing broad approaches to statutory interpretation and reading rules and texts with a professorial precision. On the Court, they have behaved as, well, themselves.

Even Justices Kennedy and Souter, much vilified for allegedly shifting left on the Court, told us who they were in their opinions and testimony. Justice Kennedy is a small-town, civics-books conservative, in accord with the judicial and social conservative agendas on most issues, but genuinely–indeed almost uncritically–believing that it is both America’s destiny and his duty to give concrete meaning to soaring abstractions like “liberty” and “equality.” While Justice Souter is harder to pin down with a label–if I had to try I’d somehow cross “Yankee Republican” with “traditional Anglo-American common law jurist”–his tour-de-force performance before the Senate Judiciary Committee told us what kind of judge he was going to be: cautious, humble, learned, yet willing to take seriously the courts’ traditional equitable and gap-filling roles in both statutory and constitutional matters, in other words a genuine moderate by historical standards.

Certainly, the Justices retain the ability to surprise us in individual cases or areas of the law. (No one, for example, would have predicted that Justice Souter would have become such a solid vote for defendants in criminal procedure cases.) And, if Justices stay on the Court long enough, history may well reshuffle the issues in a way that require them to stake out new positions or choose between different strands in their judicial personas (witness the late Court careers of both Hugo Black and John Paul Stevens). But, in the medium term and in the larger picture, there are few if any surprises. In this era of well-vetted nominees with long and impressive academic and professional credentials, what you see is what you get.

Posted by amsiegel on June 29, 2007 at 09:32 AM

» Round-Up: Other News from SCOTUSblog CNN has this story on the High Court’s decision to hear Guantanamo detainee cases, Boumediene v. Bush (06-1195) and Al Odah v. U.S. (06-1196); William Glaberson of the New York Times reports here on the Court’s decision to reconsider the… [Read More]

Tracked on Jun 29, 2007 4:17:07 PM

» Round-Up: Grants, Decisions & End-of-Term Analysis from SCOTUS blog Co-authored by Adam Chandler. CNN has this story on the High Court’s decision to hear Guantanamo detainee [Read More]

Tracked on Jun 29, 2007 5:21:55 PM

Comments

Larry–

I am 95% in agreement with you about Justice Stevens–most of the controversial positions he has taken on the Court are presaged by something in his earlier opinions or record. I provided that caveat at the beginning because I didn’t want my larger point about the transparency of modern nominees to get obscured in a debate about Justice Stevens, who was nominated in an earlier era and has a wonderfully complex legacy.

Posted by: Andrew Siegel | Jun 29, 2007 1:10:46 PM

I believe that the thesis advanced in this post applies to Justice Stevens as well. See, for example, his dissenting opinion in Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev’d, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).

Larry Rosenthal Chapman University School of Law

Posted by: Larry Rosenthal | Jun 29, 2007 11:07:17 AM

Kennedy’s opinion in the school cases delivers another gem in the vein of the “sweet mystery of life”:

“Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona, without state intervention that classified on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”

What an odd combination of points. Surely it would have been enough for him to have said, “Under our Constitution the individual is proctected against state intervention that classified on the basis of his race or the color of her skin.”

What that middle bit — “the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona” — adds to the legal point is beyond me. Kennedy is seemingly obsessed with the concept of self-definition, and he’s throwing it in even where it’s not plausibly relevant.

It reminds me of Bob Solow’s criticism of Milton Friedman: “Everything reminds Milton of the money supply. Well, everything reminds me of sex, but I keep it out of [my] paper.”

Posted by: Adam | Jun 29, 2007 10:51:43 AM

Leegin v. PSKS

The school cases have gotten much of the attention today in the media and on the law blogs, not to mention generating a whopping 185 pages of opinions from the Supreme Court. (At the risk of again prompting commentary over my use of the term, I will say it — WOW! Supreme Court opinions in tax cases just are never that long, thank goodness.) But another, really important opinion came out today in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., overruling a precedent dating back almost 100 years and concluding that agreements between manufacturers and distributors or retailers that establish minimum resale prices are not per se illegal (and in a comparatively svelte 55 pages of opinions plus syllabus, by my count). I am neither an economist nor an antitrust expert, so I really have little more than your average educated lawyer to say about the substance of the Leegin opinions. Still, it’s not every day the Supreme Court overrules such established precedent. Analysis of the case and links to further analysis are available here and here and here.

Posted by Kristin Hickman on June 28, 2007 at 04:58 PM

Comments

I am not referring to this opinion alone, although the Leegin dissent has demonstrated quite handily (as cynic obliquely acknowledged) that “stare decisis” has become “stare deceased.” While Congress can repair the damage the Court has done to antitrust law (if you contend that it is “damage”; I’m frankly ambivalent on the subject), there is so little remaining of the concept of “binding precedent” in American law that we can no longer legitimately count ourselves among the common-law countries.

Links you might find intriguing in this regard:

* http://law.wlu.edu/lawreview/page.asp?pageid=127 (symposium on the subject, with a list of law review articles)

* http://www.coloradopols.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=3625 (proof that the Tenth Circuit systematically discriminates against pro se litigants)

* http://www.nonpublication.com/ (extensive list of resources with regard to the Anastasoff problem)

In my judgment, Leegin is like Anastasoff: The actual controversy is almost beside the point.

Posted by: dissenter | Jun 30, 2007 7:41:47 AM

won’t states just legislate the prohibition right back in?

Posted by: student | Jun 29, 2007 8:31:33 AM

I assume “dissenter” doesn’t know much about antitrust law. Randy Picker has a more interesting explanation of how this has been in the works for a while.

http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/06/doctor-who-reas.html

The opinions are worth reading a little more closely (or at all) for their discussion of stare decisis.

Posted by: cynic | Jun 29, 2007 1:28:58 AM

Modern judges only follow “binding” precedent when it takes them precisely where they want to go. We don’t have a system of law any more; we have the “judocracy” Thomas Jefferson both feared and predicted.

Next stop: Roe v. Wade.

Posted by: Dissenter | Jun 28, 2007 10:24:42 PM

Innovative Teaching

Singing For those rising prawfs who are just beginning to think about their teaching tactics and style, here’s an innovative way of doing it, courtesy of Rose Cuison Villazor:

Singing!

Hey, it worked for Harvard mathematics professor Tom Lehrer, didn’t it?

Lyrics to one of my favorite Lehrer songs, Lobachevsky (about the career-boosting aspects of plagiarism) here.

Posted by Laura I Appleman on June 28, 2007 at 03:31 PM

Summer Romance

Beachblanketbingo Summer is finally upon us, and as exciting as our research undoubtedly is, we should all take a moment to savor the season. Of course, thoughts of summer often lead to thoughts of summer romance, and the legendary couples that arose from such trystings: Tristan and Isolde, Gatsby and Daisy, Danny and Sandy…

But how to achieve such fabled happiness, you cry, what is the best way to find love ? And where can it be sought?! Well, once again Ovid, one of my favorite sages, has the answer (hat tip to Frank Pasquale):

And the law-courts (who’d believe it?) they suit love:

a flame is often found in the noisy courts:

where the Appian waters pulse into the air,

from under Venus’s temple, made of marble,

there the lawyer’s often caught by love,

and he who guides others, fails to guide himself:

in that place of eloquence often his words desert him,

and a new case starts, his own cause is the brief.

There Venus, from her neighbouring temples, laughs:

he, who was once the counsel, now wants to be the client.

(Ars Amatoria, Book I, Part III: Search While You’re Walking)

Go and sally forth, young lawyers–your romance awaits!

Posted by Laura I Appleman on June 28, 2007 at 03:08 PM

The School Assignment Cases and Grutter

There are 185 pages, all told, in the opinions in today’s school assignment cases; I have not read them all and don’t want to make any unduly hasty judgments. But let me address one issue of particular interest to me. One question bruited about before the decisions came down was whether the Court, with its new composition, would eviscerate or overrule its recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan Law School case. While I might modify my view upon a closer reading of the judgments as a whole, I think we can say that neither of these possibilities occurred. Grutter retains its vitality, for reasons that are important to larger projects I have discussed here, although it may be that those who thought that Grutter could apply in a variety of circumstances turned out to be wrong.

The relevant discussion comes at pages 13-17 of the majority opinion. The majority notes that Grutter rested on “the interest in diversity in higher education.” But the Court stresses that the kind of diversity at issue in Grutter was not simply “race alone,” but included a variety of factors beyond race. Moreover, the admissions program approved in Grutter involved a set of holistic and individualized determinations about admissibility, and not just a crudely operated search for racial balance. The Court thus distinguishes Grutter from the present cases, certainly without overruling and also, I think, without quietly eviscerating it. I think it is this last conclusion that will occasion the most controversy, and others may point to other aspects of the ruling that they do think damage Grutter. (More on this later, after the jump.)

The majority, in the course of disagreeing with those lower courts that applied Grutter to various K-12 school assignment plans, also emphasizes that Grutter “relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher education, noting that in light of the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.” Thus, to the majority, Grutter takes place within the “unique context of higher education,” and within the tradition of academic freedom found in many First Amendment rulings over the past 50 years — a First Amendment tradition that substantially underwrote the Court’s decision in Grutter, and that is not relevant with respect to K-12 schools.

This is of special interest to me because, in several prior works and some forthcoming work, I have argued that Grutter supports a larger argument in favor of a First Amendment framework that is more institutionally oriented: that is, a framework that favors substantial judicial deference to a variety of entities that are especially important to our system of public discourse, that are bound by a variety of self-governing rules and traditions, and that accordingly are entitled to a substantial degree of autonomy. Nothing in today’s discussion of Grutter undermines that approach, I think. To the contrary, the Court’s explicit focus on the First Amendment aspects of Grutter tends to support it. (Although I must observe pointedly that this focus on the “unique context of higher education” was nowhere in evidence when the Court decided Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights last term.)

Now, this leaves open some important questions, both for the Court and for my own little project. One question is this: Why is higher education a “unique context” in ways that elementary education is not, at least for purposes of this case? Courts usually speak in terms of the special expertise that universities have in deciding who shall be a member of the student body, among other questions; why do lower public schools not possess similar epistemic authority as compared to the courts? Even if the Court erred on this point, the outcome might be no different, given the very different nature of the admission plans in Grutter as compared the plans in today’s cases. But the Court might have said more on this point. Perhaps the distinction is that the law school in Grutter did a better job of relating its interest in diversity to the particular expertise it wielded as a center of higher education, while the school districts in today’s case engaged in a blanket assignment system that was not closely enough linked to their special interest in education. I can’t say, and look forward to further commentary.

One other note I would make about this is that, if I am right, the Court found the law school’s claim to epistemic authority strong enough to justify deference in Grutter, but did not find the school districts’ claims to epistemic authority strong enough to justify deference in today’s cases. But just last week, the Court did defer in a variety of ways to the determinations of public school administrators, in its decision in Morse v. Frederick. What gives?

I am sure much more remains to be said on the impact of today’s cases on Grutter. For one thing, Grutter also comes up in a section of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion that is joined only by a plurality of the Court, and Justice Kennedy specifically refuses to join that discussion in his concurring opinion. I do not think that discussion matters to my discussion of Grutter as a First Amendment case, but it might have implications for Grutter in its primary Fourteenth Amendment aspects. Also, I noted above that whether you believe today’s decisions damage Grutter may depend on what you think Grutter meant in the first place. After that decision, some commentators argued that Grutter applied naturally across a range of other environments — public workplaces, lower public schools, and so on. Today’s decisions, without definitively answering that question, certainly cast doubt on it. But that was not my impression of Grutter in the first place, so I am not sure that this really counts as evidence that today’s decision reduces the footprint of its earlier decision. In any event, to the extent that Grutter was about the degree to which courts will defer to the expertise of universities as “First Amendment institutions,” certainly nothing in today’s decision alters or undermines it.

Posted by Paul Horwitz on June 28, 2007 at 01:41 PM

» Desegregation Opinions: Blogs and Media React from The Debate Link [This is a round-up post on the just-released decisions striking down Seattle and Louisville’s desegregation plans. Other posts in the series: Reaction to C.J. Roberts’ opinion Reaction to Justice Stevens’ dissent Reaction to Justice Kennedy… [Read More]

Tracked on Jun 28, 2007 3:31:54 PM

» Brown v Board of Education’s Original Intent from Jon Swift The Brown decision, perhaps more than any other event in our history, gave rise to the modern conservative movement. [Read More]

Tracked on Jun 29, 2007 11:49:26 AM

Comments

one more case for the abolishment of public education

Posted by: student | Jun 29, 2007 8:29:17 AM

I’ve always thought that the diversity rationale developed in Grutter depended heavily on the idea that the healthy exchange of ideas among graduate school students (and college students too) is an especially important one in those institutional environs. That’s why considering race as a factor in fostering that diversity makes sense. Graduate school students are adults, and part of the educational experience in graduate school involves an exchange of ideas, backgrounds, and general world views between members of different social, economic, intellectual, and racial strata.

This rationale just doesn’t work as well in the grade school context. This isn’t to say that it doesn’t work at all. Kindergarteners do come from different backgrounds, of course, and they are capable of telling one another about those backgrounds. But the thick version of the rationale supporting Grutter-diversity is out of place here. What I think is missing is that grade school is for learning, more than talking. One has to have ideas to share before sharing them.

Having said that, I think that the mere fact of exposure to people of different backgrounds (including different skin colors) is its own compelling interest, both because the public school’s primary function is didactic, rather than dialectic (and the public school has historically been charged to impart civic values like equality), and because physical proximity strikes me as an important base for facilitating Grutter-diversity later on. But I’m with Kozinski and Boudin here. Forcing the public school to make an argument about its compelling interest in Grutter-diversity is like forcing a round peg into a square hole.

Posted by: md | Jun 28, 2007 2:34:40 PM

CONNtemplations: Do Law Reviews Matter?

You may have read Paul and Steve’s discussions of CONNtemplations, the new online companion for the Connecticut Law Review. The three of us each contributed essays for the launch, along with Al Brophy, John Doyle, and Ronen Perry. The title of the inaugural edition is “Do Law Reviews Matter? “, and the commentary flows from a set of articles by Ronen Perry and Al Brophy on the law review’s relationship to law schools and legal scholarship. Some links for your reference:

All of these essays are available in .html as well as .pdf form. There are comment sections for each article — I encourage you to comment over at CONNtemplations and start the dialogue.

Posted by Matt Bodie on June 28, 2007 at 11:51 AM