This Sixth Circuit decision cannot be right.
Hess, an observer at a Michigan election recount procedure (who sounds like a crazy pain-in-the-ass), told someone in a public gathering that they should “hang” the county director of elections for “treason.” Hess was arrested and prosecuted under the state terrorist-threat statute. While his case was ongoing, the state court of appeals in a different case declared the state law invalid for failing to comply with the state-of-mind requirement of Counterman v. Colorado. The state court dismissed the prosecution on Hess’s motion (rejecting the state’s request for a stay). Hess then filed a § 1983 action to enjoin future enforcement; the district court granted the P/I. The state courts continue wrestling with the validity of state law–the state supreme court reversed the court of appeals declaration of invalidity; the court of appeals implied a recklessness mens rea into the statute; and the state supreme court agreed to review that decision. Shortly after the district court granted the P/I, the state moved to reinstate the charges against Hess; that motion is stayed pending resolution of the federal appeal.
The Sixth Circuit held that Younger abstention did not apply. Granting the P/I constituted “proceedings of substance on the merits” in the federal court prior to initiation of state proceedings. The court also agreed that Hess showed likelihood (if not certainty) of success on the merits in showing that his statement did not constitute an unprotected true threat.
But: Hess could not show irreparable harm. Pre-enforcement EpY/§ 1983 litigation stops future enforcement against future speech; it is not an appropriate vehicle for stopping future enforcement against past speech. Once an individual has engaged in some (arguably) protected speech, he has an adequate remedy at law through defensive nullification in the presumptively good-faith state prosecution. Of course, that opportunity reflects the “equity” piece of Our Federalism. And labeling a preliminary injunction against a threatened state criminal prosecution one of the “most dramatic remedies in a federal court’s arsenal” reflects the “comity” piece of Our Federalism. In other words, in a case where Our Federalism does not compel abstention because of how the litigation process went, the court smuggles Our Federalism into the injunction analysis to achieve the same result.
Again, this cannot be right.
It is true that most pre-enforcement actions involve attempts to stop prosecution of future speech rather than past speech. Practical rather than legal reasons explain this: The state likely can commence enforcement before plaintiff’s federal action commences; the state certainly can commence enforcement before the federal action gets too far (i.e., responding to the federal action by commencing the state action, the “reverse removal” that Justice Stewart warned about). And the plaintiff may have trouble establishing standing–where the state has not moved quickly to prosecute prior speech, it may suggest the absence of an imminent threat and thus an imminent injury. Limiting EpY to lawsuits about planned future speech carries that practical conclusion to a new place.
The idea is also inconsistent with Younger‘s “proceedings of substance on the merits” limitation. A speaker avoids Younger if he can commence and pursue federal litigation before the state commences enforcement. But the state commences enforcement against past speech, not unspoken future speech. If a federal court may consider how far federal proceedings have progressed in deciding whether to abstain in deference to state proceedings targeting that past speech, it must follow that a speaker can pursue federal litigation to stop enforcement against past speech and use the state of federal proceedings to keep the case in federal court. If the Sixth Circuit were correct, courts would never make the “proceedings of substance” inquiry or consider abstention–the injunction would be denied on grounds of lack of irreparable harm.
[Update: On further review, the Sixth Circuit’s approach is inconsistent with Younger itself. Harris had engaged in prior Communist speech; Miranda had shown Deep Throat; M&L had held past nude dancing in the bar. True, the Court declined to hear each case. But the reasoning matters. In each, the Court invented a reason (Our Federalism) not to exercise jurisdiction. Were the Sixth Circuit correct, SCOTUS would have exercised jurisdiction but concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to those injunctions. That SCOTUS took the former path suggests that plaintiffs can pursue actions and obtain injunctive relief to stop present and future enforcement against past, completed speech]
Moreover, absent a pending state proceeding triggering Younger, we fall back to Ex parte Young. EpY identified as one reason for federal litigation the risk that the state will not pursue enforcement, leaving the railroad uncertain of its rights and without recourse to vindicate those rights and determine its permissible activities. The threat of enforcement hovers over Hess (insert Sword of Damocles reference), at least until the statute of limitations has run. EpY, § 1983, and the Declaratory Judgment Act all seem to authorize Hess to stop the Sword from dangling, at least until the state pursues enforcement.
Finally, I do not believe this squares with First Choice. Plaintiffs there challenged an already-issued subpoena that targeted past activity, including past and ongoing donor records. Those plaintiffs did not limit their action (and SCOTUS did not require them to limit their action) to stopping future subpoenas. And the Court clearly rejected the idea that defending eventual state enforcement proceedings an adequate remedy at law to avoid irreparable harm.
I am more accepting of Younger and other limits on federal adjudication, limits that force rights-holders to pursue state defensive nullification. If the state wants to prosecute Hess and initiates those proceedings, I generally believe defending those proceedings offers him sufficient protection. But I stop at the idea that § 1983 is categorically unavailable for litigation over past speech or constitutionally protected conduct when state enforcement has not begun.
