Federal judges in Florida struggle with NYT and actual malice

Last week a judge on the Southern District held that Trump plausibly alleged actual malice by alleging ill-will and personal animosity. This week a judge on the Middle District held that Trump plausibly alleged actual malice because the challenged false statements (suggesting Trump committed complex tax and financial crimes) were not supported by detailed forensic analysis and legal and factual research and the reporters and publishers did not seek or obtain that rigorous analysis.

Like last week’s decision, this decision seems so wrong on the law as to warrant defendants taking a shot at mandamus.

The court’s approach1 creates a presumption of actual malice if the challenged statements describe sufficiently complex conduct that truth can be established only with expert analysis and opinion. Rather than speech being protected unless the defendant knew the statements were false, the speech is unprotected if the defendant fails to conduct the complex analysis to determine the statements were true. The court infers knowledge of falsity from failure to perform (or hire) that expert analysis.

This endangers a large swath of political expression. A person criticizing or warning about the dangers of complex public policy (“cutting USAID will cause millions of deaths”) must have legal, factual, and empirical support to make those statements. It also would seem to require legal research to support statements of opinion or of hyperbole–no one could say Elon Musk “murdered” children in Africa because consulting with an expert would show that this is legally impossible.

Another point, filed under “process matters but don’t overread process stuff.” This case made news in September 2025 when the judge sua sponte struck the original (85-page, 156-paragraph) complaint for including “many, often repetitive, and laudatory (toward President Trump) but superfluous allegations,” “persistently alleged in abundant, florid, and enervating detail.” I cheered the move, although I argued the judge erred by purporting to apply Rule 8 as the basis to strike under 12(f), even if he reached the correct end. I also urged everyone to calm down–not to read this as another judicial repudiation of Trump but as a justified-but-small procedural step.

At the same time, I wrote at the time that the judge might have done this “to signal his views on the merits of the pleading, hoping the attorneys will give up the ghost” and not attempt to replead what the judge believes is a nonsense case. Clearly I got that one very wrong.

Finally, we might ask whether this wave of bad district court decisions reflects the new project among (some) conservative judges to overrule NYT. These decisions help tee-up opportunities to overrule the decision (and its progeny), in appeals brought by defendants (rather than plaintiffs who the decision hurts). These bad decisions demonstrate the impossibility of applying actual malice, offering another reason to overrule.

  1. Which somewhat came from nowhere. The court correctly stated the legal standard for actual malice and the pleading standard under Twiqbal. It then applied (without citation or discussing similar cases) a completely different standard in the last three substantive pages of the opinion. ↩︎