As SCOTUS channels the big cases into the final twelve days (making it impossible for the press and public to accurately digest, understand, report, and protest what the Court did), we got the remaining Fed-Courts-nerd case on Thursday.
T.M. v. Univ. of Maryland Medical Sys. resolves an open question in Rooker-Feldman: The ban on state court losers using § 1983 to challenge a state-court judgment applies to non-final state judgments (where state review remains). Bizarre 5-4 lineup: Sotomayor wrote for Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson; Barrett dissented for Roberts, Kagan, and Gorsuch.
The Court divided over several underlying issues: The statutory source of RF, the effect of Exxon (2005), and the role of federalism in the doctrine.
For the majority, RF arises from the intersection of § 1257 (SCOTUS appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of state highest courts) and § 1331 (district court original jurisdiction). The combination means district courts never review state-court judgments; SCOTUS can review final highest-court judgments; and state judgments subject to state appellate review cannot be challenged in federal court. Exxon limited RF to cases in which state court losers challenge a judgment “after the state proceedings ended.” But that did not impose a formal finality requirement or make finality a core part of RF; while Rooker and Feldman involved final judgments, finality was not core to the reasoning of either case. And RF rests on a federalism foundation–federal courts must allow state judicial systems to function without interference. Allowing lower-court losers to run to federal court before completing state appellate review (at which point RF kicks in) undermines state processes. (Justice Jackson made this point during arguments).
For the dissent, RF is a § 1257 doctrine, designed to protect SCOTUS’ appellate jurisdiction (over final state court judgments) from district court interference; Exxon eliminated any role § 1331 might have in the doctrine. District courts exercise original, not appellate, jurisdiction over collateral challenges to non-final state judgments; collateral challenges are different than appeals in several respects. Exxon‘s reference to federal actions filed “after the state proceedings ended” reflects the reality of Rooker and Feldman–both involved final state-court judgments. And federalism principles are best served by limiting RF and relying on state preclusion law (through which states dictate when federal courts must respect their judgments) and federalism-based abstention doctrines (Younger, Colorado River, Burford, Pullman) to achieve the same results.
I am partial to the majority’s resolution. It makes no sense to allow a state-court loser to run to federal district court rather than pursuing state appeals while barring a state-court loser from running to federal district court after exhausting state procedures.
Some random points on RF going forward:
• A lot of back-and-forth on what it means for RF to be “confined” or “limited” and how to ensure the doctrine does not expand too far.1 The dissent worries that this decision will extend RF. The majority insists (correctly in my view) that the problematic expansion of RF arises when courts apply it in lieu of ordinary preclusion, more on-point abstention doctrines (such as Younger), and when it mistreats a challenge to conduct in and around litigation as a challenge to the judgment itself.2
• The dissent tries to head-off renewed mischief , ending the opinion this way:
Still, the news is not all bad. Although the Court expands Rooker-Feldman beyond Exxon’s line, it repeatedly emphasizes that the doctrine is “narrow.” See ante, at 1, 7, 8, 18. Courts should not lose sight of that message. In the end, Rooker-Feldman has been given an inch—it should not be allowed to take a mile.
• The majority hints (although does not discuss) the solution to a common conflation of Younger and RF. By their terms and logic, Younger and RF cover different types of § 1983 actions: Younger where the federal plaintiff challenges the constitutional validity of the state law being enforced or used in state court, RF where the federal plaintiff claims a constitutional violation from the state judgment itself. The majority discusses Feldman and Skinner v. Switzer as cases in which RF did not apply to the first category, although neither case mentioned Younger.
Post-T.M., courts may have less use for Sprint‘s third Younger category (civil orders uniquely in furtherance of state court ability to perform judicial functions). RF now bars a federal action to challenge, for example, a (non-final) contempt order, something that also fits Sprint # 3. Again, the line should be RF bars a challenge to the order itself and Younger bars the challenge to the law authorizing the court order. Sprint also should be limited to a narrow class of unique state-court orders (contempt, pre-judgment attachment, post-judgment bonds), leaving RF to cover more routine orders. I do not believe courts will be that particular.
• The two sides engage on whether RF should exist. The dissent says “it is not clear what Rooker-Feldman brings to the table.” The majority reads the dissent as suggesting that RF is wrong and should be cabined, if not overruled, then insists that the issue is not raised or fairly included in the QP.3 Justice Thomas wrote a sole concurrence to defend RF on originalist grounds.
- This is a fun pendulum in the lower courts. District courts extended the doctrine as an easy way to clear dockets (especially to replace ordinary preclusion), Exxon tried to reel them back in, district courts pushed the limits, courts of appeals called them out. ↩︎
- For example, a lawsuit alleging that state officials engaged in misconduct within the state litigation–for example, falsifying evidence–does not claim injury from the judgment. ↩︎
- The T.M. argued included a funny moment in which Lisa Blatt, arguing for the respondent in the most Lisa Blatt way, told the Court it would not overrule RF, “[n]ot in an April case. Not happening.” ↩︎