Technology’s Intent

I’m a big fan of Dropbox. With a full schedule of professional travel, a need to work at home and on the go, and a less-than-perfectly-reliable university-issued computer, I’ve learned the hard way that I need dependable, easy-to-use cloud-based storage for my important data. But Dropbox has always targeted the casual data-sharer as much as the power user, and yesterday the company unveiled a new feature of its software that allows users to share files on their computers with anyone using an http link to a copy of the file stored on Dropbox’s cloud-storage servers. The thing about this service, as some tech commentators have pointed out, is that it implements essentially the same technology that led to the federal government’s recent criminal indictment of file-sharing juggernaut MegaUpload and its eccentric founder, Kim Dotcom.

So does Dropbox have a date with the feds in its future? I think most would agree the answer is no, but getting to that answer reveals the problems we’ve created in trying to manage the social, legal, and technological issues that surround the exchange of information. More after the jump…

The big story in copyright law for the past two or three decades has been the ongoing battle between the forces of “content” and “distribution”–between the owners of intellectual property rights in information and the sellers of technology that makes the distribution of that information cheaper, easier, and broader. This is nothing particularly new; those who make their living off of the creation and sale of new information have always been wary of technological progress. But mass adoption of digital technology and high-speed data networks have significantly raised the stakes.

In Section 512(c) of the Copyright Act (the so-called “DMCA safe-harbor”) and in the case of Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Congress and the Supreme Court, respectively, attempted to strike what turns out to be an uneasy balance between these competing interests. Section 512(c) immunizes the sellers of technology that facilitates the distribution of copyrighted information from liability for infringing uses of their services by customers, provided the technologists meet certain conditions. In Sony, the Court announced that technology itself is not a copyright outlaw so long as it is capable of substantial non-infringing uses. But of course, individuals and institutions may well use such technology for infringing purposes, and such uses remain actionable. We thus have a distinction set up within copyright law itself between the power of a technology in itself and the use of that technology by real people in real social settings. While we may hold individuals responsible for uses of technology that infringe a copyright, we do not hold the technology itself responsible for such uses.

This leads to the odd situation in which we now find ourselves, where the viability of entire segments of the digital economy, and of some of the largest and fastest-growing businesses in the world, come to turn on the thorniest and most contentious questions of fact the legal system can ever grapple with–questions of intent. In MGM v. Grokster, for example, the defendant companies were denied summary judgment on grounds that there was sufficient evidence that they intended to induce third parties to infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights using their peer-to-peer file sharing services. But of course, intent is not a fact that can be proven by prying open the skull of a defendant and looking inside. Intent must always be proven circumstantially. In Grokster, the most important category of circumstantial evidence cited by the Court as sufficient to create a triable issue of fact (and likely sufficient to award summary judgment to the plaintiff–which was eventually granted) was evidence tending to show that the defendants targeted the cast-off customers of adjudged secondary infringer Napster. But “complement[ing]” that evidence, the court said, was the defendants’ failure to impose filtering systems on their services that Section 512(c) arguably makes legally unnecessary, as well as evidence that the defendants–gasp!–were interested in growing their user base to maximize advertising revenues.

This is what Larry Lessig once referred to as “the monster Grokster created”: the inquiry into a particular defendant’s state of mind is now part and parcel of the legal battle between content and distribution. And because evidence of intent is necessarily circumstantial, these cases are likely to turn on a factfinder’s response to the overall story woven by the parties’ lawyers–a gut reaction as to whether the defendant is a good guy or a bad guy. Facts that might otherwise seem innocuous can be cited as circumstantial evidence of intent to commit secondary infringement if the factfinder just doesn’t trust the defendant.

Which brings me back back to Dropbox and its new link-to-share service. Dropbox, it seems, is not maintaining a searchable index of the files its customers share via link–the type of activity that got Napster in trouble. One might think that this fact suggests the company has no interest in attracting customers who are interested in using its services to locate and freely download copyrighted content. But take a look at Paragraph 10 of the MegaUpload indictment, which alleges that MegaUpload did not maintain a searchable index of content on its servers in order to “conceal the scope of its [copyright] infringement.” That paragraph also notes that MegaUpload provided financial incentives to customers whose uploaded files increased traffic on MegaUpload’s website and, thereby, increasing the company’s revenue base. Dropbox, in turn provides existing customers with additional free cloud storage for referring new customers to the service. If, as Grokster suggests, a desire to broaden one’s customer base is circumstantial evidence of an intent to induce infringement, should we expect the refer-a-friend program to be cited in a federal indictment or a civil complaint in the near future?

I don’t think so, but I can’t be sure, and that is ultimately the point. The social dynamics of information exchange that new technologies like Dropbox (and, frankly, MegaUpload) make possible are unpredictable and often out of the direct control of the service providers themselves. Such exchanges can be public or private, shared or hidden, broadcast or narrowcast, and everywhere in between. Section 512(c) attempts to account for this, for example by making knowledge of specific infringing activity a prerequisite for secondary liability. But like intent, knowledge is a thorny factual issue that courts continue to disagree about, often based on differing views of the inferences that can be drawn from a particular mix of circumstantial evidence.

For my part, I look at all this as a lawyer who, in a former life, was sometimes called on to give clients guidance as to whether a course of action they were considering for their business would be likely to generate legal liability. I have to admit, I’d have a hard time giving a client like Dropbox useful advice today. And it strikes me that a legal regime that doesn’t allow a segment of our economic and social lives as fundamental as the information we exchange with one another to be planned with some degree of certainty isn’t doing its job very well.

Posted by Jeremy Sheff on April 24, 2012 at 01:36 PM

Comments

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Posted by: Orimark | Apr 25, 2012 5:15:59 AM

This is far from my area (although I am a fan and user of Dropbox). I wonder about the degree to which “intent” here means something like “business model.” No one could plausibly argue that infringing uses are central to Dropbox’s business model. But business models evolve, especially in the world of internet companies. If MegaUpload had started out by providing a backup-and-sync service like Dropbox, and then proceeded to do exactly what it did, would there have been liability (or even a claim)? Would the answer have turned on the role infringing uses played in MU’s _new_ business model?

Posted by: Joey Fishkin | Apr 24, 2012 5:05:52 PM

Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: Part VII Expedited Reviews

In this next post on the law review submission process (see intro, part I, part II on timing of submissions,part III interview, part IV interview, part V interview and part VI interview if interested) I am exploring the expedited review.

Once a piece is submitted on Expresso, the waiting begins until an offer (hopefully) is received. Once an offer is received, many authors will chose to expedite their submission. This typically involves a note sent to all of the other journals that they prefer over the journal that they received an offer from (or sometimes similiarly situated journals) stating that they would like to hear back on their piece within a limited period of time.

Expedited reviews can be a source of stress for authors. Sometimes they wonder, for instance, if they get an offer from a top-100 journal, should they expedite it all the way to the top upon receiving their first offer? Or should they just expedite to the top 50 and wait until they receive another offer to keep expediting on up? What should an expedite say? Should it be short and sweet (ie the form email that Expresso provides) or should it try to sell editors on how amazing the piece is in addition to giving them a deadline? There are many questions that expedited reviews raise that I of course have no answers to, but I think given my interviews with editors at Stanford, Vanderbilt and BYU (and a few other informal ones with editors at T10 schools), I may be able to provide a bit of insight.

So, a few tips:

1. Writing a personal email (that is nice) with an expedite does not hurt. Editors receive a lot of requests for review and being nice or writing something personal to the journal is never going to hurt. Telling the journal that you will take their offer immediately with an expedite has worked for some authors but it also has backfired by making you appear desperate.

2. Writing a short note about how amazing/timely/relevant/citable your topic and piece are in the expedited review does not hurt.

3. Realize (and I didn’t realize this until my interviews) that the person who is receiving your expedited review may not be an articles editor who is substantively involved in chosing articles. At some law reviews, the editor receiving the expedites is a managing editor who makes assignments to various law review editors. In these cases, writing extra nice notes #1 is not as helpful as #2 making them think your topic/paper is amazing. In the #2 case, the managing editor may be more likely to pass your article on with a note stating that the articles editor should take a close look.

4. Be mindful that the schools most interested in your piece will be those in the general upward vicinity of the journal where you received your offer. It seems that articles editors’ interest is most piqued when an author has received an offer from a school within the general ballpark of the school they are seeking expedited review from.

5. Be honest in your expedites. It is not even close to worth the damage to your reputation among faculty and law reviews to make up an offer to expedite on. I spoke with some editors at a T-10 law review that had a black list of authors that had faked expedites in the past that they passed on their faculty and new editors. They had added an additional author this year because the particular author had faked an expedite from one top law review to another and the senior articles editors at those schools happened to be good friends. Ouch. (It may be smart for Expresso or individual journals to require some sort of verification to stop this from happening–I like Columbia Law Review’s expedite system since they require the “phone number or e-mail address of a contact person” at the journal where you received an offer. That would seem to act as a disincentive to create a fake expedite.)

That’s all of the tips I have. Any additional tips you have (particularly from you articles editors and former articles editors) would be great as well.

Ok, so next up…a quick post on fall submission timing and a post on best practices for law reviews (former articles editors from top schools who are now in the academy, feel free to email me if you are willing to answer a few questions).

Posted by Shima Baradaran Baughman on April 24, 2012 at 11:30 AM

Comments

Practitioners who would fabricate offers–i.e., engage in fraud–to try to get new offers should, in this practitioner’s opinion, be subject to disciplinary review by the bar. Why should the expectations and potential consequences for faculty be any lower?

A blacklist is too mild.

Speaking of blacklists, does anyone doubt that journals will hold it against you if you’ve previously turned down offers in the last year or so. I’d suggest they already keep shorter term lists that trigger automatic disinterest.

Posted by: b | Apr 25, 2012 12:48:37 PM

Frankly, it seems to me that making up an expedite would be evidence of the kind of serious character defect that ought to raise real questions about someone’s qualifications to be a member of the academy. It’s the faculty equivalent of the student who cuts material out of the books in the library. And in each case, ought the remedy to be expulsion?

Posted by: Paul Gowder | Apr 25, 2012 11:26:29 AM

@TJ: So in effect you’re saying we should always ignore expedite requests from professors with economics training? (Joke!) I mean, look, we’re not Holmesian bad men. We’re a community of scholars with norms of truth-telling, discovery, mutual courtesy. We should, and often do, serve as role models for our students. If we were wild west claim-stakers, then yeah, plan for expected-value-maximizing rampant cheating. But we’re not.

I actually think it’s harmful to everyone’s interests to think of the submissions process in bad-man terms. Encouraging students to set penalties so than b < pv undermines our message of a community that has to rest on norms of mutual regard. That’s why I’ve argued for years in posts & comments here for everyone to respect that norm.

On the other hand, I am also aware that you can’t maintain a stable system of norms if participants come to believe that others are cheating without consequence. But, as I said, there are less dramatic ways of curbing cheaters. I would think getting a call or e-mail from a journal’s advisor would be fairly scalding, and wouldn’t have the disproportionate consequences of blacklists or more-public shaming.

Having said all that, the suggestion that expedite requests forward the offering e-mail is a good one, and seems like a best practice I’ll adopt for myself going forward.

Posted by: BDG | Apr 25, 2012 9:46:17 AM

Any author making up an expedite telling some school “I rec’d an offer from school x and I need your review no later than (fill in date)” is cheating and hurting every honest author. The system is tough enough with law journals receiving 1000-2000 competing articles a year but imagine writing a great article only to have it rejected because slots are filled by fake expedites. Then people wonder why law reviews look at other factors such as author rep, prior article placement, number of cites. Of course editors need these factors to help them separate the wheat from the chaff. The list of blacklisted authors is correct – these miscreants need to be punished and being blacklisted is most appropriate.

Posted by: ex-dist.ct.law.clerk | Apr 25, 2012 4:48:29 AM

I’m with Aaron over Brian on this. Our concern should not be that this remedy is too harsh, but that it is clearly insufficient. Contrary to the main post, if the private blacklist is the only remedy then I would submit that any rational lower tiered author or those without any letterhead should ALWAYS make up fake expedites to the top journals. On the one hand, you have the benefit of placing in a top journal (if you get away with it). On the other hand, you have the loss of:

*the value of future placements in the same journal, but *discounted by the miniscule chance you would ever legitimately place in said journal without dishonesty *discounted by the miniscule chance of being caught

Lets plug in some (I hope reasonable) numbers. Suppose that an author has a 0.1% chance of getting an acceptance without dishonesty, and a 1% chance with the fake expedite, and he expects to write 20 future articles in his lifetime (all with these same odds). The chance of even one future placement in that journal without dishonesty is (1–0.999^20 = 0.0198) or roughly 2%. Discounted further by the chance of being caught (say there is a 5% chance, which I think is a wild overestimate) and the loss is a less than 0.1% chance of a future placement. An author is ten times better off to submit the fake expedite.

And note that I am being incredibly conservative here. First, I think a 5% chance of being caught is much higher than the real figure, probably higher by orders of magnitude. Our one example is the highly improbable event that senior articles editors across different schools are personal friends (said author presumably made fake expedites to numerous law reviews, but only got caught at two, and we don’t know how many other authors were not caught). Second, a top tier placement early in one’s career is worth far more than later placements down the line.

Posted by: TJ | Apr 25, 2012 1:31:56 AM

If most offers come in via email, why not revise the process such that an expedite request consists of forwarding the acceptance email, with an additional note above? (For phone offers, the expedite request can say “On [day] I received an offer from [person] at [law review] with a deadline of [date]; her/his phone number is [#].”).

Posted by: newvap | Apr 24, 2012 10:48:38 PM

Certainly editors should take care to ensure that suspicions of system-gaming by authors are well founded. And that process should include a conversation with the author in close cases.

But if authors are indeed lying about offers in order to trigger expedited review, a private blacklist strikes me as a rather mild consequence. At the very least I’d hope the names of the offending authors are shared with other law reviews so they don’t fall for the same stunt. Public shaming seems appropriate for repeat offenders.

Posted by: Aaron Perzanowski | Apr 24, 2012 10:09:57 PM

Obviously this process is messy enough without deception. But it is deeply troubling to learn that journals keep their own secret books of disapproved authors. From what little you’ve said, Shima, these “blacklists” appear to be based on students’ perceptions of misdealing. But maybe the perceived bad acts are also the products of miscommunication, sloppy e-mailing, or bad record keeping. If the “blacklist” rumor is true, I think journals owe it to authors who they think have done wrong to afford something like due process, or at least a reasonable opportunity for explanation.

Even with something more like a fair opportunity to explain, I’d still be very troubled by blacklisting. I’ve encountered my share of journals I thought reneged on a promise I’d relied on (one just this past cycle). Some people make bad decisions. It ain’t murder, or even jaywalking, really. And it’s not as though the journals’ secret penalty can give us specific deterrence, given that offenders don’t even know they’ve offended.

In most cases, I think the more appropriate path in both directions is a word passed through the journal’s faculty advisor.

Posted by: BDG | Apr 24, 2012 6:14:23 PM

Constitutionality and political workability

Ronald Dworkin has an essay in the New York Review of Books arguing for the constitutionality of the individual mandate and ACA generally (H/T: Harold Pollack). Pollack flags the key paragraph, in which Dworkin twice makes the point that the final version of ACA–Private insurance, no discrimination, and the individual mandate–was the only solution that was politically possible or workable in the current legislative environment.

Many ACA opponents (including my friend and colleague Elizabeth Foley) insist repeatedly that the mandate is unconstitutional, but it would be perfectly fine (as a constitutional matter) to impose Medicare for everyone. But single payer was not politically viable, not only because of the keep-government-out-of-my-Medicare folks, but also because of the business interests of the insurance industry. So Congress came up with something that was politically possible, that achieves the same result while imposing no greater burden on any individual and not (at least on any of the arguments actually made in court) infringing on any constitutional liberty.

The question is how that political reality should cut in the constitutional analysis. Dworkin’s point (which is something that had been circling around) is that invalidating the individual mandate is to say that, under the Constitution, Congress lacks the basic affirmative power to handle modern situations. The point of McCulloch and rational-basis review is that the courts should defer to Congress on choice of means, that Congress can best determine the best or most appropriate way to address a problem that is within its legislative authority. It seems to me that one of the factors Congress should be able to consider, and to which courts should defer, is the political landscape and what can be enacted given preferences of the public and the members of Congress.

Posted by Howard Wasserman on April 24, 2012 at 10:42 AM

Comments

It sounds like Jimbino was an enterprising male baby able to direct his own birth process and even self-separate from his umbilical cord, a self-proclaimed libertarian birth, growing up to say:

“Obamacare was invented to transfer wealth from young, single, enterprising men to indolent breeding women ….”

I wonder what Jimbino is planning for Mother’s Day.

Posted by: Shag from Brookline | Apr 24, 2012 3:28:25 PM

Jimbino – what do you think should happen to an enterprising young man with his own small business and no health insurance who ends up drawing the short end of the stick and getting diagnosed with cancer? Take up a collection plate for his surgeries, chemo and radiation? Highly expensive health events can happen to anyone. If insurance isn’t mandated, I – a “… breeding woman” (and law prof) subsidize the health care needed by your go-it-alone dude. It is a fallacy to think there aren’t transfers now. Doesn’t it make more sense (rhetorical question Jimbino – your views are clear) to encourage people to get preventative care – facilitated by having insurance – rather than use the emergency room (at taxpayers’ expense) when things have gotten serious and more expensive to treat?

Posted by: anon | Apr 24, 2012 3:22:59 PM

Jimbino: Out of curiosity, were you an unassisted home birth, born in the woods, or born in the back seat of a car? Because if the answer is “born in a hospital,” it sounds like you were an indolent young man leeching off of others for your health care costs, at least at that stage of your life.

Posted by: Joe (not that one) | Apr 24, 2012 2:56:59 PM

Dworkin and others rely on the assertion that “everybody at some time will need health care.”

Well, that’s true of the Amish, of course, but they are exempted from Obamacare.

That’s true of Amerikan expatriates as well, whether temporary residents or visitors to foreign countries, but they are NOT exempted from Obamacare, and Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare and USSA emergency treatment are NOT available to them.

It’s true of folks who rely on alternative medicine, as well, but they are not exempted from Obamacare, which will NOT pay for lots of their treatment.

Obamacare was invented to transfer wealth from young, single, enterprising men to indolent breeding women and to support the Pharma and Insurance monopolies. It has nothing to do with providing health care, any more than our Food Insurance provides us with food.

Posted by: Jimbino | Apr 24, 2012 2:10:57 PM

I think this post makes a good point and what is ‘necessary and proper’ is (under McCulloch, which does not interpret “necessary” in a strictly literal way that some might) partially a matter of what is possible given the overall political, economic and social reality of the day.

Of course, certain means are not “proper” at any rate. So, we are left debating just how different various methods are. But, particularly unless we move past the rational basis review of CC, it does seem proper to take into consideration the basic reality of the situation, including what is possible given the period we live in.

Posted by: Joe | Apr 24, 2012 12:37:19 PM

Punishment Theory in the OSJCL

The Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law has just published an issue on punishment theory and culpability, with special editor Mitch Berman at the helm for this issue. There are some exceptional contributions from the likes of Larry Alexander, Kim Ferzan (twice!), Doug Husak, Ken Simons, Peter Westen, and Gideon Yaffe. And there’s something by me, too.

Thanks to Mitch and to Joshua Dressler for letting a welterweight fighter slip into a heavyweight class.

Posted by Marc DeGirolami on April 24, 2012 at 08:05 AM

Comments

Check out also Mike Cahill’s excellent contribution on inchoate liability. It’s fantastic and … short!

Posted by: Dan Markel | Apr 24, 2012 9:04:30 AM

Interactive Casebooks

Recently I learned that I’ll be teaching Copyright law for the first time, a circumstance that launched my search for casebook. One of the ones that I considered was Brauneis and Schechter’s Copyright: A Contemporary Approach, which is an interactive casebook just published by West. The book is released in a paper format, along with a one-year subscription to an electronic version of the book. Prawfs using a West/Westlaw password can obtain access to the electronic version.

The authors used the electronic format of the book nicely. I liked the links to the subject matter of the cases, such as clips of songs, images and the like. For example, one link which allowed me to play the video game that was the subject of Williams Electronics v. Artic Int’l. The links to the statutory text were particularly useful.

Although I ultimatley didn’t end up going with this one (at least this year), I found the format helpful and intriguing, particularly for courses where there are strong visual components. If you’ve used any of the interactive casebooks in your courses, your feedback about your experience would be very helpful.

Posted by Amy Landers on April 23, 2012 at 05:19 PM

Comments

Brauneis and Schechter comes into a field crowded with good casebooks and still manages to be an important addition. More so than any of the other books in the Interactive Casebook series, it really embraces the format. This is partly because of the subject matter: so many copyright cases have multimedia components. But it’s partly a function of good editing: it’s a genuinely nice demonstration of what a casebook gains when it’s thoroughly hyperlinked to supporting materials.

Posted by: James Grimmelmann | Apr 24, 2012 12:16:33 AM

Arizona v. United States: A Lesson from History

Not surprisingly, the United States and a number of amici in Arizona v. United States rely on the 1876 decision of Chy Lung v. Freeman, and it goes unmentioned in Arizona’s brief. The Chy Lung Court unanimously invalidated California’s efforts to suppress Chinese immigration, concluding that immigration was an area of exclusive federal authority: “the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.” A companion case, Henderson v. New York, invalidated a similar New York law allegedly justified by the police power, explaining that “no definition of [the police power], and no urgency for its use, can authorize a State to exercise it in regard to a subject-matter which has been confided exclusively to the discretion of Congress by the Constitution.”

I wish one of the amici had mentioned that Congress agreed.

As Justice White famously explained in Runyon v. McCrary, Congress enacted the predecessor to 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) in 1870 to protect Chinese immigrants being persecuted in California. It provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

Therefore Congress, like the Court, agreed that the risk of invidious prejudice was too high to allow states to discriminate against non-citizens. The Framers of the Constitution, likewise, recognized that state courts might discriminate when it granted non-citizens access to the federal courts in Article III.

Neither Chy Lung nor Section 1981 did anything for the Chinese in the long run; Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, and the Court upheld it. But these actions make the point even more clearly: Even though Congress and the Court ultimately agreed as a policy matter that the Chinese had to go, they still insisted that the federal government was responsible for making that decision and carrying it out.

Posted by Jack Chin on April 23, 2012 at 05:13 AM

80,000? That’s a Lot of Patents

I just saw this Mercedes ad, intended to celebrate the innovation of the company’s engineers. As a patent prawf, I was struck by the image of patents protecting the car.

80,000 patents can be a signal of serious advances. As Clarissa Long has observed, “patents can serve as a signal of firm quality.” Or, it might just be indicative of a lot of patenting.

Posted by Amy Landers on April 22, 2012 at 05:12 PM

Comments

Very clever commercial!

Posted by: Margaret Ryznar | Apr 25, 2012 2:53:38 PM

How Much is Cervantes Worth?

This column by David Brooks yesterday seems to be in earnest. The idea is that we ought to tally up how much a student learns in college to see whether it’s worth the extraordinarily high price tag. That ubiquitous phrase of Mammon-speak, “value-added,” makes its proud appearance — with its now standard assumption that valuable things ought to be valuated, and that what is invaluable is synonymous with what is worthless.

There are many strange little features about this proposal, the principal one of which is that it does not seem particularly well suited to the liberal arts. How much is a shock to the intellectual system worth? How much for a new thought? A new turn of phrase? An old insight refreshed? A conversation with a teacher about what Proust meant, or what Milton didn’t? The knowledge of something consummately impractical — say, the alignment of the planets? The appreciation of a sculpture? Reading Cicero in Latin? What is the worth of a morally unhygenic novel? What is the value-added of becoming less certain about what is valuable in life? Give me a number.

But perhaps the liberal arts are not the object of these sorts of proposals, and it is the non-liberal arts college education whose value can be quantified (I do not think this is true, but I’m otherwise at a loss to explain the column’s target). If that is the case, and what Brooks says is true — namely, that fewer people will send their children to college in the future for the purpose of civic or professional training without a drastic reduction in tuition — then perhaps the result will be a return to the days when college was only for those interested in the liberal arts. Others will go to work after high school, or attend trade schools, or do something else. Or, as Brooks seems to suggest, perhaps schools will simply reduce their prices dramatically to match the ratified valuation. Will the new dispensation apply to liberal arts colleges too?

Posted by Marc DeGirolami on April 20, 2012 at 07:45 PM

Comments

Everybody should be given a BA, MS, PhD, MD and JD at birth. The higher education wouldn’t be polluted by dolts, especially all those pre-meds and pre-laws pretending to learn math and physics. They could then spend their time just learning to kiss ass, pass their bars and run for Congress.

Then only those who loved learning would darken the doors of the great universities and great teachers like Jesus and Socrates might return to teaching avid learners.

Posted by: Jimbino | Apr 21, 2012 3:09:06 PM

I can imagine that David Brooks’ car has this bumper-sticker: “R-MONEY, MAMMON’S MISSIONARY”.

Brooks has been mailing in his columns since the obvious failure of the Bush/Cheney Administration even prior to the Bush/Cheney Great Recession of 2008, with filler quotes from books by obscure authors that he might not have read in their entireties. If he ever had reporting skills, they may have been lost with the long-quotes-of-others method, including in this column.

Perhaps Brooks might take a look at the late Kurt Vonnegut’s first novel, “Player Piano,” published in 1952, set sometime in the future when, as a result of technological advances, the goods and services required by Americans could be provided by a few managers (MBAs?) and engineers, resulting in the loss of once much useful employment for the masses (who would, however, because of the riches of future America, have their needs provided for by government). This would of course lead to unrest, despite needs of the masses being provided for, because the masses needed something more in life beyond food, shelter, clothing and entertainment. So there were plot lines of some protest groups among the masses, but Vonnegut’s hero was a manager, who was born into a family of managers, who rebelled (including against his spouse’s childless ambitions) against the system. And so it goes.

By following my advice, Brooks might be able to mail in a few more columns before his imagined bumper-sticker bears fruit with the election this fall of a real manager (just ask Mitt, he’ll tell you about the Bain of his existence – and worth).

Posted by: Shag from Brookline | Apr 21, 2012 7:18:24 AM

Underneath the Law Review Submission Process: Part VI Interviews with Those who Reject Us

In this next post on the law review submission process (see intro, part I, part II on timing of submissions,part III interview, part IV interview and part V interview if you are interested in interviews with Stanford and Vanderbilt editors), I interviewed two articles editors, Joseph Ballstaedt (JGB) and Ryan Merriman (RM), and the editor-in-chief, Joe Orien (JAO) for 2012-13.

One quick note before the interview. I was really impressed with something that the BYU Law Review articles editors did this year before giving an offer to an author. They did citation counts for authors to see how their previous work has been received by the academy as an indication of how important their future work will be. This isn’t necessarily helpful for junior scholars who may not have had time for their work to be cited, but I think it can be helpful for more established professors who may not teach at fancy schools but have written important pieces. And as long as this isn’t the sole or primary criteria, I think this could be a good objective measure by which to judge authors and articles.

1. If you can briefly describe how many articles you received in this winter submission cycle, when you received the most submissions (if there were any such peaks in the submission cycle) and generally how you weeded through these submissions. JGB: We received about 1000 submissions, I believe. We received articles for about a month and half, beginning in early February and ending in late March. It seemed like the flow of article submissions was pretty steady, but did pick up some toward the end of March. At least that is my memory. We had to make quick decisions at times to find articles worth reviewing even further and many articles were quickly cut out based on being too short, not having a clear thesis or engaging introduction, addressing an strange topic (like an article promoting incest), or sometimes based on not having a great publication history. However, we often gave great consideration and even offers to young lawyers and professors if their articles impressed us after a quick read. RM: Assuming the other four Articles Editors reviewed roughly the same number ofsubmissions this semester as I did, we received somewhere between 900 and 1000 articles. I personally reviewed 189 between late January and about the middleof March. It seems like we were flooded with articles towards the end ofFebruary and early March. Given the sheer volume of submissions, it’simpossible to thoroughly read through each article. The only time I ever rejectan article based on the CV alone is when the author is not a law professor, butI always take a closer look at the article when the author has a strong CV.I’ll read the introduction, the conclusion, and skim through the rest if it’sinteresting. My primary goal is always to pass on articles that will generatecitations to our law review. To that end, I look for articles that are not toonarrow, make a theoretical/descriptive contribution to the literature, orpropose a change to some area of the law. A concise, well-written introductionthat clearly states why the article is an important contribution always catchesmy attention. 2. How many levels of review do you have and do you have a vote on each article? If so is it majority or supermajority vote? JAO: We have three levels of review: an initial prescreen stage, a reading stage, and a final review. A single editor reviews each article at the prescreen. To reach the final review, each article must have been read and accepted by two articles editors. At the final review stage, I first read the article and solicit advice from faculty members. The article is then presented to all of the articles editors for discussion and a final decision. All of our decisions this year were unanimous. 3. How do you determine whether an article should be accepted for publication? What factors are most important to you? Article topic? Author’s credibility? JGB: It was always nice when the author addressed either a topic we were familiar with or had interest in; however, we often had to make judgments on articles addressing topics well outside our expertise. In these situations, a indication that we should make an offer or further investigate an article was how well we understood the topic after reading the article. If an author can successfully introduce me to a new topic and unique proposal within that topic, I am satisfied. To do this, he or she must clearly and simply explain the foundation (the basics) of this topic while still engaging a new aspect of this material in a clear way. If an author cannot do this, it is much more difficult to have confidence in the author’s article. Great minds and writers, in my opinion, can explain complex matters in a simple way. JAO: In my review at the last stage of the process, I focused almost exclusively on the quality of the article and tended to only look at the author’s credentials in close cases where we needed to rely on the author’s credibility in explaining a complex topic. In judging the quality of the articles, I focused on each article’s utility (target audience, relevance of thesis, scope), strength of arguments, writing and organization, and research quality. The best articles obviously excelled in all four areas. For articles deficient in one area or another, my decision rested on whether or not the deficiency could be improved through the editing process (e.g., it’s hard to improve an article with a poorly conceived thesis). RM: In descending order, the most important factors to me are (1) the substantive quality of the article (again, does it make a novel descriptive/theoretical contribution to anarea of the law) (2) technical quality, (3) author’s prestige. If I read anarticle with great ideas, polished prose, and it looks like it’s already been blue booked, I always pass it on to another editor even if the author isrelatively obscure. In fact, because we lose so many articles from professors at T14 schools to other law reviews, I really make a special effort to look foryoung scholars who’ve written excellent articles. Additionally, I typically reject articles that seem too narrow, or seem to belong in a niche journal (technical articles on tax or patents that don’t seem broad enough for a more general audience; pieces that read more like an econ/polisci/international relations piece than a traditional law review article). 4. Tell me about the cover letter. What is the relative value of the cover letter as opposed to the CV? What were the most effective cover letters you saw? JGB: I did not put much weight in cover letters. In fact, I only remember reading one or two. This was because we were trained not to read the cover letters and found more use in reading the introduction of the article. I would first review the CV to see whether the author was publishing successfully. Then I would consider the substance of the article, skipping the cover letter and going to the introduction–what any future reader would use to quickly assess the utility of an article. RM: I’ll be honest–After the first 20 or 30 submissions, I stopped reading cover letters. Most of them are generic and sound exactly the same. The cover letters that Ithought were effective briefly describe why the article is important in relation to prior scholarship, but an effective introduction in the article does that anyway. For that reason, I think the CV is definitely more important than the cover letter.

5. Describe (each of you), the top two articles you saw this submission cycle and why you believed they were the best articles. JGB: My favorite submission was very clean. It did what every law review article does (or tries to do), but did it better and more concisely. It did not develop any tangents or speak too long on any aspect of the topic or area of law. Rather, it gave a clear introduction that told me what the article contained, gave a concise but adequate background of the law concerning this topic, and gave me a clear idea of the author’s proposal and addition to this area of law. Essentially, it was your stereotypical law review article. It wasn’t fancy. I would have been able to read this article as a beginner to the topic (which I was not) and also as a student of the subject interested in the author’s proposal (which I was). I didn’t have to read the whole article to find the useful parts because it was organized well. The author did not hide the ball or use long-winded explanations. Other authors usually spoke too long so I was grateful to this author for taking the time to slim his article up. My next favorite article(s) was any article that did the same. In sum, any article that clearly (and sometimes creatively) made its point and made it quickly. JAO: My favorite two articles both had excellent writing and organization. When an article has clear organization, road maps, transitioning, topic sentences, summaries and conclusions, and signposts, it makes a world of a difference in how I perceive it. Both of the my favorite articles did this. They were easy to read, and I didn’t have to re-read paragraphs several times to figure out what the author was trying to illustrate. And I don’t think they were easier to read because of the subject matter (one of them, in particular, dealt with a rather complex topic). RM: We extended an offer (that was ultimatelynot accepted) on an article that examined the relationship between tort reform and economic activity. While we are sometimes wary of pieces that involveeconometrics (because frankly we’re not qualified to evaluate complex empirical work—we’re barely qualified to evaluate traditional law review pieces), the paper used a unique data set to evaluate untested empirical claims surrounding a highly contentious, high-profile issue. Organization was clear, writing was crisp, and technical quality looked ready to publish. The other article that really impressed me proposed a thought provoking solution to collective action problems that did not rely on the threat of sanctions or prospect of special benefits to participants. It used some game theory, but in a straight-forward, intuitive way I thought was accessible to a general audience. The author applied her theoretical insights to some areas of the law and proposed some substantive reforms. Organization and writing was easy to follow, citations were already in good shape, so even though the publication history was pretty sparse, I felt comfortable recommending it. 6. What kinds of trends did you identify that we can tell law professors about. For instance, did any authors do anything interesting this year that you wanted to pass on? RM:I noticed a lot of empirical pieces. Some of them were fairly sophisticated (logit/probit regressions, difference-in-difference estimation, instrumental variables) and others were more straightforward (OLS, simple cross tabs, etc.). Personally, I loved seeing so many empirical papers (full disclosure: I was anecon/polisci undergrad). However, I think in general law students feel a little skittish about accepting complex empirical papers because most have no idea how to evaluate the methodology and results. The best articles evaluated controversial, salient legal issues or challenged long-standing assumptions in the literature. They also focused mostly on presenting the results and discussing their implications and left most of the technical explanation in anappendix. 7. How effective is it when authors are extremely communicative with you with emails and updates? Is this nice or annoying? Do you prefer eager authors who may tell you that they are willing to accept an offer if you give one without expediting or does that not help? RM:I don’t think I’d communicate much before you’ve been contacted by the law review other than to let us know you’ve received an offer. Given how much we don’t know about many areas of the law, we’re always trying to look for indirect evidence that an author produces influential scholarship that will be cited—publication history, quantity/quality of citations to author’s priorwork, prior work experience indicative of expertise, and of course, offers from other journals. If you let us know that you’re willing to publish with us no matter what, that might lead use to speculate that the article isn’t important enough to generate interest from other schools. JGB: It is certainly tempting to give more weight to an author who is willing to accept an offer if we make him or her an offer. We as article editors have a lot of work to do, and we would love to have solid articles as quickly as possible. It is somewhat discouraging to know that many of the great articles that we like find offers elsewhere. I am tempted to make an offer to an author whose article might not be quite as amazing but will be accepted rather than 3 or 4 offers to authors with stronger articles but who might not accept an offer. 8. Do you ignore articles that do not come from expedited reviews or try to balance expedited reviews from reviews of regular articles? JGB: I tried to give equal weight to all articles, and I read all the articles in the order that I received them generally. But as time went on, I did start to favor expedited articles in an attempt to find better articles quicker. it is certainly hard not to read an expedited article with a presumption that it will be good. We read most articles with a presumption to reject, but an expedite automatically changes that. And they are generally better anyway RM: I will read expedited articles first, but they do not receive more substantive attention than other submissions. In my experience, most expedited articles that we offer end up publishing at a higher-ranked journal anyway. 9. Do you try to obtain a balance in article topics that you are publishing? First year topics v. non-first year topics? Public vs. private law? RM: Not really. If wealready have two articles on the same topic in an issue, we might be less inclined to extend a third offer on the same subject. But generally we’re mostconcerned with filling up our publication calendar, as are most similarly situated law reviews. That probably changes as a journal’s prestige increases. JGB: I didn’t favor any kind of topic, at least consciously. Rather, I try to find articles that will be read and will be cited. I want to add to current legal discussion, wherever it might be. Sometimes a topic that I found very interesting was not likely to receive attention, so I didn’t give it as much weight, despite my own interest in it. JAO: I tended to favor articles with broad applicability. Although a broad thesis can quickly become unmanageable, I tried to look for foundational articles that would lend themselves easily to further discussion in academic circles. I think a thesis can be too narrow in any area, so I’m not sure how much the subject matter affected my thinking. 10. You have a floor here to advice law professors on their articles. What are some tips that you would give for professors to improve their articles? JGB: If you co-write an article with a less prominent author, it is still your work. I feel that a few great authors let co-authors use their name, and the resulting article wasn’t very impressive. Also, good Bluebooking and removing simple typos can make a great difference for two reasons. 1) We don’t want to get your article ready to publish–that means a lot of work for us. We want it to come ready to publish and polish it off. 2) Poor Bluebooking and editing make your article lose credibility. Maybe we as law school students put too much emphasis on Bluebooking due to the many edits we do, but it is still something that we value (unfortunately). And grammar errors and other typos just make it look unprofessional. That goes without saying. JAO: I’m sure most professors already recognize this, but having student-edited journals (as opposed to peer-edited) means that we are frequently unfamiliar with the law underlying each article. Unless we’ve taken a course on the material covered in the article, we often rely on the article to explain it for us. So if the article doesn’t explain, even briefly, the underlying law, we will naturally find it more difficult to understand than an article that builds the blocks necessary to understanding the analysis. In fact, as I’m sure is the case with most editors, the enjoyable part of screening articles is learning about various areas of the law. I think we will often be drawn (perhaps unconsciously) to those articles that attempt to educate the reader generally. RM: So many factorsthat persuade me to recommend an article are out of an author’s control by the time they submit an article. Does it matter if you went to Harvard or Yale or clerked at the D.C. Circuit? It certainly doesn’t hurt. But setting those types of factors aside, the bottom line is to make the article as ready for publication as you possibly can prior to submission. So many authors see law review editors as an army of (free) research assistants. If something in your article seems like a pain to edit, we’re not particularly excited about doing it either. If an author is clearly an established expert in his/her field with an impressive CV, or if the substance of the piece is particularly compelling,we’re more willing to take on a difficult technical project. But if a young scholar with a short publication history submits a technically deficient piece, it’s harder to justify taking on the extra work. 11. Feel free to add anything else that you think may be helpful. JGB: One of the things that I loved to see was an article in the standard (if there is a standard) law review print format. Rather than double spacing and normal formatting, an article in law review publication format looked more like a publishable article. Though this probably shouldn’t matter, this format made me feel like the article was law-review bound–rather than any other double-spaced research project that we as students have written and read thousands of times. RM: I’ll briefly echo what my colleagues have mentioned regarding the importance of laying a little groundwork before launching in to your analysis. As second and third year lawstudents, there’s a lot we don’t know about many areas of the law we’rerequired to evaluate. We rely a lot on the article to establish a foundation.The most effective pieces in my view do several things—(1) provide a briefbackground that orients me to the prior scholarship and existing legalprecedent, (2) identifies a gap/problem/misconception in that area of the law,(3) explains briefly how the article responds to the identifiedgap/problem/misconception. The best pieces lay out all three things in the introduction.

Posted by Shima Baradaran Baughman on April 20, 2012 at 11:20 AM

Comments

I agree with pleepleus–blind peer review is difficult for heavily-workshopped pieces. Why not have a system whereby every law review publishes only their own faculty (based on first-named author) and alumni (if the author is not a law professor). In other words, why not eliminate the student-run law review article placement market altogether? That way, the law journals associated with a particular institution can serve as a means of chronicling that institution’s scholarly output, rather than as a dubious signal of quality under the current system.

Posted by: anon | Apr 23, 2012 6:50:57 PM

While the current system appears strange on its face, it makes a lot more sense when we admit that the primary function of many journals is to better train law students, not necessarily to publish significant scholarship. The submission process is just a necessary step in setting up all the other important tasks law review members perform, including drafting their own work to publish alongside professors. Overall, serving on a law journal is one of the most rigorous research and writing opportunities a law student will ever experience. No other part of law school even compares. Those who get the opportunity are foreover substantively improved in their writing and research. The quality of student articles that can be found at most any journal is a testament to this.

Because our profession spends a disproportiante amount of time writing and our students get so much out of journals, we have far more journals and articles than “professors” need. I suspect we have far more than most other disciplines. For students, I see no downside to creating more journals, but the enormous number of journals creates an artificial aggregate demand for articles. Professors respond by creating an additional scholarship to fill these journal and, as the article editors suggest, much of it is of low value (and I don’t exclude some of mine from this category).

Because most professors submit every one of their articles to the top 50 or 100 journals, editors do not have the luxury of picking the best articles from a stack of good articles. Rather, they must sift through a lot of poor articles to find the good ones. The waste of time involved in carefully reading every article would be enormous and, under current staffing, probably impossible.

One answer might be to expand the size of all law review staffs so there are more students to do the work (although this would not reduce the inefficiency). Another would be to consolidate journals at individual schools. This would shrink available publications slots while maintaining student opportunity. But because part of the bonus of being on law review is its exclusivity, I doubt the flagships would be interested.

We often blog about the need for professors to participate more heavily, but professors only make sense on the tail-end of the decision process. If they participated in the screening process, they might spend even more time than students reviewing articles. Surely professors’ time is more valueable than students. Unless deans lightened professors’ loads in other areas, which I would not recommend, I don’t think most of us could keep up with or complete the law journal’s work.

There must be other solutions, but my general sense is that we tolerate the current flaws in the system that disserve some law professors, practioners and scholarship because the current system serves the overall interests of better educating law students. I am not sure there is much “good” legal scholarship that goes unpublished. Our real gripe is about whether it makes its way into the top journals. The costs of correcting that problem likely outweigh the benefits.

The only serious dangers in the current system are bad habits students might develop during the submission process, but I find most editors thoughtful and professional enough to protect themselves and each other on that score.

Posted by: Derek Black | Apr 23, 2012 10:43:46 AM

While I agree the current system has flaws, I’m not sure peer review is the best solution. One problem is the potential for self-interested review. The people asked to be reviewers often have articles under submission at the same journals at the same time–and they’d rather their article be published than the one they’re reviewing. I’m also skeptical that review will reliably be blind. Good articles are often circulated to academics in the field, posted on SSRN, presented at workshops, and discussed on blogs in the months ahead of submission. Prawfs ubiquitously talk about works in progress in their field. By the time you get to peer review, it’s not unlikely that reviewers will recognize the work and know its author. Finally, law is not a science. You can objectively critique descriptive legal analysis, but efforts to develop doctrine beyond its current state are not readily susceptible to objective verification. Some of the best articles challenge prevailing wisdom and make provocative normative claims. Peer review may prevent the publication (or prestigious placement)of good articles that are disfavored for political or ideological reasons.

My point is not that peer review is necessarily a bad idea. I just think we should be cautious in assuming it is the perfect solution to the admittedly flawed system we have now.

Posted by: pleepleus | Apr 23, 2012 10:17:54 AM

The two tiered system in Stanford, Chicago, Yale, and Harvard are not anonymous. That is a myth. At a minimum, one of the articles editors knows the author’s identity, and at that submission stage screens articles for status and affiliation. (This is in fact the case with peer review as well). Neither of those screening tools, in my opinion, has aught to do with article quality. Based on my many conversations with articles editors over the years, the initial screener often passes that information onto the board.

Posted by: AnonProf | Apr 22, 2012 10:22:33 PM

I agree that professors share a good portion of the blame by overwhelmingly submitting articles during the current submission windows. However, speaking personally, the reason for that is a fear that law reviews won’t actively consider my pieces outside of those windows. If a critical mass of law reviews explicitly stated that they would consider all pieces equally over the first 10 weeks of each semester, and hold a few spaces for the end of those time spans, I wouldn’t hesitate to submit off-peak.

Posted by: Anonymoose | Apr 22, 2012 3:06:59 PM

I believe that most law reviews open for submissions as soon as they select a new slate of articles editors. And I think most law reviews close over the summer because students are unlikely to be in the same place, and group dynamics change dramatically when meetings can’t be held face-to-face. I think there’s still some room to expand the duration of the articles season, but one shouldn’t expect a really dramatic change without a bigger shake-up to the journal system.

Posted by: William Baude | Apr 22, 2012 1:51:42 PM

So long as an appropriate weighting for “maturity” of the author and the citation practices of a field are considered, I think the citation counts can be a useful addition to the decision making process. But, I might suggest using google scholar in addition to (or maybe even instead of) Westlaw, as that will pick up more peer-reviewed journals and books, while still getting law reviews. Influence on a broad range of fields should be valued, but will often be missed by Westlaw.

For reasons nicely stated by Dave Hoffman here (and in the linked items therein), I think that “preemption” is given much too much weight by law review editors, and should be scaled back as a consideration.

http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/04/preemption-checks.html

Not because it’s good to publish the same exact thought twice, but rather because it’s really quite rare that an article is “preempted” in a way that out to matter.

Posted by: Matt | Apr 22, 2012 12:27:25 PM

Charles,

Your points are well-taken, and many of the top (student-edited) law reviews are indeed moving to a hybrid system where they employ peer review: Stanford, Chicago, Yale, and Harvard all employ peer review.

I think it would be unwise to rely on peer review as the sole source of preemption checking since 1) peer reviewers, even specialist ones, aren’t always reliable in knowing the latest scholarship in the field and 2) peer review is a scarce resource, and most law reviews would rather not waste it on an article that’s obviously preempted by an author’s own prior work.

I agree that the two-tiered system, though, is a good way for a law review to go about checking for preemption without revealing the author’s identity to all of the editors.

Anonymoose,

You’re right. The fact that most articles are submitted in two blocs is the single biggest reasons articles editors feel pressured to resort to proxies. Most law reviews are open at other times of the year–not just during these two periods–so, while we’re clearly in a bad equilibrium, I think the solution is not obvious. Law reviews can say what they want about being open all year, but risk-averse professors seem keen on still submitting when everyone else is submitting.

Posted by: Former AE | Apr 22, 2012 12:07:37 PM

It seems to me that one way to reduce the need for student-edited law reviews to rely on proxies for quality (publication history, letterhead, etc.) would be to stretch out the submission season. I have never understood why the system has developed to allow only two windows for submissions. I realize that finals season will by necessity be a slow period for reviewing articles, but why, for instance, don’t more reviews open up for business in January, thus alleviating the crush of articles in the February and March time period? It seems to me that if a critical mass of law reviews announced that they are considering submissions on a rolling basis throughout the school year, with the exception of 2-3 weeks during finals, that they wouldn’t be as overworked as they are in the current system, which would give them a better chance to assess the quality of each piece, rather than being forced to rely on proxies.

Similarly, I understand why many reviews shut down for the summer, but also know that others do not (Chicago, Minnesota). However, if they could find a way to run over the summer, even remotely, this would again help alleviate the crush of the February-March season.

More modestly, even simply opening up a 10 week submission period during each semester would seem to dramatically improve the situation on both sides (students and professors), while not impacting the students’ exam periods or summer.

Unfortunately, we inexplicably have the worst possible system for all involved.

Posted by: Anonymoose | Apr 22, 2012 9:19:34 AM

Former AE—I see your point, but in my mind, peer review is much better at meeting these goals than the current system. Other scholars familiar with your specialty area will be much better than an articles editor at knowing whether an article says something new or is just repeating what’s been said before. That said, if a journal is seriously concerned about this, the two-stage review process used at most peer reviewed journals could solve this problem (for those unfamiliar, typically an article is first reviewed by one of the main editors for the journal, who makes a decision as to whether it is an appropriate fit; it is then sent out to double-blind peer reviewers—there is no reason why that initial editor, who knows the author’s identity, couldn’t do a quick check to verify that the same thing hasn’t effectively been published before by the author).

Anyway, I acknowledge my complaint here is really about the entire structure of the American legal publishing system—I would much rather see more specialty journals, rather than so many generalist journals, as well as more peer reviewed, rather than student-edited, journals. I doubt it will happen quickly, both because students are likely to be opposed to ceding power and professors are likely to be opposed to taking on additional responsibility (peer review is a lot more work than the current system, and exclusive submissions are much riskier). But I see a lot of subject areas moving into specialty journals, as they become so complicated that 3Ls are simply incapable of making reasonable publication decisions (you can already see this in a number of areas, such as my own (legal history)). I honestly don’t know what it will take to change things in the generalist reviews, but I suspect it will have to be lead by the top schools/law reviews.

Posted by: Charles Paul Hoffman | Apr 21, 2012 9:25:50 PM

The obsessive status consciousness law reviews display when considering authors is but the mirror image of the obsessive status consciousness authors display when considering law reviews. If we didn’t use journal rank as a proxy for article quality, it wouldn’t matter that editors also look to proxies.

Scholar, teach thyself.

Posted by: James Grimmelmann | Apr 21, 2012 7:48:33 PM

Ok, say citation count might have some merit as a factor. That being said, when assessing citations, I still don’t see why cites from the judiciary are not more important than cites from another professor. Does anyone have any insight on this?

Posted by: Anon | Apr 21, 2012 5:42:49 PM

I appreciate all of the comments and questions here on my interview.

On the citation count issue–I just want to make one point. In all three of the interviews I conducted, with Stanford, Vanderbilt and BYU, the editors made a note that expedited reviews made a difference. So, where a person had previously received an offer made a difference to the current editors reviewing the piece. And Expresso specifically informs authors to submit their CV as that is a very important factor for articles editors in considering a piece.

Given that information, why is looking at citation counts any more objectionable than looking at where the author went to school or where they have published in the past or what another law review thought of their work? I can certainly understand (and agree with) the criticism that none of these proxies should be used at all to determine what makes good scholarship–and every piece should be reviewed blindly, but I certainly don’t see why citation counts are any more objectionable than looking at a person’s CV–or what another law review thought about the piece. After all, law reviews (like legal academics) seek to be relevant. And publishing people who are likely to be cited is a logical way to achieve that.

Posted by: Shima Baradaran | Apr 21, 2012 4:27:37 PM

That citation counts are one factor in a holistic process, and that articles editors need a way to separate wheat from chaff, doesn’t provide a reason why citation counts are a relevant or appropriate factor to consider.

Posted by: Mark | Apr 21, 2012 4:03:47 PM

This is a great series of posts.

My view is that for all of the considerations not directly related to the merits of the piece, good articles will get picked up somewhere good because there are so many good outlets. Even an author at a 4th tier school will get fairly considered at the 100th-ranked law review, and an offer there starts the expedite process.

Posted by: Jack | Apr 21, 2012 3:43:57 PM

I think many of you have misinterpreted the role citation counts play in our acceptance process. It is one of many factors in a holistic evaluation process, and no single factor we identified above is determinative. Most of the pieces we’re publishing this year are from young authors with sparse publications histories. To be clear, the most important component to us is the quality of the piece. I have never rejected a well-written article because the author had a low cite count in Westlaw or did not graduate from a T14 law school.

Posted by: Ryan | Apr 21, 2012 3:40:54 PM

I think many of you are being unfair to the editors. You must understand that the journals receive many hundreds of 1000 (or more) submissions in the Feb-March cycle. Do you have any idea how many of these pieces are garbage? Do you realize how this burns an editor out? Of course the editors should and indeed must take into account other factors such as prior publications. And there is nothing wrong with looking at the number of citations. I think the editors are doing a balanced approach – it is more difficult for young or less cited authors but it is not impossible. That is just the way it is. And BTW , no the system is not perfect but my “beef” is that many journals do not bother to check the history of the submission. I dont appreciate receiving a rejection 3 months after I expedited. Obviously the submission was accepted so why dont the journal;s check their ExpresO before sending out a rejection.

Posted by: ex-dist.ct.law.clerk | Apr 21, 2012 3:00:12 PM

anon,

Most fields of academia have only a few main journals, so checking for preemption is relatively easy without author identification.

Of course, only one editor would need to know the author’s identity to run a preemption check, so publication record still shouldn’t even unintentionally affect the votes of the rest of the editors

Posted by: Former AE | Apr 21, 2012 2:51:42 PM

“There is reason to view an author’s publication record before extending an offer to publish..”

Funny how every other field of academia doesn’t need to do this.

Posted by: anon | Apr 21, 2012 2:32:28 PM

Why on earth would a law review cite be more important than a judicial cite? Why would a cite by a peer be more important than a cite that demonstrates that the article actually had some influence on the law?

Posted by: Anon | Apr 21, 2012 1:38:02 PM

There is reason to view an author’s publication record before extending an offer to publish: to ensure that the current article isn’t preempted by that author’s prior work. It’s not uncommon that authors will submit an Article that largely rehashes points made in a prior article and being able to quickly sift through their publications to see if that’s occurring is valuable.

Using citation counts as a basis for acceptance, though, serves, in my view, as an impermissible entry barrier that gives authors with high citation counts an incentive to shirk in future submissions. I’m glad BYU is open about their practice, but it’s a practice worth condemning.

Posted by: Former AE | Apr 21, 2012 1:13:25 PM

Hoffman> Yes, agreed.

What we have here are law review editors openly admitting that what matters in terms of getting an offer is the author’s prior publication record and law professor status.

For crying out loud, law reviews are the only area of academic publishing where authors are encouraged (required?) to submit their CVs! For what purpose? To ascertain whether the author was on law review himself? TO determine whether the author’s prior publication record?

This is just downright shameful. As I follow Paul Campos blog, I’m really starting to wonder whether law professors have any shame at all. I’m so glad I moved to academic medicine.

Posted by: Me | Apr 21, 2012 11:14:45 AM

Charles Hoffman,

I understand your frustration. Unfortunately, given the hundreds of submissions, it is impossible to give each an article a full review, and much easier to rely on heuristics, like BYU does.

Still, I’ve noticed plenty of authors at non-elite institutions(even from T4 schools) published in elite law journals. I think it’s an up hill struggle, but it’s possible with a quality piece.

Posted by: Former Articles Editor | Apr 21, 2012 11:03:49 AM

No offense to the the staff at BYU or prior law reviews interviewed (all of whom have been extremely forthcoming), but this series is just reinforcing my pre-existing feelings about why the American law review system is so deeply flawed. Just to take a few examples from this interview, an article might be rejected because it is: too short, uses an atypical structure, is on a subject the editors are unfamiliar with, is not expected to receive a certain number of future citations, uses empirical methodologies not traditionally common in law review articles, was written by anyone other than a law professor, or does not have a long section laying out the prior law. On the other hand, an article might be accepted if: the author went to Harvard or Yale, the author clerked on the DC Circuit, the article is type set to look like a law review article instead of a manuscript, the author’s prior articles were heavily cited, was properly Bluebooked, or it was on a subject familiar to the editors.

In aggregate, you see a system built with huge biases in favor of articles that literally *look* like law review articles, or that have been written by authors already screened for by others. All of the editors interviewed have said they are constantly looking out for the next big author, but that is not really consistent with the criteria used for selection (unless the “next big author” went to Harvard or Yale and did an elite clerkship). Indeed, the criteria seem almost designed to prefer individuals already preferred by the system—when hiring decisions are often based off of (1) where one got her JD and (2) what/where one has published, it is deeply frustrating if (2) is also dependent on where one got her JD.

Posted by: Charles Paul Hoffman | Apr 21, 2012 8:20:14 AM

Why is your goal attaining the best possible “ranking” for your law review through maximizing citation counts?

Posted by: Mark | Apr 21, 2012 8:07:12 AM

William Baude,

I am an Articles Editor for the BYU Law Review, and we weigh quite heavily an author’s prior publication history and citation counts. Westlaw makes this easy to do. The reasoning for this is that professors whose articles are cited hundreds of times and have very strong CVs are likely to be cited heavily in the future as well, thus brining more citations to our law review (the single-most important factor for law review rankings). We also do this in an effort to gauge the likelihood of acceptance, since many of these same professors are unlikely to accept an offer from schools similarly situated with BYU. This does not mean that newer professors who have only recently published will not get reviewed; when their publication history is scant / they are cited only a few times, then we take an even closer look at the piece itself. We have discussed and recognize that pieces from up-and-coming professors will generate many citations as their work gains recognition.

From my experience, law review citations are more important than judicial citations, but our Westlaw searches do cover both. There is not an efficient, uniquely scientific way to approach citation counts, and thus we do not standardize the counts or discard self-citations. That said, it is important to remember that we consider citation counts to be an important factor, but not the most important one. We remain committed to finding articles that are relevant, well-researched, and likely to generate discussion in the academic community and beyond.

Posted by: Spencer Driscoll | Apr 20, 2012 9:36:33 PM

Not all law reviews refuse to publish non-professors. I’m two-for-two the last couple of submission seasons, both at top 100 law reviews, and one at a better-ranked school than BYU.

Posted by: Joe (not that one) | Apr 20, 2012 3:09:29 PM

I’m fascinated by the idea of using prior-author citation counts as a factor in publication decisions. If any of the editors are available, I’d love to know a little more about how this works– How much of a factor is it? Are judicial citations or academic citations more important? How much effort do you put into standardizing the counts? (Do you discount by the number of years a piece has been out? Do you find and discard self-citations?)

Posted by: William Baude | Apr 20, 2012 3:09:12 PM

So, there are some 800 law reviews. As the editors here say, they only consider articles from law professors. So how hard is it to get published?

Posted by: Steve | Apr 20, 2012 2:23:50 PM

Please Save me Five Bucks and Explain Why Obamacare Might Be Unconstitutional.

At fivrr, one can purchase a number of products and services, some useful, others absurd, for five dollars. You can also ask for things you are willing to pay five dollars for. I am hoping Prawfs readers will answer for free a question that I have been unable to resolve in my own mind (but I will pay five bucks at fivrr if I have to).

I understand why a mandate to buy insurance might be unconstitutional. There are limits on what the government can force us to do. I happen to agree with my colleagues Vik Amar and Alan Brownstein who explained in an LA Times op-ed that the slippery slope argument doesn’t work here. But let’s say that the individual mandate is unconstitutional.

I don’t understand why Congress, nevertheless, cannot impose a tax on those who do not have or buy insurance. The Internal Revenue Code is full of incentives (and penalties) for things that Congress could not mandate (or prohibit) directly.

Congress can’t (or shouldn’t) make you get married, but they can lower your taxes if you do. Same with eating broccoli, buying a home, and tithing to your church, temple, mosque, etc. Similarly, they can’t prohibit you from getting married, but they can raise your taxes if you do.

In addition, as a short paper featured recently on Taxprof explains, there is no intrinsic economic difference between a tax incentive and a tax penalty. So why shouldn’t the Court say (if it is so inclined) that the mandate is invalid, but the tax effects of not buying insurance remain in force? Again, changing people’s tax rates because they do (or don’t) do something that Congress wants is absolutely routine.

One reason might be the famous distinction between a penalty and a tax. If the financial consequence were in fact a penalty, if, for example, it were public and stigmatizing, or carried with it collateral consequences affecting other domains of life, then it might be the equivalent of a mandate, and therefore valid only if they could directly require it. But the beginning and the end of this penalty is a limited, private financial consequence on the calculation of one’s income tax.

And perhaps in some cases there is a substantial difference between “raising your taxes if you don’t” and “lowering your taxes if you do.” For example, I would find it more objectionable to raise taxes on people who do not contribute to their faith institution than it is to offer a deduction to people who do, even if the economic effect were identical. But there is no arguably inappropriate social message from Congress saying “everyone should have health insurance”; not even Obamacare critics object to the government merely encouraging people to eat Broccoli.

Justice Scalia’s dissent for himself and Justices O’Connor and Breyer

Comments

Jack, Thanks for continuing the conversation. The tithing or “reduction with certain expenditures” are tax credits. But credits are only relief of the requirement. Everyone who earns money is required to pay income tax, regardless of amount, first. THEN the government gives you a credit if you do not earn enough. Some mistake this for a “negative tax” or “not being required to pay” but that is inaccurate. You are required to pay first, then if you meet certain requirements, you are given relief second. But ALL of it is predicated on you receiving income. You can avoid the income tax by not receiving income.

In the case of Heathcare Act, again, there is no way out. Joe, I read your argument, but Prof. Galle is wrong and so are his assumptions. All tax is generated from those that participate in some “act”. Again, make income, get taxed on income — not broccoli. You have to buy broccoli to get taxed on them. This is not true from healthcare. What is the action that initiates the tax if not “being alive”? And the argument that you get a “credit” if you don’t make enough income is only secondary. Receiving the credit presumes that you already participated in the action that initiated the tax. I cannot get an income tax credit for children if I haven’t first made income to be taxed. I am not interested in participating in the healthcare act. What action must I not do to be taxed?

Joe, I think if you read Jack’s article above, he makes the assumption that this is a tax for the purpose of discussion — otherwise it is a mandate. But Jack already addressed my comments to that, so I am trying to stay on point. However if you believe that our President (or any for that matter) hasn’t initiated a tax ‘because he said so,’ then I guess that Gitmo is closed, we left Iraq after 18 months, he received Congressional approval before going into Libya, and that he as worked feverishly to lower the debt racked up by his predecessor. Campaign promises are like the prelude to a one night stand. We all like hearing the flowery words, and then feel sleazy the next day.

Posted by: MarkV | Apr 26, 2012 10:11:22 AM

MarkV,

If the sum is due even if you do not have any income, then I see your point. If Joe is right that the tax is not due unless you have a certain level of income, then I see it as an income tax, which, like tithing, you could reduce with certain expenditures.

Jack

Posted by: jack | Apr 25, 2012 11:39:08 AM

“A major issue is whether the individual mandate is a direct tax. Someone commented above that the tax is not voluntary because it is a tax on existence.”

It might be a “major issue” for a few, but the passing mention this had in the long oral argument underlines overall, it isn’t really.

It is not a “direct tax” for reasons Prof. Galle and others have noted. Merely “existing” will not provide a requirement. If someone, e.g., does not make a certain amount of money, it is not required. Putting aside that it is money arising from involvement in the health industry, the usual assumption was ‘direct tax’ had a narrow reach.

Pollock was a controversial expansion of said reach and even that case dealt with a clearer case of rents and such, not a tax arising from various actions one does over one’s life.

Another person noted Obama would not have signed the law if it was a “tax.” Relying on counterfactuals based on public statements of politicians (which as a rule for courts seems ridiculous; legislative history alone is controversial) is not a good way to run a railroad, so to speak. And, it is not shocking really to assume he was spinning things somewhat, like pols usually do when taxes are involved. This underlines the value of taking an objective view of what is done, not go by what politicians say in such a fashion.

Posted by: Joe | Apr 24, 2012 12:25:15 PM

“The goverment may tax you for doing or not doing something they cannot mandate or prohibit.” Jack, I understand that. But you consistently dodge the issue. Usually we are taxed on things we participate in. How do you chose not to participate in this if it is then called a tax? At this point maybe I need to admit naiveté. What are some things that we are taxed for Not Doing?

Posted by: MarkV | Apr 24, 2012 11:36:27 AM

Jonathan —

Congress has the power to impose income taxes. As part of that power, it is necessary and proper for Congress to require individual Americans to file tax returns. Up until recently, to file tax returns required those Americans to purchase an envelope and a stamp, as electronic filing did not exist and no address is provided for filing. Thus, Congress could mandate tax-filing Americans to purchase in the private marketplace these items.

If one accepts the idea that Congress has the power to regulate the health insurance market under its commerce clause power because of the market’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, then why isn’t it within the necessary and proper clause’s broad reach (see McCulloch, see Comstock) to require individuals to purchase health insurance?

The answer seems to keep coming back to the “unprecedented” nature of making Americans purchase a product in the private market. But, as I note above, that’s not true. Moreover, it’s no answer to say that purchasing an envelope and stamp is trivial. After all, as you say, the “penalty is too small,” but the “size of the penalty (or a “tax”) has no bearing on its constitutionality.”

Posted by: Michael Teter | Apr 23, 2012 6:43:38 PM

Jack —

The distinction is not between taxes and tax rates, but between willing to impose a tax as a tax, and not being willing to do so. In any event, the reason I linked to the piece by Erik Jensen is that discusses some of the other constitutional limitations that are imposed on exercises of the taxing power. In particular, a capitation tax (or a tax on living, existence in the U.S., etc.) would be a direct tax subject to the apportionment requirement of Article I, section 2. Since the penalty for violating the mandate is not apportioned, it would be unconstitutional were it a direct tax.

The only way to use the taxing power to impose a penalty for failing to purchase insurance without creating a potential apportionment problem would be for Congress to increase income taxes on everyone and then provide tax credits for those who purchase qualifying plans. This would almost certainly be constitutional under existing precedent (and, even if not, would be immune from judicial review as no one would have standing to challenge it). This approach works because the 16th Amendment allows Congress to impose an income tax without apportionment. While the economic incentive created by this approach is the same, the political economy is different (as demonstrated by the utter refusal of the mandate’s proponents to call the penalty a tax). That’s the political economy point.

Mr. Gelbach —

According to the CBO, the penalty will not be “rarely paid.” To the contrary, the penalty is too small to provide a sufficient incentive for many younger, healthier folks to purchase insurance. In any event, the size of the penalty (or a “tax”) has no bearing on its constitutionality. It either represents a constitutional exercise of federal power or it does not.

JHA

Posted by: Jonathan H. Adler | Apr 23, 2012 6:02:43 PM

A major issue is whether the individual mandate is a direct tax. Someone commented above that the tax is not voluntary because it is a tax on existence. Historically, state and local governments have imposed a head tax or a poll tax, which is essentially a tax on existence. Because it is a tax on existence, a head or poll tax has historically been considered a direct tax. The Individual Mandate appears to be a direct tax because it is a tax on existence.

Congress is authorized to impose a direct tax, i.e., a tax on existence, but only if it is apportioned. To apportion a direct tax, Congress must impose it on everyone equally. My understanding is that the Individual Mandate applies only to people who do not have insurance. That would mean that it is not apportioned. If is not apportioned and a direct tax, the imposition of it exceeds Congress’s authority.

Posted by: Chance | Apr 23, 2012 1:02:56 PM

MarkV,

The premise of the post is an assumption, arguendo, that the mandate is unconstitutional. But that is a separate question from a price for doing or not doing something. The goverment may tax you for doing or not doing something they cannot mandate or prohibit.

Jack

Posted by: Jack | Apr 23, 2012 11:12:50 AM

Jack, of course income tax is fair for those who take in income. But we are not talking about income, Jack. You’re missing (and did not respond to) the problem of being taxed on “life.” I can intellectually justify a tax on cigarettes, income, housing, cars, gasoline, and yes even broccoli. But what is the basis for this tax? What are you participating in that requires it? The answer is, being alive. All the other taxes we are only subjected to through self participation. Buy cigarettes, get taxed on cigarettes. If the argument is that we participate in the health insurance because at some future date we will participate, then why not tax us all on gasoline, cigarettes, or cars with the presumption in the future that we may drive or smoke?

At its base, the requirement is to pay for health insurance as a “mandate” (meaning “official order or commission to do something”). And the basis for that mandate is not that you have done anything, but solely because you are. I think Jimbino and myself are humoring you, but (if you are the author) you acknowledge this as a mandate in your second paragraph but then immediately discuss it as a tax, without any understanding that the two are not synonymous.

Regardless… if this is a tax, what can we do to avoid it? I can avoid income tax by not taking income. I can avoid gasoline tax by not buying gasoline. If this is a tax, how do I voluntarily NOT participate?

Posted by: MarkV | Apr 23, 2012 11:06:40 AM

The case you’ve made proves too much — if we follow your reasoning then there is no longer an internal limit in what T&S Clause. Basically anything that raises revenue, penalizes citizens or otherwise takes money is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority, provided that the gov’t coffers are better-off. And we all know that can’t be right.

Posted by: James | Apr 22, 2012 11:58:04 PM

Jack,

It may be news to you, but there are folks who do not subscribe to insurance to pay for Western Medicine–not only the Amish, Christian Scientists and Faith Healers, but also those who chose treatment by Chiropractic, Naturopathic, Homeopathic, Ayurvedic or Chinese Medicine, etc, and those non-Amish who have the same aversion to insurance in all its ugly forms.

Not only that, Obamacare taxes folks to pay for contraception and childbirth and other natural processes and procedures that have nothing to do with medicine. In addition, it will cover circumcision, a religious ritual that is better seen as genital mutilation of a non-consenting person.

Taxing every Amerikan to support Allopathic Amerikan Medicine is like taxing pedestrians to support highways, on the theory that it is OK to tax travel. Actually, it’s more like taxing a pedestrian in the Amazon to support a highway in the USSA.

The socialist refrain used to be, “If it moves, tax it.” That is now supplanted by, “If it exists anywhere in the world, tax it.”

You can get a grip on Obamacare once you realize that it’s just another vehicle captured by gummint to “spread the wealth around.”

Posted by: Jimbino | Apr 22, 2012 8:27:26 PM

MarkV and Jimbino,

I could see your arguments if this was not a tax against income. I.e., if a person had no income at all and were subject to punishment for not paying, I see a due process problem. But the way those sorts of problems are handled is through the concept of “unconstitutional as applied.” The ultra-rare cases might get a pass. But do you think it is constitutional as applied to people who through voluntary transactions have income in the United States, and voluntarily engage in interstate commerce in the United States?

Jack

Posted by: Jack | Apr 22, 2012 12:48:32 PM

Some of the examples you site, the individual (in a sense) agrees to be taxed as part of the purchase. Get married, get taxed (if the marriage tax is still in effect). Buy a house, get taxed. Buying broccoli, get taxed. Buy cigarettes or alcohol, get taxed. Buy gas, get taxed. Get a job, get taxed on income. If you want to avoid the tax, you have that opportunity. Only if you participate in the service are you also participating in the funding of its regulation. We are all obligated to pay a minimum amount of tax. The tax credits come as relief when individuals participate in activities that society deems valuable. Raise children, receive a tax credit. Give to organizations that contribute to the moral fabric of society, get a tax credit.

The problem with the new law (which Jimbino also alludes to) is that you are taxed not from something you voluntarily participated in, but simply because you exist!! The government’s argument that you “participate” by being alive is highly offensive to most that read this bill. Even if the government would give a tax credit to individuals that voluntarily purchase their own healthcare, the underlying argument is still erroneous and a tax solely on the “right to life, liberty, and happiness.” Want to participate in the life, liberty, and happiness of America? Then Obamacare says you must pay a tax on that right. Unbelievable!!

Posted by: MarkV | Apr 22, 2012 11:55:10 AM

There’s a big difference between a tax and a penalty. An Amerikan dissatisfied with US taxes can get the hell out and while traveling and picking up odd jobs overseas will have neither US income tax liability (up to some $90,000 income) nor sales tax liability, obviously.

He will, however, be subject to the Obamacare penalty, regardless of the fact that he is never in the USSA, never spends a dime there, and lives off his wealth, earning not a single penny. And if he gets sick, he will pay for treatment from his own resources or throw himself on the mercies of the Brazilian or other government.

Don’t you see a problem?

Posted by: Jimbino | Apr 20, 2012 7:24:08 PM

Isn’t there something deeply ironic/fundamentally flawed with the notion of turning to the federal judiciary to strike down a law for not being enacted in a politically accountable fashion?

Posted by: Michael Teter | Apr 20, 2012 5:05:41 PM

If this were a tax, then President Obama would not have signed it into law (at least if you believe him). If you accept this, than there is a difference between a penalty and a tax.

Posted by: AlinVA | Apr 20, 2012 4:19:22 PM

One other point in response to JHA: opponents of the mandate have characterized it as violative of individual liberty, as a fundamental and pernicious change in our federal structure, and so on.

Surely whatever political accountability follows someone who votes for such a dastardly piece of legislation at least matches the accountability associated with support for a contingent and rarely-to-be-paid tax of $800 or whatever.

Moreover, the same cast of political characters who oppose the mandate have no problem declaring that those who voted for it are tax-and-spend fanatics, etc. So whatever bite the tax accusation has, it doesn’t seem to stop people from voting for these parading horribles of Congress.

Posted by: jonah gelbach | Apr 20, 2012 3:48:32 PM

Thanks, BDG and JHA. I should have said explicitly what was evident from the post, and that is I asked my question from the position of someone who knows little about the problem. (Although I did listen to a lot of the arguments, because I was in a long car ride at the time.)

JHA, I don’t see a major political accountability difference between a tax and a tax rate, for example, between a surtax on income derived from rent of real property, and differential rates for various types of income, including a higher rate for rental income from real property.

GJC

Posted by: Jack | Apr 20, 2012 3:24:36 PM

My colleague Erik Jensen has written what I think is the definitive piece on the problems of characterizing the mandate as a tax: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1683462

All that said, it would likely be constitutional for Congress to increase taxes on everyone and then provide a tax credit for the purchase of qualifying insurance plans. What’s the difference? Political accountability. As the Court explained in McCulloch, there must be political accountability for uses of the taxing power, to taxes must come as taxes.

JHA

Posted by: Jonathan H. Adler | Apr 20, 2012 10:34:07 AM

Indeed, Jack, and well said. See also, e.g., http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/SEIU+amicus+%2811-398%29.pdf.

And, not to be tedious on this point, since I’ve said it about 15,000 times, but the letters “tax” may be the most frequently appearing syllable in section 5000A, with the possible exception of “and.” At a minimum, as the amicus brief signed by this commenter said, it’s ambiguous whether Congress intended to abandon its characterization of the provision as a “tax.” http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Constitutional+Law+Scholars+amicus+%2811-398%29.pdf

Posted by: BDG | Apr 20, 2012 10:33:05 AM

Rob Williams Doesn’t Take Censorship of his Scholarship Lying Down

My Arizona colleague Rob Williams, the E. Thomas Sullivan Professor of Law, has his work censored when a text that included it was exiled from the Tuscon Unified School District’s reading list. He did not like it, and he told the school board so in this video–the word “barbarians” was used, and not as a compliment.

This was part of Arizona’s effort to eliminate ethnic studies from public schools in Arizona. Here’s The Daily Show, interviewing one of the school board members Rob “chatted” with.

The Daily Show Get More: Daily Show Full Episodes,Political Humor & Satire Blog,The Daily Show on Facebook

It is remarkable that a legal scholar’s work made it into a high school text, and remarkably sad that the State of Arizona has made such a concerted effort to destroy ethnic studies in Tucson.

Posted by Jack Chin on April 20, 2012 at 01:04 AM

Comments

There is a suit going on. But as you might imagine, the state’s argument is that the Mexican American studies program is different from the others, only it “generates resentment.”

Posted by: Jack | Apr 20, 2012 1:45:59 AM

Wow, that “hearsay” guy (I don’t remember his name) was really stupid. Who the hell is “Rosa Clark”? If you want to be an idiot, fine, be an idiot. But why go into local government and affect the lives of children while being willfully moronic? I don’t get it.

Has there been any talk of an equal protection lawsuit? It seems like the city is singling out the Mexican American population.

Posted by: Brando Simeo Starkey | Apr 20, 2012 1:41:05 AM

Arizona v. United States: Criminalizing Failure to do the Impossible

The amicus briefs in the SB1070 case are as good and interesting as in any case I have seen. They include briefs from states, members of Congress, and law enforcement authorities on both sides. There is also a brief from former Democratic and Republican cabinet secretaries opposing the law.

The Brief for the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and other groups was written in part by NYU Law students who I had the privilege of chatting with by email when they were drafting it . One important argument they advance, which I have not seen elsewhere, is that Section 3 of SB1070 criminalizes a failure to comply with a duty under the Immigration and Nationality Act which, under the intracacies of federal law, does not in fact exist.

Section 3 makes it an Arizona crime to fail to register with the federal government as required under 8 U.S.C. 1302(a). Failure to register as required is indeed a federal crime. But it is not a crime which people who enter without inspection, that is, most undocumented immigrants, can commit. This is because the statute directs the federal authorities to promulgate forms to carry out the registration program. They have done so, but none of those forms are directed to, or appropriate for, undocumented people to fill out. The forms (and thus the requirements) are all aimed at people entering the United States lawfully, or who have access to some path to lawful presence. This has been clear at least since the Eisenhower Administration promulgated a list of registration forms aimed at lawful residents and visitors.

The United States could, of course, draft and make available a form for undocumented people, and anyone who willfully failed to file would be in violation of the law. They have not done so, possibly because they regard it as unlikely that they would get many takers, and existing legal tools and penalties are sufficient to remove and punish those here without authorization. In addition, 8 USC 1304(d) requires the issuance of a receipt or other immigration document to anyone who registers. If undocumented people were subject to registration, and could register, this section implies that they would, by so doing, become legal!

The brief’s punch line: “Since EWIs will have no way to comply with this phantom registration requirement, Section 3 will criminalize their presence in this country.This is in direct conflict with Congress’s decision not to criminalize mere presence. All legislative proposals to criminalize mere presence have failed.”

This little jewel of an argument makes clear what critics of the law have been saying from the beginning: States generally do not have the knowledge of immigration law to make these kinds of subtle policy choices. When they blunder ahead anyway, their basic purpose is not to help carry out the federal program, but to go beyond it, to impose punishments, restrictions and requirements that Congress and the officials designated by Congress to carry out the law have chosen not to.

Posted by Jack Chin on April 19, 2012 at 09:15 PM

Comments

If 1302 isn’t applicable to undocumented workers, doesn’t that mean they can’t be prosecuted for non-compliance under 1070? For example, setting aside the federalism concerns, a state law making it a crime for every non-lobbyist to violate the registration requirements for lobbyists would apply to a set of precisely zero people.

So yes, poor drafting, but a self-defeating constitutional argument, no?

Posted by: AndyK | Apr 23, 2012 11:34:58 AM

I wish someone would take a look at Louisiana Revised Statute 14:100.13. This statute – bootstrapped onto a response to 9/11 – makes it a FELONY for a person with ‘unlawful presence’ to drive in Louisiana. Cross-examining the officers leads one to the conclusion that they don’t understand immigration law either. The ‘secretary’ was supposed to designate exactly what ‘documentation’ satisfies the statute, but to my knowledge, that has not happened. The 4th circuit (New Orleans) held the law unconstitutional and our Sup Ct denied writs. The 1st circuit (Baton Rouge and surrounding parishes) has repeatedly upheld the law, also with our Sup Ct denying writs.

I’ve argued that the true purpose of this prohibition was to make those arrested guilty of an ‘aggravated felony’ for removal purposes, thereby subjecting them to higher priority for Immigration holds. That concept has been refined since then but…

I’ve literally had a case where a ‘native’ drunk driver hit a hispanic driver and while he was charged with a misd. (DWI), she was charged with a felony (i call it driving while mexican). I’m hoping with the Farmers’ Branch decision and whatever the Sup Ct says in Arizona’s case can finally get this law overturned.

Posted by: Shawn | Apr 21, 2012 8:52:26 AM

http://www.franklinmarshallshops.com/2012-new-franklin-marshall-c-229.html

Posted by: summer | Apr 20, 2012 8:47:29 PM

Thanks for the interesting article, the Arizona immigration laws are currently quite the hot topic. I think that despite the anti-immigration arguments many Americans try to defend, there are not many Americans vying for the dish washing jobs, and much of our economy is aided by the work done by immigrants. I agree it is not the fault of immigrants who were not inspected, and it seems backwards that they should be sent back home after establishing a life and doing the labor intensive work in this country that no one else wants to do.

Posted by: Mandy | Apr 20, 2012 5:29:53 PM

I quite agree. SB1070, in general, was sloppily drafted, a botch job.

Posted by: Jack | Apr 20, 2012 5:06:49 PM

Thank you, Professor Chin, for highlighting this argument.

It’s almost as if Arizona is legislating in a time warp. While Section 3 does not “parallel” today’s federal registration scheme, arguably it parallels the scheme of the 1940’s and 50’s, when the federal government was primarily concerned with identifying and deporting Communist sympathizers. But, as you point out, the concept of a comprehensive affirmative registration requirement in 2012 is anachronistic.

It seems that Arizona is trying to finagle back-door criminalization. Most EWIs, while subject to civil removal proceedings, are simply not subject to criminal penalties under the federal scheme. Although illegal entry constitutes a misdemeanor, it is governed by the federal five-year statute of limitations. That means that the 90+% of unauthorized immigrants who entered before 2005 are not chargeable under this provision. Dissatisfied with a mostly civil federal immigration system and in the name of “attrition,” Arizona has plucked vestigial language from the 1940 Alien Registration Act in order to create its own permanent criminal dragnet for EWI’s.

Posted by: Jordan Wells and Natasha Rivera-Silber | Apr 20, 2012 4:54:48 PM

DrGrishka, I agree that the undocumented non-citizen’s rights claim is weak or non-existent. The argument has to be based on a state’s lack of power to regulate immigration under their inherent powers.

Jack

Posted by: Jack | Apr 20, 2012 12:42:17 AM

Very interesting. I wonder though (assuming that the amicus has the federal law right) whether an argument that SB 1070 criminalizes presence not in the United States, but in the State of Arizona by someone who has no authorization to be there could be successful. Sure, Congressional proposals to criminalize mere presence everywhere in the country have failed, but that’s not what Arizona does (or can do). I don’t think that that is a particularly strong argument in light of constitutional right to travel, but perhaps the answer to that is that that right does not extend to illegal immigrants who have no right to be in the country in the first place (irrespective of criminal penalties).

Posted by: DrGrishka | Apr 19, 2012 11:20:53 PM