DJA and non-liability in private suits

Rocky and my third article on S.B. 8 tried to show that the law’s consequence–forcing individuals to face and defend private civil litigation enforcing constitutionally suspect laws–did not create a new conundrum. It reflected the world that defamation defendants have faced since the events giving rise to New York Times.

But here is a different framing: Where is the Ex parte Young counterpart for privately enforced laws? Must the target of privately enforced laws act at her peril, breach her legal obligations, and defend the subsequent suit? The Declaratory Judgment Act plays that role in insurance and IP cases–a potential patent infringer can obtain a declaration of non-infringement or invalidity, rather than infringing and defending (on those grounds) the infringement action seeking treble damages, an injunction, and attorney’s fees.

But ordinary tort litigants–the speaker who might face a defamation action or the abortion provider who might face an S.B. 8 action or the web designer who might face a discrimination suit–generally do not try this. My assumption had been they choose to lay low and hope the suit never comes.1

But perhaps, as the Southern District of New York suggests, the option is unavailable.

Journalist Michael Wolff published some statements about Melania Trump’s connections to Jeffrey Epstein. Trump sent a demand letter (a required precursor to a defamation action under Florida law), demanding a retraction and threatening a $ 1 billion lawsuit. Wolff filed an action in New York state court, seeking a DJ that his speech was protected and that any lawsuit would violate New York’s anti-SLAPP law. Melania removed

The court exercised its discretion to decline to hear the DJA.2 The court questioned whether Article III or the DJA allow pre-emptive suits absent a contractual relationship as a way for a federal court to “conduct pre-publication review of potentially defamatory statements made by and about private parties.” But it did not have to resolve that issue, because the demand letter showed Melania believed Wolff’s statements to be tortious and thus created the necessary Article III concreteness.

Nevertheless, the court abstained under Wilton, the multi-factor balancing courts apply to pure DJA actions. In essence, the court held that Wolff’s action subverts the ordinary and appropriate course of private speech-tort litigation over past, completed speech–defensive litigation and defensive nullification. And the judge made clear that she was not pleased with having to exercise that discretion, rather than never having to have dealt with this action; she accuses Wolff of engaging in gamesmanship and forum-shopping, abusing the judicial system, and undertaking a “brazen attempt to ‘short-circuit'” Melania’s litigation strategy.

In other words, at least with respect to potential defamation actions over past speech and other non-contractual conduct,there is no EpY counterpart for stopping future private civil litigation.3 And bringing this back to S.B. 8, no EpY counterpart to a potential civil action over a past unlawful abortion.

  1. The exception kind of proves the point. MGM sued the hundreds of people killed or injured in the Mandalay Bay shooting, seeking DJs that it was not liable in tort due to a federal anti-terrorism statute. MGM voluntarily dismissed the suits in response to bad publicity and terrible optics of suing murder victims. I use the complaints in Fed Courts to teach Skelly Oil and preemeption. ↩︎
  2. After finding diversity jurisdiction in what I expect to use for my Civ Pro essay next spring. ↩︎
  3. Alternatively, private and public litigation do exist in parallel for the opposite reason. Because EpY is unavailable to stop future public prosecution of past speech, the DJA is similarly unavailable to stop future private enforcement against past speech. ↩︎