What district courts can and cannot do

The conflict between Judge Novak (E.D. Va.) and maybe-U.S. Attorney Lindsey Halligan continues, with Halligan signing a brief (also naming Pam Bondi and Todd Blanche) responding to the order to show cause. Much as I hate to say it, the government is right on the particulars, if not on the obnoxious rhetoric.

The government is correct in arguing that:

• It need not follow Judge Currie’s reasoning that Halligan was improperly appointed in other cases. The government cites CASA for this point, although this is not a situation of injunctions or equitable relief; Judge Currie dismissed indictments in criminal cases. Rather, the conclusion follows from general departmentalist principles–the executive need not follow judicial precedent (certainly not district court precedent) in other cases. It puts this in stark-but-correct terms: “The United States is not required to treat her reasoning as law in any other case.”

• One district court does not create binding precedent in that district or even for that judge. The government does not violate the order of one judge by pursuing a contrary position in a different case.

• I like this framing: “That Judge dismissed two indictments based on her disagreement” with the United States’ position as to Halligan’s appointment “does not prevent the United States from otherwise maintaining it.” Some liberal news sources–adopting judicial supremacy (at least where they like the judicial opinion)–are making fun of Halligan using the term “disagreement.” They suggest ir hints of administration lawlessness, as if the force of a court’s ruling as less than law. In fact, when talking about precedent (especially district court precedent) across cases, that is all it is.

Again, this could have been avoided had Judge Novak framed this not as his being bound by Judge Currie’s order and instead as his agreeing (in his independent view) with Currie’s order and therefore taking some steps (dismissing the indictment, striking Halligan’s name, whatever) consistent with that view in this case. An individual judge can use threats of attorney discipline and other sanctions to compel the government to follow his view of the law in the litigation before him. That is neither a “gross abuse of power” nor an “affront to separation of powers;” that is how courts control the litigation and compel party acquiescence before them.

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