Standing orders, non-universality, and non-binding precedent

Jack Preis (Richmond) responded to my post about the USAO in E.D. Va. continuing to list Lindsey Halligan as US Attorney on court filings, despite a prior ruling that her appointment was invalid.

He agrees that one district judge cannot bind another district judge on the appointment’s validity. But he wonders what one district judge can do about a series of cases before him listing Halligan as US Attorney. Under CASA, the judge must enter a new order disqualifying Halligan in each case, relying on his prior decisions. Jack calls this “tedious. And he wonders whether that judge could instead issue a standing order, applicable in all criminal prosecutions, prohibiting Halligan from appearing (or being named) as US Attorney in prosecutions before him.

This is interesting, but I am not sure it works or is necessary.

For not working: I doubt a court can use a standing order for non-routine matters or matters that require, at least formally, legal and/or factual findings. In the same way, a court could not issue a standing order that a particular federal law is constitutionally invalid and dismissing all attempted prosecutions. The court must go through the motions on anything that requires detailed analysis.

The federal government made this basic argument in suing the District of Maryland over its standing order imposing mandatory administrative stays in habeas actions by alien detainees. The government argued that the court cannot issue the stay without doing the necessary equitable analysis. Thus the court cannot use a pre-filing order–by definition not grounded in the facts of one case. (The trial court rejected an offensive challenge to the policy on other grounds). Similarly, the court cannot determine the validity of Halligan’s name on a filing before the paper has been filed.

Perhaps the court could write the necessary legal and factual findings into the standing order. It then could say something like “so long as these conditions remain, Lindsey Halligan’s name cannot appear as US Attorney in any court documents before this court and the court will struck her name from any such documents.” The government then could try to show what facts have changed.

In an event, I do not think it is necessary; thanks to modern technology, issuing a new order in each case is not as tedious as it might be. The judge could draft a form order citing Case 1 as the basis for concluding Halligan’s appointment is invalid in this new case and she cannot appear and ordering her name struck. The clerk would fill-in the caption and date and the judge would sign it. Easy enough. Administratively tedious, perhaps, but not a real burden on the court.

In the late ‘90s, Milton Shadur of ND Ill. went on a campaign of trying to prod defendants into actually following Rule 8(b) and (c) in drafting Answers. He issued a series of virtually identical orders in multiple cases, calling out common misdeeds (“neither admit nor deny;” “the contract speaks for itself;” “this is a legal conclusion to which no response is required;” pleading a kitchen-sink of affirmative defenses without factual support) and demanding that the defendant end the “Pervasive & Impermissible flouting of crystal-clear directives.” My guess is he pre-drafted the basic form of the order.

Update: Jack agrees with the above but adds another idea: Perhaps a judge would relish the idea of holding an in-person hearing on a new order to show cause in each case–dragging Halligan from Alexandria on a daily basis may cause Halligan to change course.

Judicial departmentalism operates in this precise way. The executive can continue to follow its views, but the court wields tools (up to and including contempt and ethics referrals) to impose and enforce the judicial view within each case. Based on events of the past year, those tools appear less effective than we imagined, given the combination of executive recalcitrance and a tendency (especially among reviewing courts) to give the administration the benefits of many doubts and a lot of rope. Maybe, at least on some issues, we are seeing the end of that rope.