SLAPP motions after Berk v. Choy (Update)

Typically excellent analysis of Berk v. Choy in the latest Divided Arguments podcast. They raise three questions that I want to follow on (in furtherance of my original post on the case.

First, they question whether Rule 3 (the focus of JusticeJackson’s opinion) can do all the work–imagine state law allowing filing without an AoM but required dismissal. Jackson identified a second rule–Rule 12(d). By compelling dismissal of a complaint that lacked an accompanying AoM, state law required courts to look outside the four corners of the pleading in deciding whether to dismiss. This is not a Rule 8 conflict (as the majority held), because plaintiffs can provide more than Rule 8’s minimum “short and plain statement,” so the state law does not undermine Rule 8(a)(2) in adding more. The issue is whether an action can be dismissed for failing to provide more than what 8(a)(2) requires, including through a non-pleading. This presents a Rule 12(d) conflict, as state law requires courts to consider something outside the pleadings (the AoM) in deciding whether to dismiss. I said at the time that I thought Jackson had the better of the argument. Several people on the Civ Pro Listserv agree.

Second, Will raises the circuit split over SLAPP motions. The circuit split had moved entirely in one direction since the first two decisions; the prevailing view for the past 15 years is that SLAPP motions do not apply in federal court.1

The prevailing non-application position reads FRCP 12(b)(6) and 56 to form an exclusive two-prong mechanism for pre-trial disposition, leaving no room for a state law mechanism combining or filling the gaps. Even when that state mechanism serves substantive purposes. I believe the majority and concurrence in Berk reinforce that. The majority requires courts give federal rules their plain meaning and not (as Justice Ginsburg argued and Justice Jackson argues) to interpret them narrowly “with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory policies.” But the SLAPP-applies position requires such a narrowing construction–Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, read narrowly and in light of the state’s substantive concerns for free speech, are not exclusive and leave room for the SLAPP motion to operate. Berk‘s plain-language command requires courts to read those rules to cover the field, leaving state law no room to operate. Justice Kavanaugh–who wrote the leading opinion on the issue on D.C. Cir–almost certainly would reach that conclusion.

While Justice Jackson is willing to interpret rules with sensitivity to state interests, she read Rules 3 and 12(d) capaciously to stop any. I doubt she would read Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 any less capaciously.

Finally, I agree with Will that this decision may prompt states to be more straightforward in their tort-reform efforts. Rather than creating procedural mechanisms to achieve substantive goals (e.g., protecting doctors from liability and high med mal insurance costs and allowing them to provide medical services to the state), states will change substantive liability rules to achieve those goals. And as I have long argued, a state can achieve its anti-SLAPP goals through fee-shifting, which will not conflict with the FRCP and thus should apply in federal court.2

  1. Update: I forgot about this one: The en banc Ninth Circuit in October remained an outlier. It overruled precedent to hold that denials of SLAPP motions are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine but did not reach whether SLAPP provisions apply at all. Two concurrences fought that issue out. ↩︎
  2. Update: More on the Ninth Circuit. Judge Bennett’s concurrence argued that the special motion and fee-shift should apply in federal court. But the Ninth Circuit had done something unique. It incorporated the SLAPP motion into either Rule 12 or Rule 56, depending on what the parties offered. The federal court thus does not really apply state law and does not really grant an anti-SLAPP motion; it grants a 12(b)(6) or SJ. It also means that the fee-shift provision stands alone in authorizing fees whenever the plaintiff prevails; the fee-shift thus applies to all cases under a relatively unguided Erie analysis. ↩︎